China
Philippine elections expose the politics of China policy
Author: Editorial Board, ANU
When, how, and why do domestic politics shape Southeast Asian states’ relationships with China?
This is almost a trick question — not only the diversity of Southeast Asian political systems, but the multiplicity of interests that bear upon foreign policy within individual states makes mockery of the idea of ‘domestic politics’ as a single, coherent force.
A more manageable question might be: to what extent does public opinion set the terms on which Southeast Asian governments work with China?
If only it were easy to know exactly what Southeast Asian publics think about China. And then to know what influences their thinking. In Japan or Australia where the public is regularly interrogated on these questions, public opinion is hardly unfiltered from state and other interests.
In Southeast Asia, the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia survey is an invaluable snapshot of elite opinion, but isn’t necessarily an accurate barometer of the ordinary citizen’s views, filtered or otherwise. While pollsters in the major electoral democracies of Indonesia and the Philippines occasionally take the temperature of voters on China, across the region polls are too infrequent, and methodologies too inconsistent, to be able to make generalisations about region-wide trends in public opinion.
As politicians disingenuously say, the only poll that matters is an election. Indeed, the best clues to how the public’s views shape the behaviour of national governments is via a close look at how China becomes an issue in election campaigns.
As Richard J Heydarian makes clear in this week’s lead article, all the ingredients for the politicisation of the China relationship are present in the Philippines’ elections coming up in May 2022. Since the election of the populist Rodrigo Duterte in 2016, ‘bilateral relations between China and the Philippines, a United States treaty ally, have undergone a tremendous transformation’. While going through the motions of amplifying public outrage over Chinese actions in the South China Sea, the Duterte administration has made soliciting Chinese investment in infrastructure and industrial development the focus.
Yet actual follow-through on projects to which Chinese lenders have pledged support has been underwhelming, and China continues to push the envelope in the South China Sea. Duterte’s critics accuse him of having cosied up to Beijing with little to show for it either on the South China Sea dispute or bringing economic transformation to the Philippines.
The criticism seems to have registered with the outgoing president. Now, ‘in his twilight months in office’, Duterte ‘has adopted a dramatically divergent tone on China’ as a majority of the contestants running to replace him distance themselves from the administration’s China policy. Only the current frontrunner Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr promises continuity with Duterte’s conciliatory approach; other candidates are promising a return to hedging, or to the pro-Western stances associated with the Philippine military establishment.
Duterte and his administration might have been defying political gravity in seeking close economic ties with Beijing while leaving the South China Sea issue unresolved, emboldened by the stratospheric approval ratings for Duterte and his brutal but popular drug war. As the country looks beyond Duterte’s ‘penal populism’, and to a more conventional president drawn from the Manila-based oligarchy, the politics of foreign policy might be reverting to the historical mean. ‘In the Philippines’ boisterous democracy’, Heydarian writes, ‘public opinion and the sentiments of the military reign supreme. Whoever succeeds Duterte will come under tremendous pressure to adopt calibrated assertiveness with respect to the South China Sea disputes, but also a measure of geopolitical pragmatism in relations with China’.
It’s a stretch to generalise from the Philippines to the rest of Southeast Asia. The Philippines is a US treaty ally, and there is ample public goodwill there towards the United States. The electoral system allows for a diverse field of presidential candidates who can win with a plurality of the vote. Elections are famously competitive, with candidates more incentivised to pander to public opinion rather than respect elite consensus on foreign policy.
More fundamentally, there are genuine and abiding differences within the political elite on how to balance the economic opportunities and security risks of China’s…
China
Foreigners in China: 2024 Living and Working Guidelines
China’s Ministry of Commerce released updated guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China in 2024. The guidelines cover accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols. It also outlines responsibilities regarding social security premiums and individual income tax obligations. prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required upon arrival.
The updated 2024 guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China, released by the country’s Ministry of Commerce, outline essential procedures and considerations covering accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols.
On January 25, 2024, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) released the latest version of the Guidelines for Foreign Businessmen to Live and Work in China (hereinafter referred to as the “guidelines”).
