iClick Interactive announced the completion of its disposal of demand side marketing solutions in mainland China, aiming to improve operational efficiency, liquidity, and profitability to enhance long-term shareholder value.

iClick Interactive Completes Business Disposal

HONG KONG, Nov. 27, 2024 /PRNewswire/ — iClick Interactive Asia Group Limited (NASDAQ: ICLK), a leading online marketing provider in Asia, has finalized the sale of its demand side marketing solutions business in mainland China. This move aligns with a share purchase agreement dated September 11, 2024, signaling a strategic shift for the company.

Enhancing Operational Efficiency

The company plans to enhance operational efficiencies and realign its focus to meet evolving market trends. These initiatives aim to boost liquidity and profitability, potentially increasing long-term shareholder value. iClick aims to leverage its strengths to drive business growth amidst dynamic industry conditions.

About iClick Interactive

Founded in 2009, iClick offers data-driven online marketing solutions across Asia, helping brands optimize performance throughout the consumer lifecycle. For further information, visit iClick’s investor relations. This release contains forward-looking statements about the company’s strategies and performance; actual outcomes may differ.

Source : iClick Interactive Completes Strategic China Marketing Business Divestment | ICLK Stock News

China’s organic product industry is booming, with sales hitting $14 billion in 2023, making it the third-largest globally. The government promotes sustainability and quality through regulations, while understanding the certification process is vital for stakeholders to leverage growth opportunities.

China’s organic product industry is rapidly growing, with sales reaching US$14 billion in 2023, making it the third-largest market globally. The Chinese government is actively promoting this sector through regulations and initiatives to meet sustainable development goals and rising consumer demand for high-quality products. Understanding the certification process and key trends in this industry is crucial for stakeholders looking to capitalize on its lucrative opportunities.

China’s organic product industry is experiencing robust and rapid growth, with total sales reaching US$14 billion in 2023, making it the third-largest organic product consumption market globally.

The Chinese government is actively promoting the organic sector to meet sustainable development goals and rising consumer demand for high-quality food and products. The Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) has introduced regulations on constructing and managing national organic food production bases to standardize the development process. This initiative aims to enhance the supply capacity of green and organic products, driving high-quality growth in the organic industry.

In September 2024, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) released the China Organic Product Certification and Organic Industry Development (2024) report (hereafter, “the report”). The report highlights that organic product sales in China surpassed RMB 100 billion (US$13.8 billion) for the first time, marking a 61 percent increase compared to 2018. Over the past five years, sales have grown at an average annual rate of nine percent, further solidifying China’s position as one of the world’s leading organic consumption markets.

As China’s organic product market continues its rapid expansion, understanding the certification process for organic producers, processors, and handlers will be crucial for future growth. This article will outline the steps required for organic certification and explore key trends shaping the industry’s future.

The China Organic Product Certification program is a government initiative governed by the National Standard GB/T19630-2019, issued by the SAMR. This standard outlines requirements for the production, processing, labeling, and management of organic products. It is designed to regulate the production and trade of organic goods for the Chinese market and applies to both domestically produced and imported products. The current version of the standard, originally published in December 2011, was updated on August 30, 2019, and became effective on January 1, 2020.

Organic agriculture is a fast-growing industry in China. With people’s living standards improving and rising consumer demand for high-quality food and goods, organic agriculture has emerged as one of China’s fastest-growing industries. Organic products, requiring additional investments in production processes and higher care standards, typically command premium prices in the market. Obtaining organic product certification not only increases profitability for producers and handlers but also elevates their market competitiveness.

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On November 5, Palau votes for a new president, with potential implications for its diplomatic ties to Taiwan amidst growing Chinese influence in the Pacific region.

The United States isn’t the only country with a big election on November 5. Palau, a tourism-dependent microstate in the north Pacific, will also vote for a new president, Senate and House of Delegates that day.

Why does this election matter? Palau is one of the few remaining countries that has diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

In addition, elections in the Pacific – and the horse-trading to form government that follows – often present a chance for China to steal an ally away from Taiwan in its efforts to further reduce the self-ruling island’s diplomatic space.

For example, there was speculation Tuvalu could flip its allegiance from Taipei to Beijing based on the outcome of January’s election, but the government decided to remain in Taiwan’s camp.

Another Pacific nation, Nauru, did flip from Taiwan to China in January, less than 48 hours after Taiwan’s own presidential election.

I recently visited Palau as part of a research project examining China’s growing extraterritorial reach, and was curious to see if the balance is shifting towards Beijing in the lead-up to this year’s election.

What’s at stake in Palau’s election?

