China
Putin and Xi: Beijing Belt and Road meeting highlighted Russia’s role as China’s junior partner
The recent Belt and Road Forum in Beijing saw decreased attendance from world leaders, highlighting geopolitical tensions. Vladimir Putin emphasized Sino-Russian cooperation, but trade imbalances reveal Russia’s subordinate role.
The third Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing recently attracted fewer heads of state or senior officials than the previous forums in 2017 and 2019. There were 11 European presidents and prime ministers at the 2019 forum. But last week’s forum attracted only three.
This is understandable, given that the two-day meeting took place against the backdrop of high tension in the Middle East caused by the conflict between Israel and Hamas as well as the war in Ukraine – both wars which have highlighted differences in views on regional and global order between the west and a number of non-western countries.
One enthusiastic participant was the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. For Putin, the forum provided an opportunity to meet other leaders without fear of arrest, given his indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes which had kept him away from September’s Brics summit in South Africa.
While Putin was just one among 20 or so world leaders at the Forum, he was photographed at Xi Jinping’s right hand and given a prominent place in proceedings. Delivering a speech at the forum immediately after the Chinese president and staging a press conference for the Russian media before boarding the plane to Moscow, Putin attempted to convey the message of tight cooperation with China.
He was keen to remind his audience of Russia’s credentials as a UN security council member, together with China, responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. He also noted that he and Xi had discussed both the situation in Gaza and the events in Ukraine, describing these situations as “common threats” which strengthen Sino-Russian “interaction”.
Putin drew particular attention to the high bilateral trade volume between Russia and China, which has reached nearly US$200 billion (£163 billion). This sounds impressive until you remember that the bulk of this trade consists of export of Russian hydrocarbons and other raw materials to China. This is nothing new – in fact trade in hydrocarbons between Russia and China have been boosted by western sanctions.
Perhaps the most instructive aspect of the visit was Putin’s explicit acknowledgement of the different roles played by Moscow and Beijing in international politics. Putin described the Russia-dominated Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) – a concept Moscow has promoted as a response to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that would fuse the Eurasian Economic Union with the BRI – as a regional or “local” project. Meanwhile he happily described the BRI as “global” in scale.
For the past decade, Russian policymakers and experts have consistently held up the GEP as symbolising Russia’s equality with China. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has described it as “the creation of a continent-wide architecture”.
Putin’s words, coupled with the lack of any meaningful results of the meeting (bar a contract on food and agricultural products which has yet to be confirmed by Beijing), illustrate the extent to which Russia’s war against Ukraine has deepened the asymmetry between the two powers.
Holding back?
The lack of genuine progress on the issue of the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline, which will transport gas from Russia’s Yamal gas fields, which used to supply Europe, via Mongolia to China, was further evidence of this asymmetry. Xi was kind enough to express hope that the project could proceed quickly. But he did not outline any concrete steps in that direction.
China’s agreement, if confirmed by a contract, would have been the most clear signal of Beijing’s strategic support for Russia, especially given Gazprom’s shrinking European market. By prolonging negotiations, China seems to be trying to extract specific concessions from Russia, related to the price of gas, possible Chinese ownership of gas fields in Russia, or Beijing’s acquisition of shares in Gazprom.
Meanwhile, in May 2023, China revived the prospect of building the so-called section “D”, enlarging the capacity of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline system, which will bring gas from Turkmenistan via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to China, emphasising China’s other sources of energy supplies.
While continuing to offer Moscow political support and not interfering with Chinese companies’ attempts to take advantage of the exodus of western companies to increase their presence in the Russian market, Beijing has clearly attempted to prevent any embarrassment related to Russia. A gas contract would have overshadowed the BRI summit and generated a strong reaction in the US and Europe, potentially strengthening China hawks in the west.
Beijing making its move
Putin’s delegation was full of ministers and CEOs of key Russian enterprises, from Rosneft and Gazprom to Novatek, so the conclusion of commercial agreements can’t be ruled out, but the probability is low. It is clear that Beijing does not want to be seen to be openly supporting Russia in resisting and bypassing western sanctions.
In the 1990s, Russian officials regularly warned of the dangers of becoming a “raw materials appendage” to China. Today the economic benefits that Russian elites gain from hydrocarbons mean this danger has now become a reality. Russia has locked itself into an economic partnership in which it is the supplicant, a role that Moscow seems happy to play.
