China
What Trump’s reelection means for relations between regional rivals China and Japan
Trump’s reelection raises concerns about US-China relations, potentially impacting Japan-China ties. While economic cooperation has thrived, historical tensions complicate political collaboration amidst shifting leadership in Japan.
Donald Trump was declared the winner of the US presidential election on November 6, sealing a historic and improbable return to the White House. His reelection has triggered speculation as to the state of world affairs once he assumes office in January.
One of the relationships most speculated on is between the US and China. Trump waged a trade war against China during his first term as president and has now promised higher tariffs on Chinese goods – of 60% or more – at a time when China’s economy is struggling.
But much less discussed is the potential effect of Trump’s policies on relationships between other countries. In the absence of US trade and security guarantees during Trump’s first term, regional rivals China and Japan entered a detente, a period of thawing relations. With Trump’s second term on the horizon, will relations between China and Japan thaw once again?
The Chinese-Japanese relationship is an example of “hot economics, cold politics”. This term, which originated in the early 2000s to describe the distinctive relationship between these two countries, still holds true to today.
Over the next decade, China and Japan have agreed to cooperate on an estimated US$26 trillion (£20 trillion) worth of regional infrastructure projects. And, in 2021, trade between China and Japan edged above US$372 billion (£292 billion). Japan now serves as China’s second-largest trade partner, behind only the US, with China serving as the largest trading partner of Japan.
Yet political animosity is a source of continuing tension. Japan’s invasion of China during the second world war, in which over 20 million Chinese people died, has left an enduring legacy. Anti-Japanese sentiment is a core characteristic of contemporary Chinese nationalism, which routinely calls for vigilance against what it considers to be an inherently militaristic Japanese culture.
A man at a protest in China in 2013 holds a Japanese military flag featuring the word ‘Shame’ alongside a picture of Japan’s former prime minister, Shinzo Abe.
Associated Press / Alamy Stock Photo
Meanwhile, Japan is anxious about a rising China. Japan has been a pacifist nation since the second world war, with Article 9 of its post-war constitution outlawing war as a means to settle international disputes. But the right wing of Japanese politics has long called for constitutional reforms that would allow for Japan’s rearmament to counter China’s rise.
The Article 9 debate is a concern for China, which considers the calls for reform a potential indication of a newly militaristic Japan and, thus, a renewed threat. So, although China and Japan are willing to cooperate extensively on economic matters, unsettled historical issues make political cooperation difficult for the two nations to achieve.
Thawing relations
Revenue from China’s exports to the US fell by US$53 billion in the first nine months of 2019, after the start of Trump’s trade war. Anticipating further reductions in trade with the US, China turned to Japan, the world’s third-largest economy and an established economic partner of China. This led to a 7.3% increase in trade between the two countries.
Japan, on the other hand, relies on the US to guarantee its security through a defence pact signed after the second world war. During Trump’s first term, he questioned the fairness of the agreement. So, with Article 9 reform unlikely due to domestic political opposition and with the US appearing unreliable, the Japanese government sought to secure itself through further economic engagement with China.
This included the reestablishment of high-level economic forums between the two countries, which had been suspended in the early 2010s following anti-Japanese protests in China and a surge of anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan. Japan’s government also consented to Japanese businesses engaging with the belt and road initiative, China’s flagship economic infrastructure and development programme.
The economic relationship between China and Japan became so fundamental to the core interests of both countries that they were willing to temporarily overlook their political animosity. Japan’s prime minister at the time, Shinzo Abe, even visited China in 2018 in what was the first such visit in years.
The detente ended in 2020, when the US and China signed a preliminary trade deal that lessened China’s economic reliance on Japan. And less than a year later, tensions between China and Japan renewed over the Senkaku Islands, an island chain in the East China Sea that is administered by Japan and claimed by China (where they are known as the Diaoyu Islands).
Will we see another detente?
We can expect China and Japan to again look for alternatives to the US for economic stability and security following Trump’s reelection. Trump has already promised to impose high tariffs on goods from China, and is reportedly looking to China hawks such as Michael Waltz and Marco Rubio for key security and foreign policy roles in his cabinet.
He has been less vocal about his plans for the alliance with Japan, but Trump has been critical of Nato countries for falling short of his expectations. It therefore seems likely that he will again take a poor view of Japan’s constitutional pacifism. However, while Trump’s presidency might again push China and Japan closer together, there has been a key change in Japan’s political leadership.
China and Japan were led by Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe respectively during Trump’s first term. Both were long-term leaders of their country and, despite their mutual dislike, there was by the late 2010s a degree of familiarity between Xi, Abe, and their administrations. This familiarity served as a foundation to build the heightened economic cooperation that temporarily overcame political concerns during the first detente.