Palau, a nation of 16,000 registered voters, has close ties to the US. It was under US administration after the second world war and recently signed a “Compact of Free Association” with the US. Palau also has a similar presidential system of government, with a president directly elected by the people every four years.

However, there are also some key differences: there are no political parties in Palau, nor is there any replica of the absurd Electoral College voting system.

The archipelago also has extremely polite yard signs (“Please consider[…]”, “Please vote for […]” and “Moving forward together”). Alliances are based more on clan and kinship relations than ideology (although that’s not entirely dissimilar to the US).

This year’s presidential race is between the “two juniors”: the incumbent, Surangel Whipps Junior, and the challenger, Tommy Remengensau Junior. If either man were facing a different opponent, he would win easily. Nearly all of Palau’s political insiders deem this contest too close to call.

Whipps has been in office since 2021. Accompanied by his beloved father, a former president of the Senate and speaker of the House in Palau, he is expected to door-knock each household at least four times.

Palau President Surangel Whipps Junior speaking at the United Nations in September.
Sarah Yenesel/EPA

Remengensau isn’t a political newbie, either. He’s been president for 16 of Palau’s 30 years as an independent state. In the comments section of the YouTube live feed of a recent presidential debate, one person asked, “you’ve had four terms, how many more do you need?”

Whipps copped flak for his tax policy, but the comments and the debate itself reached Canadian levels of politeness. As the debate wound up, the rivals embraced warmly – befitting their closeness (they are actually brothers-in-law) and their lack of discernible ideological differences.

2024 Palau presidential debate.

A ‘pro-Beijing’ candidate in the race?

However, there is one issue that has the potential to drive a wedge between the two candidates: the China–Taiwan rivalry.

In a recent article for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Remengensau was described as a “pro-Beijing” candidate who might be inclined to switch Palau’s diplomatic relations to Beijing, cheered on by the “China-sympathetic” national newspaper, Tia Belau.

Remengensau’s reaction to the ASPI piece was genuine fury, and aside from a few fly-in lobbyists from the US, no one in the country has taken the characterisation seriously. Yes, he is less pro-US than Whipps, reciting the “friends to all, enemies to none” mantra beloved by Pacific leaders in the debate. But that’s some distance from being “pro-Beijing”.

Other outside commentators have also weighed in with similar viewpoints. Recent pieces by right-wing think tanks, the Heritage Foundation and the Federation for the Defence of Democracies, have pushed a similar line that every Pacific nation is just “one election away from a [People’s Republic of China]-proxy assuming power and dismantling democracy”.

What’s really behind concerns of Chinese influence

The basis for both allegations in the ASPI piece is a fascinating investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP). The story detailed an influence attempt led by a local businessman from China, Hunter Tian, to set up a media conglomerate in Palau with the owner of the newspaper Tia Belau, a man named Moses Uludong. (I played a small part in the investigation.)

The proposed conglomerate had eyebrow-raising links to China’s secret police and military. But COVID killed the deal, and today, the newspaper runs press releases from Taiwan’s embassy without changing a word.

Palau’s media is also ranked as the most free in the Pacific, and Tia Belau is a central part of this healthy media ecosystem.

Uludong is a pragmatic businessman who’s no simple cheerleader for Beijing, explaining to OCCRP’s journalists last year:

The Chinese, they have a way of doing business. They are really not open.

This doesn’t mean Chinese operations in Palau will stop, though. Representatives of the Chinese government like Tian, who is the president of the Palau Overseas Chinese Federation and has impressive family links to the People’s Liberation Army, will keep trying to influence Palau’s elites and media.

Evidence uncovered by Palau’s media suggests some of their elites are vulnerable to capture. In recent months, the immigration chief stepped down for using his position “for private gain or profit”, while the speaker of the House of Delegates was ordered to pay US$3.5 million (A$5.2 million) for a tax violation, in part due to an irregular lease to a Chinese national.

Chinese triads are also now involved in scam compounds and drug trafficking in Palau, which has done little to burnish China’s image among Palauans.

Playing into China’s hands

So, can we expect a dramatic Palau diplomatic flip after November’s election? Not anytime soon.

But labelling respected leaders and media outlets as “pro-Beijing” with no basis, and fabricating a Manichean struggle in a nation where there’s plenty of goodwill for the US, won’t cause China’s boosters in Palau to lose sleep.

Egging on US agencies to “do something” to counter Chinese influence in the Pacific, such as a poorly thought-out influence operation run by the Pentagon in the Philippines during the pandemic, will just play into Beijing’s hands. In the Pacific, secrets don’t stay secret for long. And if you call someone “pro-China” for long enough, one day you might get your wish.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.