But the BRI is not just about economics. It is also a key part of Beijing’s bid to project itself as a “global responsible power”. Beijing has recently outlined what it calls its “Global Security Initiative” which explicitly rejects the Western rules-based order. This comes alongside a “Global Development Initiative” and, nested within these, a “Global Civilisation initiative”. Taken together these question western universalist ideas about human rights and democracy.
China’s thinking has gained traction among many countries of the global south, providing a developmental path without lectures on human rights. China speaks to these countries using its dual identity as both a rapidly developing power and a member of the UN security council. By comparison, notwithstanding its security council position, Russia has few tangible benefits to offer these countries. Last week’s BRI forum has driven this point home.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
Navigating Turbulent Waters: Trust Between China and the Philippines
Despite a July 2024 deal ensuring Philippine resupply missions at Second Thomas Shoal, tensions with China persist, marked by confrontations and deep distrust, indicating potential for future conflict escalation.
Ongoing Tensions in the South China Sea
Despite a July 2024 agreement facilitating uninterrupted resupply missions to the contentious Second Thomas Shoal, tensions between China and the Philippines remain significantly high. Increased aerial and naval confrontations in August, compounded by longstanding mutual mistrust, hint at a precarious situation. Both nations are employing legal strategies alongside military maneuvers, while China’s recent maritime regulations and the Philippines’ military modernization efforts suggest a future marked by conflict.
Rising Provocations and Distrust
The situation deteriorated further in June 2024, when Manila accused Chinese forces of intercepting its boats and injuring a sailor. Although the July deal allowed for a resupply mission without incident, broader tensions persisted as China reportedly fired flares dangerously close to Philippine aircraft in August. The incidents at Second Thomas Shoal illustrate the deepening security crisis that has persisted since 2021, as China continues to challenge Philippine resupply efforts.
Potential for Escalation
While the recent agreement may offer temporary relief, it is unlikely to resolve the long-standing maritime disputes in the region comprehensively. The continuing misinterpretations of the deal and the profound distrust between the two nations suggest an ongoing trajectory of escalating tensions. As disputes over competing claims in the South China Sea intensify, the situation at Second Thomas Shoal serves as a volatile flashpoint for future conflicts.
China
Is life getting better for China’s tech billionaires?
Pony Ma, Tencent co-founder, is China’s richest person with over A$65 billion. Despite past crackdowns, his wealth indicates a potential market recovery, while maintaining state control over the economy.
According to the latest Bloomberg Billionaires Index, Pony Ma, co-founder of Tencent Holdings, is once again China’s richest person, now with a net worth of more than A$65 billion, placing him 27th globally.
Close behind him in the rankings are bottled water tycoon Zhong Shanshan, and Zhang Yiming, the main co-founder of tech giant ByteDance, which owns TikTok.
Only a few years ago, China’s ruling Communist Party launched a crackdown on billionaires and other business leaders. Some were publicly jailed. Others simply disappeared from public view.
Ma’s resurgence might seem like a positive signal of a more permissive market environment. But as we watch China’s private sector grow, we should remember it follows China’s unique playbook.
The ascent of Tencent
Ma’s wealth primarily comes from his stake in Tencent, which he co-founded in 1998 with its headquarters in Shenzhen. As China’s economy grew, Tencent became a world-leading internet and technology company.
Tech billionaire Pony Ma at a government meeting in 2018.
Song Fan/AP
Tencent is well-known for QQ and WeChat, which quickly became two of the most popular instant messaging apps in China and connect more than a billion people.
Tencent is also the largest video game vendor in China, with popular games such as “Honour of Kings” and “League of Legends”.
Last month, Tencent released “Black Myth: Wukong”, China’s first-ever “AAA” video game. AAA is a globally recognised gaming industry buzzword that refers to major, high-budget, standalone productions.
The much-hyped game surpassed 10 million sales across platforms within three days of its release, becoming one of China’s most successful games of all time.
The game itself draws on a 16th century Chinese novel called “Journey to the West” and features various Chinese landscapes. Its popularity aligns with Beijing’s ongoing efforts to boost China’s international cultural appeal.
China’s state-owned media outlet Xinhua highly praised the game for “telling Chinese stories with world-class quality” and offering a new way for global players to understand Chinese culture.
Ma’s fortunes reflect his company’s
This official appraisal means a lot. In previous years, Tencent has had a challenging time coping with Beijing’s strict gaming regulations.
In August 2021, China’s video game regulator announced policies to limit online gamers under the age of 18 to only one hour of play on Fridays, weekends and holidays. This was a major blow to China’s gaming industry, including Tencent.
