China
Is Taiwan a country or not?
The UK referred to Taiwan as an “independent country” in a report, despite not officially recognizing Taiwan as a country.
Defining what is and isn’t a country is a lot more complicated than many people would realize. Take the case of Taiwan.
On Aug. 30, 2023, a committee of the U.K. Parliament referred to Taiwan as an “independent country” in a report. This is the first time any part of the British political system has used that phrasing.
Officially, the U.K. “does not recognise Taiwan” as a country, nor does it “maintain formal diplomatic relations with the island,” which is one way states recognize each other as equals on the international stage.
Like the U.K., the U.S. also “does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan,” although there is a “robust unofficial relationship,” according to the State Department. Many other countries are in a similar boat.
So where does that leave Taiwan? Is it, or is it not, a country?
From my perspective as a political scientist, here’s how I would approach this question.
A country by declaration
According to what’s known as the “declarative theory of statehood,” a country – which is often referred to as a “state” in political science and international relations terminology – must possess the following qualities: “(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”
These four qualities were agreed upon in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which is an international treaty registered with the League of Nations, the precursor to the United Nations.
Article 3 of that treaty says that the existence of a “state is independent of recognition by the other states.” In other words, as long as the four qualities above are met, an area qualifies as a country even if other countries choose not to recognize it.
One criticism of this framework is that it opens the door for many areas to be considered countries, even though they may seem outlandish.
For example, in the 1960s, Italian engineer Giorgio Rosa built a 4,000-square-foot (400-square-meter) platform 7 miles (11 kilometers) off the coast of Italy. On June 24, 1968, Rosa – whose last name means “rose” in English – declared that his platform was an independent country named the Republic of Rose Island. This artificial island had a restaurant, bar, souvenir shop and post office. Its official language was Esperanto.
It could be argued that Rose Island met the criteria outlined in the Montevideo Convention, as there was a permanent population because Rosa lived there; his humanmade platform had a defined territory; there was a government because Rosa declared himself president; and Rose Island’s post office gave it the capacity to communicate with, and thus enter into relations with, other countries.
Although several countries, including the U.S., have ratified the Montevideo Convention, Italy has not. So, 55 days after Rose Island declared independence, the Italian military destroyed the platform.
A country by recognition
In contrast to the declarative theory of statehood, what’s called the “constitutive theory of statehood” considers a country to be a country only if it is recognized by other already recognized countries.
There is no magic number for how many countries one must be recognized by. Rather, those that aspire to be regarded by the world as an independent country must join the United Nations as a full member.
In order to join the United Nations, applicants must be recommended by the Security Council, which comprises 15 members. Five of those members are permanent and have a veto. Applicants must have the support of nine of the 15 members, including each of the permanent members.
If the Security Council recommends admission, the application is presented to the General Assembly, where each full member of the United Nations has a single vote. A two-thirds majority is necessary before a country can join.
U.S. Rep. Rob Wittman, vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, met with Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen, right, at the presidential office in Taipei, Taiwan, in September 2023.
Taiwan Presidential Office via AP
One China or two?
Today, most of the world’s countries officially adhere to some variation of the idea that there is only one China, whose capital is Beijing, and which encompasses both the mainland territory and the island of Taiwan.
There is a government there, but there is also a government on Taiwan, based in its capital, Taipei. That government calls itself the Republic of China and traces its history to the early 20th century, when a revolution overthrew the emperor of China.
Notably, at that time, nobody’s definition of China included the island of Taiwan, which was then commonly called Formosa. Japan had seized the island in a war in the late 19th century.
In 1927, an uprising by the Chinese Communist Party attacked the Republic of China government. That kicked off a bloody civil war that lasted until 1949.
In that year, the government of the Republic of China retreated to the island of Taiwan. That same year, Mao Zedong, leader of the Chinese Communist Party, proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of China, with its capital in Beijing.
But Mao still sought control over his enemy’s territory, declaring, “Taiwan is ours, and we will never compromise on this issue, which is an issue of internal affairs.”
To this day, the government of the People’s Republic of China, whose capital is Beijing, considers Taiwan part of its “sacred territory.” The constitution of the People’s Republic of China states that “(i)t is the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland.” Its foreign affairs ministry says, “Taiwan is a sacred and inseparable part of China’s territory.” On Oct. 2, 2023, the Beijing government celebrated its national day by releasing a video signifying its focus on unity with the people of Taiwan.
In contrast, the Republic of China refers to the area under its control as “the Taiwan area,” or “the free area.” It refers to the rest of China as “the mainland area,” which the Taiwanese government has described as being under a “Period of Communist Rebellion.”
