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China

Beijing’s BRI influence over the UN Human Rights Council

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A woman takes part in a demonstration against China during its Universal Periodic Review by the Human Rights Council in front of the United Nations Office in Geneva, Switzerland, on 6 November 2018. (Photo: Denis Balibouse/Reuters)

Author: Anna Hayes, JCU

As a United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) member state, China has a responsibility to promote and protect human rights globally. Yet through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing has used economic coercion, inducement, harassment and manipulation to undermine the international human rights framework. This poses a serious threat to the effectiveness of the HRC.

Beijing prioritises ‘people-centred development’ over universally recognised human rights. But China’s high-modernist development at home involves human rights violations that have disempowering impacts on marginalised peoples. This is evident in the Tibet Autonomous Region and in the unfolding genocide in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

Focussing on XUAR, calls for a UN investigation into allegations of mass human rights violations in the region were first raised in 2018. But action was delayed by Beijing’s unwillingness to allow entry and then by COVID-19.

These delays prompted 22 states to present a letter to the HRC in July 2019 expressing their concerns about human rights violations in the XUAR. They urged Beijing to accept the inspectors and called on China to uphold its obligations to protect human rights.

In response, Beijing mobilised 37 states to write a second letter defending China’s record in XUAR and praising its ‘counter-terrorism’ efforts. Almost all signatories of Beijing’s letter were BRI partner states, including several authoritarian states with dubious human rights records.

In May 2022, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet gained access to the XUAR, but her tour was greatly restricted. There was a long delay in the release of the official report and allegations surfaced that Beijing attempted to pressure her into not releasing the report. The report was released on her last day in office.

Bachelet’s report found that China’s anti-terrorist legislation had resulted in serious human rights violations and possible crimes against humanity. It documented the use of ethnic profiling, arbitrary detention, torture and other forms of ill-treatment, including rape and sexual abuse. It also reported the denial of reproductive rights, the eradication of rights to privacy and free movement for Uyghurs, enforced disappearances and the targeted eradication of Islam and religious sites.

The report also identified the transnational reach of China’s human rights violations, arguing that the Chinese state has been threatening and intimidating members of the diaspora community and has severed contact within families.

In response to the report, the 51st session of the HRC considered a motion seeking a debate on the situation of human rights in the XUAR. Prior to the vote, China’s ambassador to the United Nations deployed wedge politics to divide member states by alleging that the motion was a ‘US plot’ and warning developing states that they ‘could be targeted’ next.

While the vote was close, the motion was defeated. Beijing claimed this outcome as a victory against ‘Western human rights’ being ‘imposed’ on the rest of the world. These statements call into question China’s suitability as a member of the HRC given its objections to the universal human rights framework that underpins the HRC.

Of the 19 states that voted against the motion, excluding China, all states have BRI agreements. Of those states that abstained from voting, 8 out of the 11 have BRI agreements with China.

This vote raises questions about the extent of China’s influence over international forums and the possible emergence of a Chinese-led bloc of BRI states. Given that BRI agreements are not made public, it is difficult to identify specific economic promises and rewards that may be jeopardised if state leaders displease Beijing in international forums like the HRC.

Beijing’s coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions against Australia may be viewed by BRI partner states as a cautionary tale even though Australia is not a BRI partner state. Beijing has also used economic coercion against BRI partners states such as Lithuania and South Korea, demonstrating that Beijing is prepared to flex its muscle against BRI partners to get what it wants.

Of the 47 member states on the HRC, only 13 states do not have a BRI agreement with China. Given Beijing’s track record of deploying economic punishment to achieve its goals, BRI partner states are more susceptible to economic coercion and may not be willing to support votes unfavourable to Beijing.

The XUAR situation…

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Trends and Future Prospects of Bilateral Direct Investment between China and Germany

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China and Germany experienced a decline in direct investment in 2023 due to global economic uncertainty and policy changes. Despite this, China remains an attractive destination for German FDI. Key industries like automotive and advanced manufacturing continue to draw investors, although FDI outflows from Germany to China decreased by 30% in the first three quarters of 2023. Despite this, the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21% in the same period according to MOFCOM. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data and MOFCOM’s actual use of foreign capital provide different perspectives on the investment trends between the two countries.


Direct investment between China and Germany declined in 2023, due to a range of factors from global economic uncertainty to policy changes. However, China remains an important destination for German foreign direct investment (FDI), and key industries in both countries continue to excite investors. We look at the latest direct investment data between Germany and China to analyze the latest trends and discuss key factors that could shape future business and commercial ties.

