China
China’s economy took centre stage in Xi’s new year address, spinning slow growth as a ‘remarkable’ achievement
Xi Jinping’s New Year address emphasized China’s economic growth and nationalism, while attempting to downplay slowing GDP and high youth unemployment, reflecting the Chinese Communist Party’s increasing insecurity and media control.
Chinese president Xi Jinping delivered his annual televised new year address on December 31, and commentators have been quick to share their interpretation. Some have emphasised Xi’s passing reference to Chinese reunification as a threat against Taiwan. Others have focused on Xi’s comments about China’s economy, framing them as a fearful reaction to Donald Trump’s reelection as US president.
However, these accounts miss the bigger picture. Xi’s new year address speaks to the increasing insecurity of the Chinese Communist party’s (CCP) grip on power. This insecurity is evident in how Xi’s comments, supported by the party’s control of Chinese media, attempted to gaslight the Chinese people.
The mainstay of Xi’s address concerned the economic success of China. He stressed that the Chinese economy is thriving, and explained that China’s total GDP is soon expected to surpass 130 trillion yuan (£14.3 trillion). This equates to a 4.9% increase in GDP over the course of the last 12 months.
Reports on Xi’s address in the Chinese media have taken this a step further. China Daily, the official CCP-owned newspaper often used to communicate the party’s position to the Chinese people, praised Xi’s “heartening speech” and stressed the impressiveness of China’s “remarkable” growth rate. An article published on January 1 explained that other developed economies struggled to average rates of 1.5%.
Omitted from the positive economic commentary of Xi’s address is the reality that China’s economic growth has slowed, falling from 5.2% in 2023. Although a growth rate of 4.9% is impressive relative to other developed economies, it is disappointing within the context of Chinese economic growth. China achieved annual growth rates of over 10% in the 2000s, with GDP even growing by around 13% in some years.
One year ago, in his 2024 address, Xi acknowledged the challenges facing the Chinese economy. He promised economic interventions that would accelerate growth and promote job creation to tackle worrying rates of youth unemployment. However, despite these interventions, China’s economic growth continues to slow and youth unemployment remains high.
Gaslighting the Chinese people
It is perhaps difficult to understand why Xi and the CCP admitted to economic challenges when China’s growth rate was higher and celebrated economic success when growth had slowed. But it makes sense when considered through the lens of “goal-shifting” – an act that goes beyond the positive spin governments put on their country’s economic performance.
Goal-shifting is a form of political gaslighting, in which an established goal is “shifted” to one that is easier to achieve. This has the result of allowing an unfavourable outcome by the standard of the original goal to be presented as an achievement by the standard of the new goal.
If we take China’s 2024 GDP growth of 4.9% as the outcome, it can be viewed unfavourably in comparison with China’s 5.2% growth in 2023. However, by shifting the goal to China having higher GDP growth than other developed economies – a feat that was never truly in doubt – China’s 2024 growth rate can be framed as “remarkable” in Chinese media.
It appears the CCP is using its influence and control over the Chinese media to emphasise the economic message of Xi’s address. In doing so, it is gaslighting the Chinese people by shifting China’s economic goals to downplay the struggling economy. At the same time, the CCP is framing the relative strength of Chinese growth compared to other countries as a success of the party’s economic stewardship.
After decades of growth, China’s economy is beginning to falter.
metamorworks / Shutterstock
Since the 1980s, the CCP has relied on the twin pillars of economics and nationalism to uphold the legitimacy of its government. Economically, its legitimacy was upheld by years of high growth, which has lifted more than 800 million people in China out of poverty. But, with growth slowing over the past decade, the CCP has pivoted towards a reliance on nationalism.
The CCP and China’s nationalist movement have a symbiotic relationship. The CCP promotes nationalistic values in schools and supports nationalist projects throughout China such as historical societies, patriotic statues and museums. This gives nationalist groups a vested interest in supporting the CCP.
However, this relationship is detrimental to the CCP in the long term. The CCP cannot constrain nationalist groups without undermining its own nationalist credentials. This has resulted in scenarios where nationalist groups have acted against the CCP’s wishes, including launching cyber attacks both in China and abroad.
Read more:
Chinese nationalist groups are launching cyber-attacks – often against the wishes of the government
The twin-pillar model the CCP has relied on for decades is faltering. In his previous new year address, Xi took the unprecedented step of acknowledging China’s economic struggles. Reluctant to stir nationalist sentiment, the CCP attempted to use the economic pillar by betting on a reversal of economic fortunes in 2024. This reversal failed to materialise.