Other countries are similarly delicate. For example, in 1972, the U.S. “acknowledge(d) that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” In 1979, the U.S. again “acknowledge(d) the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.”
Taipei’s Mid-Autumn Festival drew crowds to the Night Market.
AP Photo/Chiang Ying-ying
Taiwan’s place in the world
Taiwan argues that it meets the Montevideo Convention’s criteria for being considered a country under the declarative theory of statehood. However, Taiwan has not yet formally declared itself to be a new, independent country. According to President Tsai Ing-wen, “(w)e don’t have a need to,” because “(w)e are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China.”
But recall that, according to the constitutive theory of statehood, a country is only a country if it’s recognized by other already recognized countries, and the ultimate manifestation of such recognition is full membership in the United Nations.
Interestingly, the Republic of China was actually a founding member of the United Nations. However, in 1971, the United Nations voted “to expel” the Republic of China, and instead recognized the Communist government “as the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations.” Subsequent attempts by Taiwan to join the United Nations have been unsuccessful.
Today, only a dozen or so countries continue to maintain formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, most of which are small island developing states such as Nauru, Palau and Tuvalu.
Each of these countries recognizes Taiwan as “the Republic of China,” and none of them simultaneously maintains offical ties with the People’s Republic of China.
Until Taiwan formally declares itself independent of the rest of China – or until Taiwan is recognized by the international community as being independent of the rest of China – Taiwan’s status as a country will continue to be questioned.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
Putin and Xi: Beijing Belt and Road meeting highlighted Russia’s role as China’s junior partner
The recent Belt and Road Forum in Beijing saw decreased attendance from world leaders, highlighting geopolitical tensions. Vladimir Putin emphasized Sino-Russian cooperation, but trade imbalances reveal Russia’s subordinate role.
The third Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing recently attracted fewer heads of state or senior officials than the previous forums in 2017 and 2019. There were 11 European presidents and prime ministers at the 2019 forum. But last week’s forum attracted only three.
This is understandable, given that the two-day meeting took place against the backdrop of high tension in the Middle East caused by the conflict between Israel and Hamas as well as the war in Ukraine – both wars which have highlighted differences in views on regional and global order between the west and a number of non-western countries.
One enthusiastic participant was the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. For Putin, the forum provided an opportunity to meet other leaders without fear of arrest, given his indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes which had kept him away from September’s Brics summit in South Africa.
While Putin was just one among 20 or so world leaders at the Forum, he was photographed at Xi Jinping’s right hand and given a prominent place in proceedings. Delivering a speech at the forum immediately after the Chinese president and staging a press conference for the Russian media before boarding the plane to Moscow, Putin attempted to convey the message of tight cooperation with China.
He was keen to remind his audience of Russia’s credentials as a UN security council member, together with China, responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. He also noted that he and Xi had discussed both the situation in Gaza and the events in Ukraine, describing these situations as “common threats” which strengthen Sino-Russian “interaction”.
Putin drew particular attention to the high bilateral trade volume between Russia and China, which has reached nearly US$200 billion (£163 billion). This sounds impressive until you remember that the bulk of this trade consists of export of Russian hydrocarbons and other raw materials to China. This is nothing new – in fact trade in hydrocarbons between Russia and China have been boosted by western sanctions.
Perhaps the most instructive aspect of the visit was Putin’s explicit acknowledgement of the different roles played by Moscow and Beijing in international politics. Putin described the Russia-dominated Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) – a concept Moscow has promoted as a response to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that would fuse the Eurasian Economic Union with the BRI – as a regional or “local” project. Meanwhile he happily described the BRI as “global” in scale.
For the past decade, Russian policymakers and experts have consistently held up the GEP as symbolising Russia’s equality with China. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has described it as “the creation of a continent-wide architecture”.
Putin’s words, coupled with the lack of any meaningful results of the meeting (bar a contract on food and agricultural products which has yet to be confirmed by Beijing), illustrate the extent to which Russia’s war against Ukraine has deepened the asymmetry between the two powers.
Holding back?
The lack of genuine progress on the issue of the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline, which will transport gas from Russia’s Yamal gas fields, which used to supply Europe, via Mongolia to China, was further evidence of this asymmetry. Xi was kind enough to express hope that the project could proceed quickly. But he did not outline any concrete steps in that direction.
China’s agreement, if confirmed by a contract, would have been the most clear signal of Beijing’s strategic support for Russia, especially given Gazprom’s shrinking European market. By prolonging negotiations, China seems to be trying to extract specific concessions from Russia, related to the price of gas, possible Chinese ownership of gas fields in Russia, or Beijing’s acquisition of shares in Gazprom.