In December 2023, Beijing introduced more legislation aimed at further capping the amount of money and time that could be spent on video games. The announcement resulted in a 12.4% drop in Tencent’s share price. But the company still promised to strictly implement any new regulatory requirements.
The success of ‘Black Myth: Wukong’ reflects an improving outlook for Tencent.
Andy Wong/AP
A cautionary tale
In China, complying with state regulations is important. Another Chinese tech billionaire, Jack Ma, faced the consequences of publicly challenging them.
In 2020, Jack Ma was poised to launch what was set to be the world’s largest initial public offering (IPO), raising about A$50 billion for his financial technology giant, Ant Group.
However, after he gave a speech in Shanghai harshly criticising Chinese financial regulators for outdated rules and excessive intervention, regulators halted the Ant Group IPO.
Citing concerns that Ant Group’s e-finance products encouraged unrestrained borrowing and investment, China ultimately suspended the IPO in late 2020.
Over the following years, Ant and its affiliate company Alibaba were slapped with billions in fines for alleged breaches of financial regulations.
Getting on the front foot
This phase marked a much stricter regulatory posture from China. The tech tycoons had to adapt to a new reality.
In 2021, Pony Ma publicly stressed the importance of tightly regulating internet businesses, including his own. He also proactively volunteered to meet with antitrust authorities.
Tencent downsized by divesting stakes in various sectors, and the government demanded a restructuring of its financial business.
Many of China’s other billionaires heeded lessons from Jack Ma’s troubles at Ant Group.
Alex Plavevski/EPA
The party remains the ultimate authority
China’s economy is a “socialist market economy”. That is, China’s government thinks of the market as a useful tool to achieve socialist objectives.
That doesn’t mean the private sector doesn’t play a huge role, but the government has long been cautious about the emerging market power of oligarchs as a potential threat to the party’s authorities.
Over past decades of reform and opening up, Beijing has been committed to unleashing market forces, encouraging private sector development and modernising its financial institutions. The precondition is that the state should maintain the ultimate authority to regulate and mobilise market resources.
However, its economy has been stubbornly sluggish post-COVID. The clampdown on the private sector has undermined the confidence of many investors and entrepreneurs, which is crucial for restoring China’s economic vitality.
Last year, Beijing introduced a 31-point action plan in response, aiming to make the private economy “bigger, better and stronger”. Hours after its release, Pony Ma publicly praised the government’s move as “encouraging and inspiring”.
Could spring now be coming for China’s private sector? Perhaps, but only on China’s terms.
Remember, market development is always a means for the state to achieve its own ends. This will never be a story of the market growing while the state steps back.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
Zhejiang Province Increases Marriage Leave to 13 Days
On September 27, Zhejiang Province expanded marriage leave from 3 to 13 days for legally married employees. The new regulations ensure continued pay and benefits during leave and address demographic challenges by encouraging population growth. Businesses must update internal policies accordingly.
On September 27, the 12th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 14th Zhejiang Provincial People’s Congress approved the Zhejiang Province Marriage Leave Regulations (hereinafter referred to as the “Regulations”), extending the marriage leave to 13 days from three days.
According to the Regulations, employees who legally register their marriage are entitled to 13 days of marriage leave, excluding national statutory holidays and rest days. During the marriage leave, employees’ wages, bonuses, and other benefits will continue to be paid by their employers.
Notably, to ensure a smooth transition between the old and new leave regulations and to minimize disputes following the implementation of the new rules, the Regulations state that employees who registered their marriage within one year before the implementation of the new regulations and have not yet taken their marriage leave will be entitled to the new 13-day leave. Those who have already taken their marriage leave can supplement it according to the new regulations.
Businesses with operations in Zhejiang province are advised to amend their internal leave policies and employee handbook as soon as possible.
The extension of marriage leave in Zhejiang Province is part of a broader effort to support population growth and address demographic challenges. The province has seen some positive effects from its initial fertility support policies, which have helped to slow the sharp decline in birth rates.
*Granted to those who take pre-marital checkups, which involve being checked for any health conditions that will affect childbirth.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
- Navigating Turbulent Waters: Trust Between China and the Philippines
- Is life getting better for China’s tech billionaires?
- Zhejiang Province Increases Marriage Leave to 13 Days
- China ETFs Celebrate Beijing’s Stimulus Initiative
- From Bubble Tea to Business Partnerships: Exploring China-ASEAN Trade Integration
- With China seeking AI dominance, Taiwan’s efforts to slow neighbor’s access to advanced chips needs support from the West
