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Asean

South China Sea dispute dynamics

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Author: Donald R. Rothwell, ANU

The decision handed down by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 19 November 2012 in the Nicaragua v Columbia case has several implications for the South China Sea disputes, particularly with respect to the status of the disputed maritime features under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).

A Fililipino protester holds a slogan beside a Philippine flag during a rally outside the Chinese Consulate in suburban Makati, south of Manila, Philippines on 11 June 2013. (Photo: AAP)

In the Nicaragua v Colombia case the ICJ was called upon to determine sovereignty over a number of islands and maritime features in the Caribbean Sea claimed by Nicaragua and Colombia, the maritime entitlements of those features, and the consequent exclusive economic zone (EEZ)/continental shelf boundary. The ICJ’s judgment explored a range of issues which not only bear similarities to aspects of the South China Sea land and maritime disputes but which set a precedent for the interpretation of the relevant international law. In particular, the ICJ considered the definition in international law of islands and associated maritime features, their entitlements to maritime zones, and the impact of these features upon maritime boundary delimitation between two states with joint claims over a maritime area. Of particular significance for South China Sea disputes is how the court dealt with Colombia’s maritime entitlements in the Caribbean Sea immediately adjacent to the Nicaraguan coast and at some distance from the Colombian metropolitan coast.

Part VIII of the LOSC details the ‘Regime of Islands’, which contains provisions of considerable significance for the South China Sea. Article 121(1) defines an island as ‘a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide’. An artificial island does not therefore meet the criteria. Rocks, shoals or reefs which may be visible at low tide are not Article 121(1) islands for the purposes of the LOSC. The importance of Article 121(1) islands under the LOSC is that they generate the complete range of maritime zones. An exception applies in the case of islands that may be characterised as rocks, and which ‘cannot sustain human habitation or an economic life of their own’. These features do not enjoy an entitlement to a continental shelf or an EEZ. In the South China Sea distinguishing between islands, rocks and low-tide elevations is of greater significance because of the number of maritime features in dispute, and the efforts by some of the claimant states to build structures such as platforms, lighthouses and small dwellings on these features in an effort to sustain their territorial claims and the capacity of those maritime features to be characterised as Article 121(1) islands.

A major feature of Nicaragua v Colombia was the maritime features found in the disputed sea areas, including offshore features comprising a mix of islands, reefs, cays, banks, shoals and atolls. A key threshold issue for the ICJ was the capacity of these features to be subject to appropriation. The court reaffirmed established principles in this respect by distinguishing between the capacity of islands, even very small islands, to be subject to appropriation, while low-tide elevations cannot be appropriated other than if they fall within the territorial sea.

In drawing conclusions as to the significance of the Nicaragua v Colombia decision for the South China Sea great care needs to be exercised due to the very distinctive maritime geography that was under review. Nevertheless, the following general conclusions can be made. The first is that the ICJ undertook a forensic analysis in order to determine whether certain maritime features are Article 121(1) islands, or alternatively are rocks or low-tide elevations. The second is that the ICJ will consider a range of issues as they relate to islands in its assessment of what are the relevant circumstances following the drawing of a provisional equidistance or median boundary line. To that end, the size of the island and its potential distorting effect upon a maritime boundary are factors that will be considered.

In the context of the South China Sea this decision would certainly suggest that, even if territorial sovereignty was conclusively settled over disputed islands and associated maritime features, there is every likelihood that the ability of these features to generate vast maritime claims would be compromised. This is either because these features are not Article 121(1) islands, or because they would have a distorting impact upon the maritime boundaries based upon competing maritime claims from continental or island land masses whose status is not in dispute.

A realisation of how these issues are being dealt with by international courts may have implications for how some of the South China Sea claimants view their territorial and maritime assertions. This would especially be the case if there was a realisation of the very limited capacity of some of the currently disputed maritime features to generate either an EEZ or continental shelf under Article 121(1); or, even if those features did generate a maritime entitlement, their capacity to significantly influence the direction of a maritime boundary between continental or archipelagic states. Such an objective determination as to the status of these features may ultimately have an impact on the current geopolitics within the region, and may act as a catalyst for other means of dispute resolution including the reaching of agreements on maritime boundaries.

Donald R. Rothwell is Professor of International Law at the ANU College of Law, Australian National University. 