Meanwhile, in May 2023, China revived the prospect of building the so-called section “D”, enlarging the capacity of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline system, which will bring gas from Turkmenistan via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to China, emphasising China’s other sources of energy supplies.
While continuing to offer Moscow political support and not interfering with Chinese companies’ attempts to take advantage of the exodus of western companies to increase their presence in the Russian market, Beijing has clearly attempted to prevent any embarrassment related to Russia. A gas contract would have overshadowed the BRI summit and generated a strong reaction in the US and Europe, potentially strengthening China hawks in the west.
Beijing making its move
Putin’s delegation was full of ministers and CEOs of key Russian enterprises, from Rosneft and Gazprom to Novatek, so the conclusion of commercial agreements can’t be ruled out, but the probability is low. It is clear that Beijing does not want to be seen to be openly supporting Russia in resisting and bypassing western sanctions.
In the 1990s, Russian officials regularly warned of the dangers of becoming a “raw materials appendage” to China. Today the economic benefits that Russian elites gain from hydrocarbons mean this danger has now become a reality. Russia has locked itself into an economic partnership in which it is the supplicant, a role that Moscow seems happy to play.
But the BRI is not just about economics. It is also a key part of Beijing’s bid to project itself as a “global responsible power”. Beijing has recently outlined what it calls its “Global Security Initiative” which explicitly rejects the Western rules-based order. This comes alongside a “Global Development Initiative” and, nested within these, a “Global Civilisation initiative”. Taken together these question western universalist ideas about human rights and democracy.
China’s thinking has gained traction among many countries of the global south, providing a developmental path without lectures on human rights. China speaks to these countries using its dual identity as both a rapidly developing power and a member of the UN security council. By comparison, notwithstanding its security council position, Russia has few tangible benefits to offer these countries. Last week’s BRI forum has driven this point home.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
China
Unlocking Potential: China Welcomes Foreign Investment in Cell Therapy and Fully Foreign-Owned Hospitals in Select Pilot Cities
On September 8, 2024, MOFCOM expanded pilot programs in China’s medical sector, allowing foreign-invested enterprises to engage in cell and gene therapy in select free trade zones and permitting wholly foreign-owned hospitals, while adhering to regulations and restrictions.
On September 8, 2024, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) published a circular on its official website announcing the expansion of pilot programs for opening up the medical sector (the Circular). This circular lifts bans on foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) engaging in cell and gene therapy (CGT) in selected free trade zones (FTZs) and permits wholly foreign-owned hospitals in selected cities.
This follows the release of the full text of the “Special Administrative Measures for Foreign Investment Access (Negative List) (2024 Edition)” (2024 FI Negative List) by the MOFCOM and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) on the same day.
While the final 2024 FI Negative List still includes provisions prohibiting investment in human stem cells, gene diagnosis and treatment technology development and application, and limiting medical institutions to joint ventures, the relaxation of foreign investment limits in CGT and medical institutions in pilot cities aligns with the directives from the State Council meeting, offering new opportunities for foreign investors eyeing China’s biotech and healthcare sectors.
Below, we summarize the key points of the Circular and delve into its implications.
According to the Circular, effective immediately, FIEs are now permitted to engage in the development and application of human stem cell, gene diagnosis, and treatment technologies within the China (Beijing) Pilot Free Trade Zone, China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, China (Guangdong) Pilot Free Trade Zone, and Hainan Free Trade Port (FTP). These activities are aimed at product registration, listing, and production. Once registered, listed, and approved for production, these products can be utilized nationwide.
Despite this relaxation, FIEs participating in the pilot program must adhere to relevant Chinese laws and regulations, including those related to human genetic resource management, drug clinical trials (including international multi-center clinical trials), drug registration and listing, drug production, and ethical review, and must follow the necessary management procedures.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
China
Agoa trade deal talks: South Africa will need to carefully manage relations with the US and China
South Africa must navigate its economic relationships cautiously amid rising tensions between China and the US, particularly during the 2023 Agoa Summit, to protect its interests and strengthen diplomacy.
South Africa must tread carefully in its economic relationships to avoid being caught in the escalating tension between east and west, and more specifically China and the US. The country’s hosting, and the outcome, of the 2023 Agoa Summit should strengthen its role in diplomatic relations and contribute towards safeguarding the country’s economic interests.
From 2-4 November 2023, the US and 35 sub-Saharan African countries will meet in Johannesburg for the 20th Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum (Agoa Forum). It entails strengthening trade and investment ties between the US and sub-Saharan Africa through the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa), US legislation which provides various trade preferences to eligible countries in the region.
