China
China Strengthens Its Presence in Myanmar Following the Coup
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Naypyidaw in April 2026 saw China reiterate its firm support for Myanmar in safeguarding its sovereignty and security. Beijing’s language was familiar — stability, sovereignty, non-interference and friendship — but its practice tells a more complicated story. Through carefully calibrated interventions, China is actively managing its neighbour to serve its own strategic interests.
Before Myanmar’s 2021 coup, Beijing had already built strong ties with Naypyidaw. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2020 visit was a high point in bilateral relations, particularly discussions of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor. China gained access to the civilian government, the military and ethnic armed organisations.
In comparison, the 2026 visit was more than a regular diplomatic call. It came shortly after Min Aung Hlaing was sworn in as president, following an election widely criticised as designed to consolidate military rule. Myanmar’s detained state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi was also moved from prison to house arrest, a move that looked more like regime image management than political opening.
Though the political context in Myanmar may have changed, China’s interests have not. China wants stability along its border, protection for infrastructure corridors, access to strategic resources and an outlet to the Indian Ocean. Central to this is the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor which links Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal through pipelines, roads, railways and port projects. The Kyaukphyu deep-sea port in Rakhine State in particular offers a potential gateway to the Indian Ocean, reducing China’s reliance on the Malacca Strait.
Northern Myanmar has also become a critical source of rare earths and tin for China’s industrial, clean energy and defence supply chains. In Kachin State, rare earth mining areas such as Chipwi and Pangwa show how a local war economy intersects with global technology competition. The mines sit in Myanmar but processing, pricing and downstream industrial power remain centred in China. Beijing does not need to control every mine directly so long as it controls the routes, refineries and markets.