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South China Sea dispute dynamics

Asean

ASEAN weathering the COVID-19 typhoon

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Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc addresses a special video conference with leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), in Hanoi 14 April, 2020 (Photo:Reuters/Manan Vatsyayana).

Author: Sandra Seno-Alday, Sydney University

The roughly 20 typhoons that hit Southeast Asia each year pale in comparison to the impact on the region of COVID-19 — a storm of a very different sort striking not just Southeast Asia but the world.

 

Just how badly is the COVID-19 typhoon thrashing the region? And what might the post-crisis recovery and reconstruction look like? To answer these questions, it is necessary to investigate the strengths and vulnerabilities of Southeast Asia’s pre-COVID-19 economic infrastructure.

Understanding the structure of the region’s economic house requires going back to 1967, when Southeast Asian countries decided to pledge friendship to one another under the ASEAN framework. While other integrated regions such as NAFTA and the European Union have aggressively broken down trade barriers and significantly boosted intra-regional trade, ASEAN regional economic integration has chugged along slower.

Southeast Asian countries have not viewed trade between each other as a top priority. The trade agreements in the region have been forged around suggestions for ASEAN countries to lower tariffs on intra-regional trade to within a certain range and across limited industries. This has lowered but not eliminated barriers to intra-regional trade. Consequently, a relatively significant share of Southeast Asian trade is with countries outside the region. This active extra-regional engagement has resulted in ASEAN countries’ successful integration into global value chain networks.

A historically outward-facing region, in 2010 around 75 per cent of Southeast Asian commodity imports and exports came from countries outside of ASEAN. This share of extra-regional trade nudged closer to 80 per cent in 2018. This indicates that ASEAN’s global value chain network embeddedness has deepened over time.

Around 40 per cent of ASEAN’s extra-regional trade is with the rest of Asia. From 2010 to 2018 Southeast Asian countries forged major trade relationships with four Asian countries: China, Japan, South Korea and India. Outside Asia, the United States is the region’s major trading partner. ASEAN’s trade focus on Asia’s largest markets is not surprising. Countries tend to establish trade relationships with large, geographically close, and culturally similar markets.

Fostering deep relationships with a few large markets, however, is a double-edged sword. While it has allowed ASEAN to benefit from integration in global value chains, it has also resulted in increased vulnerability to the shocks affecting its network connections.

ASEAN’s participation in global value chains has allowed it to transition from a net regional importer in 1990 to a net regional exporter in 2018. But the region’s deep embeddedness in a small and tightly-coupled network cluster of extra-regional global value chain partners has exposed it to disruption to any and all of its external partners. By contrast, ASEAN’s intra-regional trade network structure is much more loosely-coupled: a consequence of persistent intra-regional trade barriers and thus lower intra-regional trade intensity.

In the pre-COVID-19 period, ASEAN built for itself an economic house held up by just five extra-regional markets, while doing less to expand and diversify its intra-regional trade network. The data shows that ASEAN trade became increasingly concentrated in these few external markets between 2010 and 2018.

This dependence on a handful of markets does not bode well for risk and crisis management. All of the region’s major trading partners have been significantly affected by COVID-19 and this in turn is blowing the ASEAN economic house down.

What are the ways forward? The immediate task at hand is to get a better picture of the region’s position in global value chain networks and to get on top of managing its network risk exposure. Already there are red flags around the region’s food security arising from its position in food value chains. It is critical to look for ways to introduce flexibility into existing supply chains for greater agility in responding to crises.

It is also an opportune time for ASEAN to harness the technology transfer gains of global value chain participation and invest in innovation-driven diversification of products and markets. The region’s embeddedness in global value chain networks certainly places it in a strong position to readily access large export markets not just in Asia but also Europe and the Americas.

Over the longer term, ASEAN is faced with the question of whether it should seriously look…

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Tiger Trade Launches SGX Trading, Meeting Demand from Asian Investors

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Asean

Can Asia maintain growth with an ever ageing population ?

To boost productivity in the future, Asian governments will have to implement well-targeted structural reforms today.

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Asia has been the world champion of economic growth for decades, and this year will be no exception. According to the latest International Monetary Fund Regional Economic Outlook(REO), the Asia-Pacific region’s GDP is projected to increase by 5.5% in 2017 and 5.4% in 2018. (more…)

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