Direct investment between China and Germany has undergone profound changes over the past decade. An increasingly complex investment environment for companies in both countries has led to falling two-way FDI figures in the first three quarters of 2023, in stark contrast to positive trends seen in 2022.

At the same time, industries with high growth potential, such as automotive and advanced manufacturing, continue to attract German companies to China, and high levels of reinvested earnings suggest established firms are doubling down on their commitments in the Chinese market. In Germany, the potential for electric vehicle (EV) sales is buoying otherwise low investment among Chinese companies.

According to data from Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, total FDI outflows from Germany to China fell in the first three quarters of 2023, declining by 30 percent to a total of EUR 7.98 billion.

This is a marked reversal of trends from 2022, when FDI flows from Germany to China reached a record EUR 11.4 billion, up 14.7 percent year-on-year.

However, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21 percent year-on-year in the first eight months of 2023. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data, which follows standards set by the IMF, the OECD, and the European Central Bank (ECB), includes a broader scope of transactions within its direct investment data, including, broadly, direct investment positions, direct investment income flows, and direct investment financial flows.

Meanwhile, the actual use of foreign capital recorded by MOFCOM includes contracted foreign capital that has been concluded, including the registered and working capital paid by foreign investors, as well as the transaction consideration paid for the transferred equity of domestic investors.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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China’s coast guard on Saturday fired a water cannon at a Philippine supply boat in disputed waters in the South China Sea, causing “significant damages to the vessel” and injuring its crew, the Philippine coast guard said.

Manila was attempting to resupply troops stationed on a ship at the Second Thomas Shoal, known locally as Ayungin Shoal, when the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia “harassed, blocked, deployed water cannons, and executed dangerous maneuvers against the routine RoRe (rotation and resupply) mission,” said the Philippine National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea.

The West Philippine Sea is the part of the South China Sea that Manila claims as its jurisdiction.

The Chinese coast guard also set up “a floating barrier” to block access to shoal where Manila ran aground an old warship, BRP Sierra Madre, to serve as a military outpost.

The Philippine task force condemned China’s “unprovoked aggression, coercion, and dangerous maneuvers.”

Philippines’ RoRe missions have been regularly blocked by China’s coast guard, but this is the first time a barrier was set up near the shoal. 

The Philippine coast guard nevertheless claimed that the mission on Saturday was accomplished.

Potential consequences

The Second Thomas Shoal lies within the country’s exclusive economic zone where Manila holds sovereign rights. 

China, however, claims historic rights over most of the South China Sea, including the Spratly archipelago, which the shoal forms a part of.

A Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson on Saturday said the Philippine supply vessel “intruded” into the waters near the shoal, called Ren’ai Jiao in Chinese, “without permission from the Chinese government.”

“China coast guard took necessary measures at sea in accordance with law to safeguard China’s rights, firmly obstructed the Philippines’ vessels, and foiled the Philippines’ attempt,” the ministry said.

“If the Philippines insists on going its own way, China will continue to adopt resolute measures,” the spokesperson said, warning that Manila “should be prepared to bear all potential consequences.”

Chinese Maritime Militia vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, March 5, 2024. (Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson wrote on social media platform X that her country “stands with the Philippines” against China’s maneuvers.

Beijing’s “interference with the Philippines’ freedom of navigation violates international law and threatens a free and open Indo-Pacific,” she wrote.

Australian Ambassador to the Philippines Hae Kyong Yu also said that Canberra shares the Philippines’ “serious concerns about dangerous conduct by China’s vessels adjacent to Second Thomas Shoal.” 

“This is part of a pattern of deeply concerning behavior,” Yu wrote on X.

Edited by Jim Snyder.

Read the rest of this article here >>> Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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Foreigners in China: 2024 Living and Working Guidelines

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China’s Ministry of Commerce released updated guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China in 2024. The guidelines cover accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols. It also outlines responsibilities regarding social security premiums and individual income tax obligations. prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required upon arrival.


The updated 2024 guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China, released by the country’s Ministry of Commerce, outline essential procedures and considerations covering accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols.

On January 25, 2024, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) released the latest version of the Guidelines for Foreign Businessmen to Live and Work in China (hereinafter referred to as the “guidelines”).

The document is divided into four main sections, labeled as:

Furthermore, the guidelines elucidate the regulatory framework governing foreign businessperson’s responsibilities concerning social security premiums and individual income tax obligations.

This article provides a comprehensive overview of the guidelines, delving into their significance and implications for foreign businesspersons in China.

Upon arrival in China, prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required.

If staying in a hotel, registration can be facilitated by the hotel staff upon presentation of a valid passport or international travel documents.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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