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Trade

The United States doubles down on its tech war with export and IP controls that target China but also hit Taiwan and South Korea

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People visit the stand of NVIDIA during the 11th China Digital Entertainment Expo and Conference, known as ChinaJoy 2013, in Shanghai, China, 25 July 2013 (Photo: Oriental Image via Reuters).

Author: June Park, Schmidt Futures

The United States has unleashed its arsenal to go ‘full throttle’ in the chip war against China regardless of the potential consequences, including the impact on its allies. On 7 October 2022, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the US Department of Commerce laid out high level export controls on supercomputers and semiconductors to China.

The market was shaken in September 2022 by restrictions on the sale of graphic processing units by Nvidia and Advanced Micro Devices to China. Companies had already begun to pull their staff out of China in response to new controls prohibiting US citizens from supporting the development and production of chips in Chinese firms.

The new license requirements for items destined to a chip fabrication facility in China are blocked subject to a number of thresholds. The new measures are meant to halt Chinese chip companies at their current levels of progression. Ten days after the BIS announced the reinforced export controls, the US International Trade Commission announced a Section 337 investigation into semiconductors in response to two cases filed by the non-practicing entity Daedalus Prime LLC, which holds intellectual property of US chipmaker Intel against Qualcomm, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company and Samsung.

The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company and South Korea’s Samsung and SK Hynix have received one-year waivers from the BIS regulations, but the doors may soon close on upgrading their businesses in China. SK Hynix is reluctantly contemplating selling or relocating its equipment in China to South Korea.

The BIS move comes at a time when the US Department of Commerce, in concert with the US Trade Representative, is soliciting Asian counterparts to join the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Yet US President Joe Biden’s ‘Made in America’ initiative is concurrently aiming to increase the domestic production of semiconductors via the CHIPS and Science Act and the CHIPS for America Fund, and to re-shore other high-tech industries involving clean energy via the Inflation Reduction Act. This is all in the pursuit of US supremacy in emerging industries.

The BIS export controls have been met with disillusionment from allies, particularly as the measures are being imposed on them without clear incentives, while the US Department of Commerce is still approving most US tech exports to China. Seoul has frowned upon US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo’s diversion of a Taiwanese silicon wafer firm GlobalWafers’ investment bound for South Korea to Texas.

For the United States, the restrictions are not a question of feasibility but are imperative to limiting the transfer of dual-use technology. But for allies, the reality of ‘friend-shoring’ — manufacturing and sourcing components and raw materials within a group of countries that have shared values — raises questions as to whether they can defend their key industries.

US export controls on dual-use technology are not at all new. In 1949, the United States launched the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls against the Eastern Bloc in the aftermath of World War II.

This committee was dissolved upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, but the United States launched the Wassenaar System in 1996 to succeed it. During the US–Japan trade war in the 1980s, the United States did not hesitate to impose measures against its ally. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, originally established in 1975 to study foreign investment, was empowered to reject deals from 1988 by the Exon-Florio Amendment. This revision occurred amid fears of Japanese investment after Japan’s Fujitsu tried to acquire Fairchild Semiconductor.

The United States fortified its unilateral export controls in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001. These export controls were reinforced during the US–China trade war from 2018 under former president Donald Trump. Biden’s tech war now presents an upgraded form of these export controls as uncertainty looms over the US economy.

As Chinese President Xi Jinping enters his third term, the stakes for the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company have been raised by the likelihood of escalation in the Taiwan Strait. The United States has been manoeuvring to compel its East Asian allies — Taiwan, South Korea and Japan — to join the ‘Chip 4 Alliance’, for which the preliminary meeting was held on 29 September 2022.

While the partnership aims to build a more robust semiconductor…

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Fixing fragmentation in the settlement of international trade disputes

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Fragmentation in global trade due to the lack of development in multilateral trade rules at the WTO has led to an increase in FTAs. The Appellate Body impasse has further exacerbated fragmentation, requiring a multilateral approach for reform.