The CCP has become increasingly insecure, so Xi’s 2025 new year address adjusted the goals for judging China’s economic performance. Meanwhile, the party encouraged reporting that supported Xi’s address, spinning China’s slowing growth and worsening economic woes as a “remarkable” economic achievement.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Business
China’s Sany Heavy Contemplates Selling Stake in Indian Operations – MSN
China’s Sany Heavy is contemplating selling a stake in its Indian operations, signaling a potential strategic shift in its business approach within the country.
Sany Heavy’s Strategic Move
China’s Sany Heavy Industries is contemplating a stake sale in its Indian operations. This decision aligns with the company’s strategy to streamline its business and enhance operational efficiency in the competitive Indian market.
Implications for India’s Construction Sector
The potential stake sale could significantly impact India’s construction machinery landscape, as Sany is a prominent player in this sector. Investors are closely monitoring the situation, which could lead to increased capital infusion into the market.
Future Prospects
If the stake sale proceeds, it may open up opportunities for new partnerships and investments in the Indian construction industry. Sany’s decision reflects broader trends of foreign companies reassessing their positions in India’s evolving market.
Source : China’s Sany Heavy is considering stake sale in India business – MSN
China
2025 Guide to Accounting and Auditing in China – New Release from China Briefing
China’s new year demands foreign companies navigate complex compliance and financial reporting processes. The updated “Guide to Accounting and Audit in China 2025” aids executives by detailing recent accounting changes, personal information protection audits, tax health checks, and HR audits to ensure compliance.
The start of a new year is a hectic time for foreign companies in China. To meet the various compliance deadlines throughout the year, they need to begin the long and complicated financial reporting process, months in advance. Failure to comply will risk them being hit with deteriorating credit, additional fines, and penalties, and such companies might not be able to remit their profits overseas.
China Briefing’s Guide to Accounting and Audit in China 2025 (3rd Edition), produced in collaboration with the audit experts at Dezan Shira & Associates, aims to walk foreign businesses through the annual audit and compliance process from start to finish, in addition to introducing China’s accounting framework in a comparative context. We hope this guide helps your business add value to its annual statutory audit and compliance reporting in China.
The guide covers the following:
This practical and easy-to-understand guidebook will be of invaluable use to all executives involved in handling company finances concerning China, including:
In this year’s updated version of Guide to Accounting and Audit in China, there are notable changes that require your attention:
New changes to China’s accounting system: In 2024, China made several significant changes to its accounting system, including the amended Accounting Law, the Interim Provisions on Accounting Treatment of Enterprise Data Resources, Interpretation No. 17 on the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises, and updates to the International Financial Reporting Standards and the Accounting System for Non-governmental Non-profit Organizations. We have updated the section “New Changes to China’s Accounting System” to reflect these changes and provide practical advice to help businesses prepare.
Legislative developments in personal information protection audits: Following the release of the Draft Measures for the Management of Personal Information Protection Compliance Audits in 2023, the National Information Security Standardization Technical Committee issued the national standard Data Security Technology – Personal Information Protection Compliance Audit Requirements (Draft for Comments) in July 2024. The Network Data Security Management Regulations, published on September 24, 2024, and effective from January 1, 2025, reaffirm the legal obligation for enterprises to conduct personal information protection compliance audits. However, as of this guide production, the draft measures and standards have not been formally adopted, and most enterprises are still in a wait-and-see mode. We have reflected these developments in the “Other Types of Special Purpose Reviews” section.
Tax health check: With tax compliance becoming more prominent in China, tax health checks, conducted either independently or by engaging professional institutions, have become a popular way for businesses to identify and correct non-compliance issues in their tax handling. This reduces the risk of tax penalties and avoids potential financial and reputational losses. We have included a general overview of the tax health check in the “Other Types of Special Purpose Reviews” section.
Human resources and payroll audit: An HR audit can uncover hidden HR-related problems and errors, as well as potential compliance issues, especially given China’s ever-evolving regulations. This enables organizations to establish best practices, thereby mitigating operational and legal risks. We have added a brief introduction to this type of special-purpose audit, including the suggested frequency and methods.
This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Trump wants China’s help in making peace in Ukraine – he’s unlikely to get it
Trump invited Xi Jinping to his inauguration, aiming to involve China in Ukraine ceasefire talks. However, China’s support for Russia complicates its willingness to assist in negotiations, benefiting from ongoing conflict.