Given Russia’s continuing war in Ukraine and its rising tension with Nato, plus the China-US trade war, tensions between east and west are high. South Africa has come under attack for its non-alignment role in the Ukraine war. It refused to support UN resolutions condemning Russia. This resulted in some US congressmen pushing for the forum to be moved out of South Africa.
The country recently hosted the 15th Brics summit, which resolved to expand the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa grouping to 11 member states. The enlargement will bolster Brics’ role as a geopolitical alternative to the west, which is dominated by the US. Might this be a direct challenge to American hegemony?
I have been researching major global economic developments, such as globalisation and the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, for 20 years. This body of work shows the risks that come with behaviour like South Africa’s. The country could find itself in the middle of a tense situation.
South Africa needs to pull off an exceptional balancing act in managing its international relations in a sensible way that protects and advances its economic interests.
Note that the geopolitical tensions between China and the US are not just about trade disputes. They also include espionage, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, climate change and environmental issues, and tensions over Hong Kong, Taiwan and South China Sea disputes.
As a major source of infrastructure financing to sub-Saharan Africa, China is now the region’s largest bilateral official lender. Its total sub-Saharan African external public debt – what these governments owe to China – rose from less than 2% before 2005 to over 17% in 2021.
Agoa might present a challenge to China as competition for its own interests in Africa. China would like African countries to untie or loosen their agreements with the US. It is thus a good moment to take stock of the actual benefits South Africa has derived from the Agoa agreement with the US.
What Agoa is about
The Agoa agreement was approved as legislation by the US Congress in May 2000 for an initial 15 years. On 29 June 2015 it was extended and signed into law by then president Barack Obama for a further 10 years to 2025.
It will come into review again in 2024, hence the importance of the upcoming summit. Recently, Louisiana senator John Kennedy introduced a bill to the US Congress to extend Agoa by a further 20 years to 2045. This is a bid to counter China’s growing influence in Africa, and to continue to allow sub-Saharan African countries preferential access to US markets.
Agoa’s benefits to South Africa
In 2021, the US was the second most significant destination for South Africa’s exports worldwide, mainly thanks to Agoa. China took the top spot; Germany was third. The US ranked third as a source of South Africa’s imports, following China and Germany. In that year, the total trade volume between South Africa and the US reached its zenith at $24.5 billion, with a trade imbalance of $9.3 billion in South Africa’s favour.
Agoa offers preferential entry for about 20% of South Africa’s exports to the US, or 2% of South Africa’s global exports. The stock of South African investment in the US has more than doubled since 2011, amounting to US$3.5 billion in 2020. American foreign direct investment (FDI) in South Africa increased by over 70% over that period, to US$10 billion. This made the US South Africa’s fifth largest source of FDI in 2019. The US was its third largest destination for outward FDI.
US investment in South Africa is mainly concentrated in manufacturing, finance and insurance, and wholesale trade, which is vital for economic growth. American multinationals doing business in South Africa employ about 148,000 people.
More specifically, Agoa’s benefits include:
duty-free and quota-free access to the US market for a wide range of South African products. This benefits South Africa’s textile and apparel industry in particular. To sub-Saharan African countries, Agoa provides duty-free access to the US market for over 1,800 products. This is in addition to the more than 5,000 products that are eligible for duty-free access under the US Generalised System of Preferences programme
export diversification, especially of items such as agricultural products, textiles, and manufactured goods. This is vital for increasing export earnings, which help to improve South Africa’s balance of payments, particularly its trade account.
capacity building through technical assistance and programmes to help South African businesses meet US standards, thus becoming more competitive in the global marketplace.
economic development and poverty reduction, which aligns with South Africa’s developmental goals.
Balancing economic interests
China is the largest consumer of South African commodity exports, and thus a key influencer of the rand exchange rate. In addition, China and Russia’s planned move towards de-dollarisation (trying to replace the petrodollar system with their own system) puts American interests under threat. This means South Africa needs to carefully navigate its relations with the US and its Brics partners, China and Russia.
It will want to keep strong ties with the US through Agoa without getting into a difficult position between China and the US. The outcome of the November meeting will have serious economic implications.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
- Putin and Xi: Beijing Belt and Road meeting highlighted Russia’s role as China’s junior partner
- Unlocking Potential: China Welcomes Foreign Investment in Cell Therapy and Fully Foreign-Owned Hospitals in Select Pilot Cities
- Self-Reliance and Openness: Core Principles of China’s Third Plenary Session
- Trade Prevails Over Political Persuasions in China-Germany Relations
- Agoa trade deal talks: South Africa will need to carefully manage relations with the US and China
- Beijing introduces Negative List to streamline Data Export in Free Trade Zone