Fragmentation in Global Trade

Fragmentation in global trade is not new. With the slow development of multilateral trade rules at the World Trade Organization (WTO), governments have turned to free trade agreements (FTAs). As of 2023, almost 600 bilateral and regional trade agreements have been notified to the WTO, leading to growing fragmentation in trade rules, business activities, and international relations. But until recently, trade dispute settlements have predominantly remained within the WTO.

Challenges with WTO Dispute Settlement

The demise of the Appellate Body increased fragmentation in both the interpretation and enforcement of trade law. A small number of WTO Members created the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) as a temporary solution, but in its current form, it cannot properly address fragmentation. Since its creation in 2020, the MPIA has only attracted 26 parties, and its rulings have not been consistent with previous decisions made by the Appellate Body, rendering WTO case law increasingly fragmented.

The Path Forward for Global Trade

Maintaining the integrity and predictability of the global trading system while reducing fragmentation requires restoring the WTO’s authority. At the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference in 2022, governments agreed to re-establish a functional dispute settlement system by 2024. Reaching a consensus will be difficult, and negotiations will take time. A critical mass-based, open plurilateral approach provides a viable alternative way to reform the appellate mechanism, as WTO Members are committed to reforming the dispute settlement system.

Source : Fixing fragmentation in the settlement of international trade disputes

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WTO ministerial trading in low expectations and high stakes

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The WTO’s 13th Ministerial Conference is set to focus on e-commerce transparency, investment facilitation, and admitting new members. However, progress may be hindered by disputes, especially regarding fisheries subsidies.

The World Trade Organisation’s 13th Ministerial Conference

The World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) 13th Ministerial Conference is set to take place in Abu Dhabi on 26–29 February, with expectations of deals on electronic commerce transparency, investment facilitation for development, and the admission of Timor Leste and the Comoros as WTO members. Despite these positive developments, the expectations are relatively modest compared to promises made at the 12th Ministerial Conference, which included addressing fisheries subsidies and restoring a fully functioning dispute settlement mechanism by 2024.

Challenges in Dispute Settlement and Agricultural Trade Reform

However, challenges remain, especially in the deadlock of dispute settlement since December 2019 due to a US veto on the appointment of Appellate Body judges. Progress in restoring the dispute settlement mechanism has stalled, and discord continues regarding India’s grain stockholding policy as a potential illegal subsidy. Restoring a fully functioning dispute settlement mechanism hinges on addressing US concerns about perceived bias against trade remedies in relation to China’s state subsidies.

Geopolitical Tensions and the Future of Trade Relations

The likelihood of reaching agreements amid geopolitical tensions between Western democracies and China appears slim, with issues surrounding subsidies and global supply chains causing rifts in trade relations. As nations focus on self-reliance within the global value chain, opportunities for trading face obstacles. Advocacy for open markets and addressing protectionist sentiments remains crucial for fostering resilience to external shocks and promoting economic growth.

Source : WTO ministerial trading in low expectations and high stakes

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Trade

Getting Vietnam’s economic growth back on track

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Vietnam’s economy grew 8% in 2022 but slowed in 2023 due to falling exports and delays in public investments. The economy’s future depends on structural reforms and reducing dependency on foreign investment.

Vietnam’s Economic Roller Coaster

After emerging from COVID-19 with an 8 per cent annual growth rate, Vietnam’s economy took a downturn in the first half of 2023. The drop was attributed to falling exports due to monetary tightening in developed countries and a slow post-pandemic recovery in China.

Trade Performance and Monetary Policy

Exports were down 12 per cent on-year, with the industrial production index showing negative growth early in 2023 but ended with an increase of approximately 1 per cent for the year. Monetary policy was loosened throughout the year, with bank credit growing by 13.5 per cent overall and 1.7 per cent in the last 20 days of 2023.

Challenges and Prospects

Vietnam’s economy suffered from delayed public investments, electricity shortages, and a declining domestic private sector in the last two years. Looking ahead to 2024, economic growth is expected to be in the range of 5.5–6 per cent, but the country faces uncertainties due to geopolitical tensions and global economic conditions.

Source : Getting Vietnam’s economic growth back on track

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