China
5,000 Myanmar nationals flee into China, face shortages
Some 5,000 Myanmar nationals, including hundreds of children, who fled into China amid an ethnic army offensive in northern Shan state are in dire need of food and water in Yunnan province, the displaced and their family members said Friday.
On Oct. 27, the Northern or “Three Brotherhood” Alliance of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Arakan Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army launched “Operation 1027” – named for the date of the offensive.
The groups simultaneously struck junta positions in the strategic Shan cities of Kunlong, Hseni, Chin Shwe Haw, Laukkaing, Namhkan, Kutkai, and Lashio, the state’s largest municipality.
Fierce fighting in the vicinity of Chin Shwe Haw at the start of the offensive forced some 5,000 residents to cross the border and take up temporary shelter in Yunnan province, Thet Naing, a family member of one of the displaced, told RFA Burmese.
On Thursday, Chinese authorities transferred the displaced to Yunnan’s Mengding township, where they are now sheltering at a former COVID-19 testing center, he said.
“They said they moved to the vicinity of Mengding and are living in a room there – I heard that it’s a building formerly used as a COVID-19 center,” Thet Naing said. “They said that the entire camp was moved by vehicles last night because there might be another fierce fight in Chinshwehaw.”
Water shortage
But supplies are short at the center, located around 30 kilometers (20 miles) east of Chin Shwe Haw, and those sheltering there – including around 700 children – need food, water, and supplies, said one of the displaced, named Ko Sai.
“Because of the water shortage, we have to boil water we received for bathing, and some of us are suffering from diarrhea,” he said. “Many are experiencing health problems and some have fainted.”
Ko Sai said the center is being “guarded by the Chinese police and army,” and that the reason for the water shortage “is because they aren’t allowing donations.”
In addition to residents of Chinshwehaw, other displaced people at the center include migrant workers from northern Shan, Kachin and Rakhine states, he said, as well as Yangon, Mandalay and Sagaing regions.
Chinese authorities have provided the displaced with tents, which can accommodate anywhere from five to 10 people each, he added.
Scant and poor food
Htoo Htoo, another displaced Myanmar national at the center, told RFA that while Chinese authorities are providing two meals a day, “the food isn’t good.”
“They provided us with eggs and tomatoes the past two days … but I can’t eat the eggs and tomatoes served today,” he said. “The tomatoes are spoiled, so I can only eat rice … [and while they have offered pork], many people felt nauseated after eating it.”
Htoo Htoo said that the displaced “are not allowed to cook” and that police had even “confiscated” bread and drinking water he ordered with his own money from outside the center.
Additionally, goods like sanitary napkins “are difficult to get” because of the restrictions on donations, he added.
Sources at the center said that when they asked authorities to get them food and water on Thursday, they were “forced to disperse.”
In addition to the shortages, the displaced said they have mostly been unable to contact their families because authorities “confiscated our phones,” but noted that Myanmar phone and internet services – normally accessible across the border – had been cut since the fighting began.
People at the center told RFA that they want to be allowed to move back across the border to a refugee camp in Shan state’s Nam Thit town, which is under the control of the ethnic United Wa State Army. Barring such a move, they want authorities at the camp to provide them with enough food and water, they said.
Attempts by RFA to contact the Chinese Embassy in Yangon for comment on the issue of Myanmar nationals fleeing into China went unanswered, as did calls to junta Deputy Information Minister Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun and the Myanmar Embassy in Beijing.
Yan Naing, the information officer of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or MNDAA, said that the displaced “may have difficulty” returning to their homes, given the severity of the fighting.
“Our organization helps to take care of those displaced by fighting to the best of our ability,” he said. “Right now, during the operation, it is quite difficult to … return to their homes.”
Fighting rages on
The fighting in northern Shan state has displaced some 25,000 people since the start of the offensive – around 10,000 in Nam Tit, another 10,000 in cities in northern Shan – including Hseni, Lashio, Kunlong and Mone Koe – and 5,000 in China’s Mengding.
With roads and transportation cut off as clashes raged, residents of Shan told RFA that there is “no aid for the displaced.”
In a statement on Thursday, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said there have been clashes in at least nine out of 22 townships in northern Shan state, and that the number of displaced persons had reached “more than 23,000.”
The Northern Alliance said that during the eight days of Operation 1027, it had captured more than 90 junta outposts, as well as six armored vehicles. The alliance said it “effectively controls the cities of Chinshwehaw, Hpawng Hsen and Kyu Koke.”
Myanmar junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing said at a meeting of his Cabinet held in Naypyitaw on Thursday that his regime would “strike back” against those who attack it.
Translated by Htin Aung Kyaw. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.
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China
Exploring the Revamped China Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) Program: Potential Benefits for International Businesses
Companies in China must navigate compliance, trading, and reporting within the CCER framework, impacting operations and strategic objectives. The program focuses on afforestation, solar, wind power, and mangrove creation, offering opportunities for innovation and revenue streams while ensuring transparency and accuracy. The Ministry of Ecology and Environment oversees the program.