China’s president, Xi Jinping, shaking hands with the then Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, at a G20 summit in 2016.
plavi011 / Shutterstock
While Xi remains the president of China, Abe resigned from his post in 2020 and was assassinated in 2022. Japan has had three prime ministers since Abe’s resignation, each with their own cabinet, advisers and opinions of China. This has lessened the familiarity between the Chinese and Japanese governments.
Trump’s foreign policies will probably recreate the conditions that caused China’s relations with Japan to thaw during his first term. So, a second detente is by all means possible. But the lack of familiarity between China and Japan’s political leadership could certainly prove a stumbling block.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Business
China’s Sany Heavy Contemplates Selling Stake in Indian Operations – MSN
China’s Sany Heavy is contemplating selling a stake in its Indian operations, signaling a potential strategic shift in its business approach within the country.
Sany Heavy’s Strategic Move
China’s Sany Heavy Industries is contemplating a stake sale in its Indian operations. This decision aligns with the company’s strategy to streamline its business and enhance operational efficiency in the competitive Indian market.
Implications for India’s Construction Sector
The potential stake sale could significantly impact India’s construction machinery landscape, as Sany is a prominent player in this sector. Investors are closely monitoring the situation, which could lead to increased capital infusion into the market.
Future Prospects
If the stake sale proceeds, it may open up opportunities for new partnerships and investments in the Indian construction industry. Sany’s decision reflects broader trends of foreign companies reassessing their positions in India’s evolving market.
Source : China’s Sany Heavy is considering stake sale in India business – MSN
China
2025 Guide to Accounting and Auditing in China – New Release from China Briefing
China’s new year demands foreign companies navigate complex compliance and financial reporting processes. The updated “Guide to Accounting and Audit in China 2025” aids executives by detailing recent accounting changes, personal information protection audits, tax health checks, and HR audits to ensure compliance.
The start of a new year is a hectic time for foreign companies in China. To meet the various compliance deadlines throughout the year, they need to begin the long and complicated financial reporting process, months in advance. Failure to comply will risk them being hit with deteriorating credit, additional fines, and penalties, and such companies might not be able to remit their profits overseas.
China Briefing’s Guide to Accounting and Audit in China 2025 (3rd Edition), produced in collaboration with the audit experts at Dezan Shira & Associates, aims to walk foreign businesses through the annual audit and compliance process from start to finish, in addition to introducing China’s accounting framework in a comparative context. We hope this guide helps your business add value to its annual statutory audit and compliance reporting in China.
The guide covers the following:
This practical and easy-to-understand guidebook will be of invaluable use to all executives involved in handling company finances concerning China, including:
In this year’s updated version of Guide to Accounting and Audit in China, there are notable changes that require your attention:
New changes to China’s accounting system: In 2024, China made several significant changes to its accounting system, including the amended Accounting Law, the Interim Provisions on Accounting Treatment of Enterprise Data Resources, Interpretation No. 17 on the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises, and updates to the International Financial Reporting Standards and the Accounting System for Non-governmental Non-profit Organizations. We have updated the section “New Changes to China’s Accounting System” to reflect these changes and provide practical advice to help businesses prepare.
Legislative developments in personal information protection audits: Following the release of the Draft Measures for the Management of Personal Information Protection Compliance Audits in 2023, the National Information Security Standardization Technical Committee issued the national standard Data Security Technology – Personal Information Protection Compliance Audit Requirements (Draft for Comments) in July 2024. The Network Data Security Management Regulations, published on September 24, 2024, and effective from January 1, 2025, reaffirm the legal obligation for enterprises to conduct personal information protection compliance audits. However, as of this guide production, the draft measures and standards have not been formally adopted, and most enterprises are still in a wait-and-see mode. We have reflected these developments in the “Other Types of Special Purpose Reviews” section.
Tax health check: With tax compliance becoming more prominent in China, tax health checks, conducted either independently or by engaging professional institutions, have become a popular way for businesses to identify and correct non-compliance issues in their tax handling. This reduces the risk of tax penalties and avoids potential financial and reputational losses. We have included a general overview of the tax health check in the “Other Types of Special Purpose Reviews” section.
Human resources and payroll audit: An HR audit can uncover hidden HR-related problems and errors, as well as potential compliance issues, especially given China’s ever-evolving regulations. This enables organizations to establish best practices, thereby mitigating operational and legal risks. We have added a brief introduction to this type of special-purpose audit, including the suggested frequency and methods.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
China
Trump wants China’s help in making peace in Ukraine – he’s unlikely to get it
Trump invited Xi Jinping to his inauguration, aiming to involve China in Ukraine ceasefire talks. However, China’s support for Russia complicates its willingness to assist in negotiations, benefiting from ongoing conflict.
US president-elect Donald Trump has invited China’s president Xi Jinping to his inauguration on January 20 in a surprise move which appears to be part of a plan to involve Beijing in ceasefire negotiations in Ukraine.
