China
Philippine elections expose the politics of China policy
Author: Editorial Board, ANU
When, how, and why do domestic politics shape Southeast Asian states’ relationships with China?
This is almost a trick question — not only the diversity of Southeast Asian political systems, but the multiplicity of interests that bear upon foreign policy within individual states makes mockery of the idea of ‘domestic politics’ as a single, coherent force.
A more manageable question might be: to what extent does public opinion set the terms on which Southeast Asian governments work with China?
If only it were easy to know exactly what Southeast Asian publics think about China. And then to know what influences their thinking. In Japan or Australia where the public is regularly interrogated on these questions, public opinion is hardly unfiltered from state and other interests.
In Southeast Asia, the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia survey is an invaluable snapshot of elite opinion, but isn’t necessarily an accurate barometer of the ordinary citizen’s views, filtered or otherwise. While pollsters in the major electoral democracies of Indonesia and the Philippines occasionally take the temperature of voters on China, across the region polls are too infrequent, and methodologies too inconsistent, to be able to make generalisations about region-wide trends in public opinion.
As politicians disingenuously say, the only poll that matters is an election. Indeed, the best clues to how the public’s views shape the behaviour of national governments is via a close look at how China becomes an issue in election campaigns.
As Richard J Heydarian makes clear in this week’s lead article, all the ingredients for the politicisation of the China relationship are present in the Philippines’ elections coming up in May 2022. Since the election of the populist Rodrigo Duterte in 2016, ‘bilateral relations between China and the Philippines, a United States treaty ally, have undergone a tremendous transformation’. While going through the motions of amplifying public outrage over Chinese actions in the South China Sea, the Duterte administration has made soliciting Chinese investment in infrastructure and industrial development the focus.
Yet actual follow-through on projects to which Chinese lenders have pledged support has been underwhelming, and China continues to push the envelope in the South China Sea. Duterte’s critics accuse him of having cosied up to Beijing with little to show for it either on the South China Sea dispute or bringing economic transformation to the Philippines.
The criticism seems to have registered with the outgoing president. Now, ‘in his twilight months in office’, Duterte ‘has adopted a dramatically divergent tone on China’ as a majority of the contestants running to replace him distance themselves from the administration’s China policy. Only the current frontrunner Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr promises continuity with Duterte’s conciliatory approach; other candidates are promising a return to hedging, or to the pro-Western stances associated with the Philippine military establishment.
Duterte and his administration might have been defying political gravity in seeking close economic ties with Beijing while leaving the South China Sea issue unresolved, emboldened by the stratospheric approval ratings for Duterte and his brutal but popular drug war. As the country looks beyond Duterte’s ‘penal populism’, and to a more conventional president drawn from the Manila-based oligarchy, the politics of foreign policy might be reverting to the historical mean. ‘In the Philippines’ boisterous democracy’, Heydarian writes, ‘public opinion and the sentiments of the military reign supreme. Whoever succeeds Duterte will come under tremendous pressure to adopt calibrated assertiveness with respect to the South China Sea disputes, but also a measure of geopolitical pragmatism in relations with China’.
It’s a stretch to generalise from the Philippines to the rest of Southeast Asia. The Philippines is a US treaty ally, and there is ample public goodwill there towards the United States. The electoral system allows for a diverse field of presidential candidates who can win with a plurality of the vote. Elections are famously competitive, with candidates more incentivised to pander to public opinion rather than respect elite consensus on foreign policy.
More fundamentally, there are genuine and abiding differences within the political elite on how to balance the economic opportunities and security risks of China’s…
Business
US vs. China: Who’s Misleading Africa? – The East African
The article discusses the influence of the U.S. and China in Africa, exploring their strategies, investments, and impacts, ultimately raising questions about motivations and the true benefits to African countries.
US vs. China: Influence in Africa
The rivalry between the US and China is reshaping geopolitics in Africa. Both nations are vying for influence, promoting their economic models and strategic partnerships to gain favor with African countries. While the US emphasizes democratic governance and human rights, China focuses on infrastructure investment and development assistance, appealing to many African governments seeking immediate economic relief.