The document is divided into four main sections, labeled as:
Furthermore, the guidelines elucidate the regulatory framework governing foreign businessperson’s responsibilities concerning social security premiums and individual income tax obligations.
This article provides a comprehensive overview of the guidelines, delving into their significance and implications for foreign businesspersons in China.
Upon arrival in China, prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required.
If staying in a hotel, registration can be facilitated by the hotel staff upon presentation of a valid passport or international travel documents.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
China Unveils 24 Fresh Initiatives to Draw in Foreign Investment
China’s legislature has released a plan to attract foreign investment, aiming to improve the business environment and expand market access for foreign companies. The plan includes measures to ease administrative burdens and level the playing field for foreign companies, with a focus on key industries like manufacturing and telecommunications. Pilot projects in FTZs will relax restrictions on foreign investment in technological innovation.
China’s legislature has released a new plan to attract foreign investment after a year of falling foreign direct investment inflows. The plan, the latest in a series of efforts to boost foreign capital in China, proposes measures to improve the business environment, ease administrative burdens, expand market access in key industries, and even the playing field for foreign companies. We outline the policy proposals that could benefit foreign companies in the coming years.
The State Council has released a 24-point plan to boost foreign capital in China. The plan, titled the Action Plan to Solidly Promote High-Level Opening Up and Make Greater Efforts to Attract and Utilize Foreign Investment (the “Action Plan”), outlines various measures to attract foreign investment, including expanding market access in key industries, ensuring equal participation of foreign companies in government bidding, and facilitating cross-border data flows.
China has been striving to encourage and support foreign investment in recent years. Efforts ramped up in 2023 when levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to China fell by 8 percent year-on-year. In July 2023, the State Council issued a similar set of measures that aimed to improve the business environment for foreign companies, with suggestions including measures to strengthen intellectual property rights and ease regulations on cross-border data flows.
In this article, we outline some of the key measures proposed by the State Council to attract foreign investment in 2024.
One of the main measures in the Action Plan is to expand market access for foreign companies by “reasonably reducing” the negative list for foreign investment access. This document lists the industries and sectors that foreign investors are prohibited from participating in, and thus by shortening it, more sectors will become accessible to foreign investors. It was last updated at the end of 2021.
The Action Plan reiterates the directives mentioned in the GWR, stating that the government remove restrictions on foreign investment in the manufacturing sector, and continue to promote the opening up of telecommunications, medical, and other fields.
Meanwhile, the Action Plan also calls for carrying out pilot projects to relax foreign investment access in the field of scientific and technological innovation. This will be carried out in pilot free trade zones (FTZ) such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong, which will be permitted to select a number of qualified foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) to expand access in areas such as the development and application of genetic diagnosis and treatment technologies.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
China’s top diplomat visits Australia, pushes stable relations
In a possible sign that often frosty relations are warming, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi met counterpart Penny Wong in the Australian capital Canberra on Wednesday. It’s the highest level meeting between the two countries since 2017.
Wong pushed for the removal of tariffs on wine, rock lobster and meat products imposed in 2020, but didn’t shy away from raising rights concerns.
“As you would expect, I raised Australia’s concerns about human rights including in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong,” Wong told a post-meeting news conference.
“I expressed our serious concern about unsafe conduct at sea, our desire for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and in our region.”
Wong also raised the case of Yang Hengjun, the Australian writer who was convicted of spying and given a suspended death sentence in February.
“Australians found the sentence imposed shocking,” Wong told reporters.
“We will not walk away from our advocacy for Dr Yang Jun.”
The meeting paves the way for a visit to Australia by Chinese Premier Li Qiang, planned for the middle of this year. Both foreign ministers said the plans are “on track.”
Wang earlier visited New Zealand where he met his counterpart Winston Peters and Prime Minister Christopher Luxon.
Edited by Taejun Kang.
Read the rest of this article here >>> China’s top diplomat visits Australia, pushes stable relations
- Foreigners in China: 2024 Living and Working Guidelines
- China Unveils 24 Fresh Initiatives to Draw in Foreign Investment
- China’s top diplomat visits Australia, pushes stable relations
- Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister, will visit Australia to discuss trade and technology.
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- China to update M&A Regulations in 2024: Changes to Filing Thresholds