As companies navigate the complexities of compliance, trading, and reporting within the CCER framework, they must also contend with the broader implications for their operations, finances, and strategic objectives.
This article explores the multifaceted impact of the CCER program on companies operating in China, examining both the opportunities for innovation and growth, as well as the potential risks and compliance considerations.
Initially, the CCER will focus on four sectors: afforestation, solar thermal power, offshore wind power, and mangrove vegetation creation. Companies operating within these sectors can register their accredited carbon reduction credits in the CCER system for trading purposes. These sectors were chosen due to their reliance on carbon credit sales for profitability. For instance, offshore wind power generation, as more costly than onshore alternatives, stands to benefit from additional revenue streams facilitated by CCER transactions.
Currently, primary buyers are expected to be high-emission enterprises seeking to offset their excess emissions and companies aiming to demonstrate corporate social responsibility by contributing to environmental conservation. Eventually, the program aims to allow individuals to purchase credits to offset their carbon footprints. Unlike the mandatory national ETS, the revamped CCER scheme permits any enterprise to buy carbon credits, thereby expanding the market scope.
The Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) oversees the CCER program, having assumed responsibility for climate change initiatives from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2018. Verification agencies and project operators are mandated to ensure transparency and accuracy in disclosing project details and carbon reduction practices.
On the second day after the launch on January 23, the first transaction in China’s voluntary carbon market saw the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the country’s largest offshore oil and gas producer, purchase 250,000 tons of carbon credits to offset its emissions.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
China Implements New Policies to Boost Foreign Investment in Science and Technology Companies
China’s Ministry of Commerce announced new policy measures on April 19, 2023, to encourage foreign investment in the technology sector. The measures include facilitating bond issuance, improving the investment environment, and simplifying procedures for foreign institutions to access the Chinese market.
On April 19, 2023, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) along with nine other departments announced a new set of policy measures (hereinafter, “new measures”) aimed at encouraging foreign investment in its technology sector.
Among the new measures, China intends to facilitate the issuance of RMB bonds by eligible overseas institutions and encourage both domestic and foreign-invested tech companies to raise funds through bond issuance.
In this article, we offer an overview of the new measures and their broader significance in fostering international investment and driving innovation-driven growth, underscoring China’s efforts to instill confidence among foreign investors.
The new measures contain a total of sixteen points aimed at facilitating foreign investment in China’s technology sector and improving the overall investment environment.
Divided into four main chapters, the new measures address key aspects including:
Firstly, China aims to expedite the approval process for QFII and RQFII, ensuring efficient access to the Chinese market. Moreover, the government promises to simplify procedures, facilitating operational activities and fund management for foreign institutions.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
Q1 2024 Brief on Transfer Pricing in Asia
Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 on transfer pricing, consolidating various guidelines. The Directorate General of Taxes focuses on compliance, expanded arm’s length principle, and substance checks. Singapore’s Budget 2024 addresses economic challenges, operational costs, and sustainability, implementing global tax reforms like the Income Inclusion Rule and Domestic Top-up Tax.
Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) has released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 (“PMK-172”), which prevails as a unified transfer pricing guideline. PMK-172 consolidates various transfer pricing matters that were previously covered under separate regulations, including the application of the arm’s length principle, transfer pricing documentation requirements, transfer pricing adjustments, Mutual Agreement Procedure (“MAP”), and Advance Pricing Agreements (“APA”).
The Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes (DGT) has continued to focus on compliance with the ex-ante principle, the expanded scope of transactions subject to the arm’s length principle, and the reinforcement of substance checks as part of the preliminary stage, indicating the DGT’s expectation of meticulous and well-supported transfer pricing analyses conducted by taxpayers.
In conclusion, PMK-172 reflects the Indonesian government’s commitment to addressing some of the most controversial transfer pricing issues and promoting clarity and certainty. While it brings new opportunities, it also presents challenges. Taxpayers are strongly advised to evaluate the implications of these new guidelines on their businesses in Indonesia to navigate this transformative regulatory landscape successfully.
In a significant move to bolster economic resilience and sustainability, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Mr. Lawrence Wong, unveiled the ambitious Singapore Budget 2024 on February 16, 2024. Amidst global economic fluctuations and a pressing climate crisis, the Budget strategically addresses the dual challenges of rising operational costs and the imperative for sustainable development, marking a pivotal step towards fortifying Singapore’s position as a competitive and green economy.
In anticipation of global tax reforms, Singapore’s proactive steps to implement the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) and Domestic Top-up Tax (DTT) under the BEPS 2.0 framework demonstrate a forward-looking approach to ensure tax compliance and fairness. These measures reaffirm Singapore’s commitment to international tax standards while safeguarding its economic interests.
Transfer pricing highlights from the Singapore Budget 2024 include:
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
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- Q1 2024 Brief on Transfer Pricing in Asia
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