Africa’s diverse and resource-rich nations find themselves at a crossroads, often leveraging competing offers from both powers. This dynamic creates opportunities for economic growth but also poses risks of dependency. African leaders must navigate this complex landscape, balancing foreign interests while prioritizing their countries’ long-term goals.
Ultimately, the question remains: who is fooling Africa? As both the US and China expand their footprints on the continent, it’s essential for African nations to critically assess these relationships, ensuring they benefit from foreign investments without sacrificing sovereignty.
Source : US vs China: Who’s fooling Africa – The East African
China
China Monthly Tax Update: November 2024
On November 24, the State Taxation Administration announced the nationwide rollout of fully digital electronic invoices (e-fapiao) effective December 1, 2024. This follows a successful pilot program. Digital invoices, legally valid, feature unique 20-digit numbers and streamline tax processes.
On November 24, the State Taxation Administration (STA) announced the official nationwide rollout of fully digitalized electronic invoices (e-fapiao) through its website. This decision follows the successful pilot program, which has been implemented smoothly across various regions. The pilot program has delivered notable achievements, including optimizing the business environment, improving administrative efficiency, and facilitating the digital transformation of the economy and society.
The nationwide rollout will take effect on December 1, 2024. According to the STA, digital invoices are classified as a type of “electronic invoice” under the Regulations on the Administration of Invoices of the People’s Republic of China and hold the same legal validity as traditional paper invoices. Unlike paper invoices, digital invoices exist solely in digital format and are issued as single-copy documents. Each digital invoice features a unique 20-digit number, structured to include the last two digits of the calendar year, a regional code for the provincial tax authority, a digit indicating the issuance channel, and a sequential code.
After receiving the electronic invoice, if the recipient needs to use it for declaring and deducting input VAT, fuel consumption tax, applying for export tax rebates, handling tax refunds on behalf of others, or selecting fuel inventory, they should confirm the purpose through the digital tax account.
Key points of the STA announcement are summarized in the table below:
Read more about fully digitalized e-fapiao, its impact, and how to prepare for it.
On November 6, 2024, the State Taxation Administration announced the promotion of fully digitalized electronic invoices (e-fapiao) for civil aviation passenger transport. The announcement, made in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Civil Aviation Administration of China, will take effect on December 1, 2024. This announcement specifies that public air transport companies and registered air transport sales agencies in China are permitted to issue electronic invoices for domestic passenger transport services.
This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
China
Drawing lines in the South China Sea: what Beijing’s new claims over a disputed coral reef mean
China recently declared new baselines around Scarborough Reef, asserting sovereignty amid ongoing disputes with the Philippines, raising tensions and potential risk of conflict in the South China Sea.
Earlier this month, China declared new “baselines” around Scarborough Reef, a large coral atoll topped by a handful of rocks barely above sea level in the South China Sea.
By doing so, China reaffirmed its sovereignty claim over what has become a global flashpoint in the disputed waters.
This was a pre-calculated response to the Philippines’ enactment of new maritime laws two days earlier that aimed to safeguard its own claims over the reef and other contested parts of the sea.
This legal tit-for-tat is a continuation of the ongoing sovereignty and maritime dispute between China and the Philippines (and others) in a vital ocean area through which one-third of global trade travels.
The Philippines rejected China’s declaration as a violation of its “long-established sovereignty over the shoal”. Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said:
What we see is an increasing demand by Beijing for us to concede our sovereign rights in the area.
As the tensions continue to worsen over these claims, there is an ever-increasing risk of an at-sea conflict between the two countries.
What is the Scarborough Reef?
Scarborough Reef is called Huangyan Dao in Chinese and Bajo de Masinloc by the Philippines. It is located in the northeast of the South China Sea, about 116 nautical miles (215km) west of the Philippine island of Luzon and 448 nautical miles (830km) south of the Chinese mainland.
Disputed claims in the South China Sea.