US president-elect Donald Trump has invited China’s president Xi Jinping to his inauguration on January 20 in a surprise move which appears to be part of a plan to involve Beijing in ceasefire negotiations in Ukraine.
Just after his recent meeting with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris, Trump posted, “There should be an immediate ceasefire and negotiations should begin,” and “China can help.” That latter remark has suddenly gained more significance after Trump extended the unusual invitation for the foreign leader to attend the January 20 ceremony.
Leaving aside whether Xi will accept Trump’s invitation to Washington DC (he probably won’t), the more important question is whether he would indeed help Trump end the Russian war against Ukraine.
China has had a strong economic and trading relationship with Russia throughout the war, and has refrained from criticising Putin. While it has denied providing Moscow with military assistance, reports suggest that China has allowed some goods that have battlefield use to be sent to Russia.
On the surface, Trump’s initiative and what China has most recently put on the table with Brazil look like two reasonably well-alligned peace proposals.
Both call for a ceasefire along the current frontlines, followed by negotiations on a permanent settlement. Both seem to accept Russia’s demand to freeze the territorial status quo, which would mean Ukraine would lose the near-20% of its territory that Moscow’s forces have illegally occupied since 2014.
Kyiv and Beijing
Ukraine and most of its western partners continue to reject this as unacceptable. Before Trump’s election victory, this was a sustainable position because the west was able to prevent Ukraine from being militarily defeated on the battlefield.
Trump has invited Xi Jingping to his inauguration.
This position may be slowly changing, but it is not clear that it would suddenly make China a welcome partner for the west in any peace negotiations – least of all for Ukraine.
Kyiv has always been wary of China and its international policies, from the economic and trade Belt and Road Initiative to the recent peace proposal. Zelensky called the China-Brazil peace initiative “destructive”. He also accused China and Brazil of being “pro-Russian”.
Zelensky is personally deeply invested in his own peace plan, particularly as Ukrainians have made enormous sacrifices in the war so far. This does not rule out compromises, but it makes concessions to China, widely seen by Ukrainians as one of Russia’s main supporters in the war, very unlikely.
Even if there was a sudden change of heart in Kyiv, it is highly doubtful that a Trump-brokered deal would serve Beijing’s interests. For Xi it is always about strengthening China’s role and influence as a global power. China will be concerned if the war is over, the US may become even more focused on its trade war with Beijing.
Read more:
Why China is worried about a second Trump presidency – and how Beijing might react
So far, the war in Ukraine has allowed China to benefit from the strain that it has put on the west.
US suggestions that it will pull back on its alliance commitments in Europe have raised doubts over the dependability of the US as an ally for Ukraine. This is becoming more acute as Trump prepares to move into the White House.
The longer the war in Ukraine continues in this way, the longer China will reap the benefits from the reduction of the relative weight of the United States as its main geopolitical and geo-economic rival.
A carefully managed continuation of the war against Ukraine, by contrast, benefits China in asserting its global leadership.
China’s approach to managing the “Ukraine crisis” was reiterarated by Xi at the recent Brics summit in Kazan, Russia, and in a meeting with former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev in Beijing on December 12 2024. It is focused on upholding “three key principles: no expansion of the battlefields, no escalation of hostilities, and no fanning flames, and [striving] for swift deescalation of the situation”.
What’s in it for China?
This is a far cry from an end to the war as envisaged by Trump. A Trump-brokered deal would likely lift sanctions and provide a possibility of renewed, more cooperative relations between the west and Russia.
It would significantly strengthen Putin’s position, contribute to Russia’s international rehabilitation, reduce his country’s dependence on China, and potentially rekindle historical Russia-China rivalries. Trump’s claim that he wants to “un-unite” Russia and China will not have gone unnoticed in Beijing.
And even if Trump did not manage to drive a wedge between Russia and China, a stronger Kremlin would mean a shift of the power dynamic in the partnership between Moscow and Beijing, potentially elevating Putin from a junior partner to Xi’s peer.
From a Chinese perspective, helping Trump to broker a deal between Russia and Ukraine offers few incentives, except potentially toning down the US trade and tariffs war against it. Draining the west’s resources in defending Ukraine keeps it away from the Indo-Pacific region in which most of the competition between China and the US will play out.
Xi has no interest in seeing Putin being strategically defeated in Ukraine, but keeping Russia bogged down in its war against Ukraine will ensure that the partnership between Beijing and Moscow will stay on current terms with the balance of power tilted towards China.
Keeping the war in Ukraine going, rather than helping Trump to end it, therefore is the most likely choice that Beijing will make.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.