Just after his recent meeting with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris, Trump posted, “There should be an immediate ceasefire and negotiations should begin,” and “China can help.” That latter remark has suddenly gained more significance after Trump extended the unusual invitation for the foreign leader to attend the January 20 ceremony.
Leaving aside whether Xi will accept Trump’s invitation to Washington DC (he probably won’t), the more important question is whether he would indeed help Trump end the Russian war against Ukraine.
China has had a strong economic and trading relationship with Russia throughout the war, and has refrained from criticising Putin. While it has denied providing Moscow with military assistance, reports suggest that China has allowed some goods that have battlefield use to be sent to Russia.
On the surface, Trump’s initiative and what China has most recently put on the table with Brazil look like two reasonably well-alligned peace proposals.
Both call for a ceasefire along the current frontlines, followed by negotiations on a permanent settlement. Both seem to accept Russia’s demand to freeze the territorial status quo, which would mean Ukraine would lose the near-20% of its territory that Moscow’s forces have illegally occupied since 2014.
Kyiv and Beijing
Ukraine and most of its western partners continue to reject this as unacceptable. Before Trump’s election victory, this was a sustainable position because the west was able to prevent Ukraine from being militarily defeated on the battlefield.
Trump has invited Xi Jingping to his inauguration.
This position may be slowly changing, but it is not clear that it would suddenly make China a welcome partner for the west in any peace negotiations – least of all for Ukraine.
Kyiv has always been wary of China and its international policies, from the economic and trade Belt and Road Initiative to the recent peace proposal. Zelensky called the China-Brazil peace initiative “destructive”. He also accused China and Brazil of being “pro-Russian”.
Zelensky is personally deeply invested in his own peace plan, particularly as Ukrainians have made enormous sacrifices in the war so far. This does not rule out compromises, but it makes concessions to China, widely seen by Ukrainians as one of Russia’s main supporters in the war, very unlikely.
Even if there was a sudden change of heart in Kyiv, it is highly doubtful that a Trump-brokered deal would serve Beijing’s interests. For Xi it is always about strengthening China’s role and influence as a global power. China will be concerned if the war is over, the US may become even more focused on its trade war with Beijing.
Read more:
Why China is worried about a second Trump presidency – and how Beijing might react
So far, the war in Ukraine has allowed China to benefit from the strain that it has put on the west.
US suggestions that it will pull back on its alliance commitments in Europe have raised doubts over the dependability of the US as an ally for Ukraine. This is becoming more acute as Trump prepares to move into the White House.
The longer the war in Ukraine continues in this way, the longer China will reap the benefits from the reduction of the relative weight of the United States as its main geopolitical and geo-economic rival.
A carefully managed continuation of the war against Ukraine, by contrast, benefits China in asserting its global leadership.
China’s approach to managing the “Ukraine crisis” was reiterarated by Xi at the recent Brics summit in Kazan, Russia, and in a meeting with former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev in Beijing on December 12 2024. It is focused on upholding “three key principles: no expansion of the battlefields, no escalation of hostilities, and no fanning flames, and [striving] for swift deescalation of the situation”.
What’s in it for China?
This is a far cry from an end to the war as envisaged by Trump. A Trump-brokered deal would likely lift sanctions and provide a possibility of renewed, more cooperative relations between the west and Russia.
It would significantly strengthen Putin’s position, contribute to Russia’s international rehabilitation, reduce his country’s dependence on China, and potentially rekindle historical Russia-China rivalries. Trump’s claim that he wants to “un-unite” Russia and China will not have gone unnoticed in Beijing.
And even if Trump did not manage to drive a wedge between Russia and China, a stronger Kremlin would mean a shift of the power dynamic in the partnership between Moscow and Beijing, potentially elevating Putin from a junior partner to Xi’s peer.
From a Chinese perspective, helping Trump to broker a deal between Russia and Ukraine offers few incentives, except potentially toning down the US trade and tariffs war against it. Draining the west’s resources in defending Ukraine keeps it away from the Indo-Pacific region in which most of the competition between China and the US will play out.
Xi has no interest in seeing Putin being strategically defeated in Ukraine, but keeping Russia bogged down in its war against Ukraine will ensure that the partnership between Beijing and Moscow will stay on current terms with the balance of power tilted towards China.
Keeping the war in Ukraine going, rather than helping Trump to end it, therefore is the most likely choice that Beijing will make.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
- China’s Sany Heavy Contemplates Selling Stake in Indian Operations – MSN
- 2025 Guide to Accounting and Auditing in China – New Release from China Briefing
- Trump wants China’s help in making peace in Ukraine – he’s unlikely to get it
- Trump Proposes 10% Tariff on China and Contemplates EU Tariff Measures
- Middle-Ground Trade Policies with China: Essential for Global Growth
- China Reports Agreement on Ceasefire between Myanmar’s Factions