Author provided
At high tide it is reduced to a few tiny islets, the tallest of which is just 3 metres above the water. However, at low tide, it is the largest coral atoll in the South China Sea.
China asserts sovereignty over all of the waters, islands, rocks and other features in the South China Sea, as well as unspecified “historic rights” within its claimed nine-dash line. This includes Scarborough Reef.
In recent years, the reef has been the scene of repeated clashes between China and the Philippines. Since 2012, China has blocked Filipino fishing vessels from accessing the valuable lagoon here. This prompted the Philippines to take China to international arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 2013.
Three years later, an arbitration tribunal ruled that China has no historic rights to maritime areas where this would conflict with UNCLOS. The tribunal also concluded China had “unlawfully prevented Filipino fishermen from engaging in traditional fishing at Scarborough Shoal.”
China refused to participate in the arbitration case and has strongly rejected its ruling as being “null and void” and having “no binding force”.
What did China do this month?
China declared the exact location of the base points of its territorial claim around Scarborough Reef with geographical coordinates (longitude and latitude), joined up by straight lines.
China’s new baselines claims at the Scarborough Reef.
Author provided
The declaration of so-called “baselines” is standard practice for countries that want to claim maritime zones along their coasts. Baselines provide the starting point for measuring these zones.
A country’s “territorial sea” is measured from this baseline outward to as far as 12 nautical miles (22km). Under the UNCLOS treaty, a country then has full sovereignty rights over this zone, covering the seabed, water, airspace and any resources located there.
Countries want their baselines to be as far out to sea as possible so they can maximise the ocean areas over which they can reap economic benefits and enforce their own laws.
China is no exception. Along with other countries (especially in Asia), it draws the most generous baselines of all – straight baselines. These can connect distant headlands or other coastal outcrops with a simple straight line, or even enclose nearshore islands.
China is especially fond of straight baselines. In 1996, it drew them along most of its mainland coast and around the Paracel Islands, a disputed archipelago in the South China Sea. China defined additional straight baselines this March in the Gulf of Tonkin up to its land border with Vietnam.
China says these actions comply with UNCLOS. However, its use of straight baselines around Scarborough Reef conflicts with international law. This is because UNCLOS provides a specific rule for baselines around reefs, which China did not follow.
Based on our review of satellite imagery, however, China has only advanced the outer limit of its territorial sea by a few hundred metres in two directions. This is because its straight baselines largely hug the edge of the reef.
These new baselines around Scarborough Reef are therefore fairly conservative and enclose a dramatically smaller area than the US had feared.
China’s declaration signals that it may have abandoned its much larger “offshore archipelago” claim to what it calls the Zhongsha Islands.
China has long asserted that Scarborough Reef is part of this larger island group, which includes the Macclesfield Bank, a totally underwater feature 180 nautical miles (333 km) to the west. This led to concern that Beijing might draw a baseline around this entire island group, claiming all the waters within exclusively for its use.
The South China Sea arbitration tribunal ruled that international law prohibits such claims. There will be a collective sigh of relief among many countries that China decided to make a much smaller claim over Scarborough Reef.
Significance and future steps?
However, China’s clarification of its baselines around the reef signals it may be more assertive in its law enforcement here.
The China Coast Guard has said it will step up patrols in the South China Sea to “firmly uphold order, protect the local ecosystem and biological resources and safeguard national territorial sovereignty and maritime rights”.
Given the long history of clashes related to fishing access around Scarborough Reef, this sets the scene for more confrontation.
And what about the biggest prize of all in the South China Sea – the Spratly Islands?
We can now expect China will continue its long straight baselines march to this island group to the south. The Spratlys are an archipelago of more than 150 small islands, reefs and atolls spread out over around 240,000 square kilometres of lucrative fishing grounds. They are claimed by China, as well as the Philippines and several other countries.
These countries can be expected to protest any attempted encirclement of the Spratly Islands by new Chinese baselines.
Editor’s note: one of the original authors of this article has been removed at their request.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.