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Asean

China and ideological diversity

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Author: Frans-Paul van der Putten, Clingendael Institute

One of the most enduring aspects of the global system of international relations has been the divide in terms of power and wealth between the West and the developing world. The rise of China, which combines the features of a developing country with those of an emerging superpower, is affecting the West’s position in the developing world.

The main issue is whether or not liberal values will prevail, especially in the economic sphere.

Because in China the role of the state in the economy is larger than in the west, Chinese firms abroad potentially benefit more from home government support than their western counterparts do. The Chinese government has a broad set of tools to support China’s business interests abroad — adjusting of currency exchange rates to stimulate exports, providing cheap credit for business expansion, and assisting in the financing of overseas infrastructure projects carried out by Chinese firms.

Varying economic systems make a difference as far as foreign investment is concerned. In those countries where the host government intervenes in the economy, business-to-government contacts carry a greater weight than in less-regulated markets. In economies with an interventionist state, companies that are backed directly by a strong home government are at an advantage. Also, at the international level, countries with semi-free markets will not give much support to standards that address the competitive relationship between free market economies and state-controlled economies. So it is in the interest of western countries that developing countries move towards market economies.

Different political systems too affect foreign investment, though to a lesser degree than economic systems. In countries without a liberal democratic system, the degree of protection of foreign investors against political risks often depends on their relationship with the host government. Here again foreign companies that are directly backed by a powerful home government may have a competitive advantage over foreign investors that lack similar support.

The West and China take different positions on intervening in developing countries. The United States and other western countries have long promoted free markets and political liberalism in developing countries through the World Bank, the IMF and other western-dominated international organisations. But China’s position is that each developing country must be free to choose its own development path. So from the Chinese perspective, it is not desirable that multilateral organisations promote liberal values in the developing world. In China’s worldview political-economic diversity at the international level is a norm in international relations, and this challenges the western drive for ideological uniformity.

Chinese leaders have referred to this notion as ‘harmony with diversity’. Among other instances, the former premier Wen Jiabao did so in a speech he delivered at the Arab League in 2009. This concept works in two ways for China. Its most important function is to defend China against western interference. But it also signals to developing countries that China is not a threat and that it is different from the western powers, which try to export their ideology.

Though the concept of international diversity protects China from the West, Beijing’s support for this norm is not an opportunistic ad-hoc policy that China will abandon once it no longer feels threatened by the United States and its allies. First, China has a deeply rooted foreign policy tradition that lacks the urge to spread its own political-economic model. Second, maintaining diversity as a norm increases Chinese influence in the developing world while decreasing that of the West.

As China becomes more influential in the sphere of global governance, it is increasingly capable of promoting political-economic diversity as an international norm. It is likely that China will continue to block western initiatives aimed at promoting liberal democracy and economic liberalism. China might lend support to interventionist initiatives at multilateral forums, but only on an ad-hoc basis and in spite rather than because they could result in political change. Also, for pragmatic reasons, in particular instances China may favour host-country policies for a better investment climate that correspond with a liberal economic agenda.

China furthers its concept of ‘harmony with diversity’ in international organisations. In organisations such as the UN Security Council, the IMF and the World Bank, China is an increasingly influential member. At the same time, Beijing supports the creation of alternative organisations that challenge the western-dominated forums, such as the G20 and the BRICS development bank. It may be expected that the Chinese government will use its influence in all of these multilateral forums and organisations to make sure that these do not represent a specific ideology (such as liberalism) and that they discourage or even prevent countries from intervening in other countries in order to spread a particular ideology (again liberalism).

So China’s contribution to the shaping of the world order may be to ensure that this order allows for and protects the diversity of political-economic systems. The more China succeeds in making the institutions of global governance ideologically ‘neutral’, the more difficult it becomes for the West to export liberal democracy and economic liberalism to the developing world. This changes the competitive context in developing economies to the advantage of Chinese business interests.

Frans-Paul van der Putten is a senior research fellow at the Clingendael Institute, The Hague.

This contribution is based on an article in Global Policy 4(1), 2013.

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China and ideological diversity

Asean

ASEAN weathering the COVID-19 typhoon

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Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc addresses a special video conference with leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), in Hanoi 14 April, 2020 (Photo:Reuters/Manan Vatsyayana).

Author: Sandra Seno-Alday, Sydney University

The roughly 20 typhoons that hit Southeast Asia each year pale in comparison to the impact on the region of COVID-19 — a storm of a very different sort striking not just Southeast Asia but the world.

 

Just how badly is the COVID-19 typhoon thrashing the region? And what might the post-crisis recovery and reconstruction look like? To answer these questions, it is necessary to investigate the strengths and vulnerabilities of Southeast Asia’s pre-COVID-19 economic infrastructure.

Understanding the structure of the region’s economic house requires going back to 1967, when Southeast Asian countries decided to pledge friendship to one another under the ASEAN framework. While other integrated regions such as NAFTA and the European Union have aggressively broken down trade barriers and significantly boosted intra-regional trade, ASEAN regional economic integration has chugged along slower.

Southeast Asian countries have not viewed trade between each other as a top priority. The trade agreements in the region have been forged around suggestions for ASEAN countries to lower tariffs on intra-regional trade to within a certain range and across limited industries. This has lowered but not eliminated barriers to intra-regional trade. Consequently, a relatively significant share of Southeast Asian trade is with countries outside the region. This active extra-regional engagement has resulted in ASEAN countries’ successful integration into global value chain networks.

A historically outward-facing region, in 2010 around 75 per cent of Southeast Asian commodity imports and exports came from countries outside of ASEAN. This share of extra-regional trade nudged closer to 80 per cent in 2018. This indicates that ASEAN’s global value chain network embeddedness has deepened over time.

Around 40 per cent of ASEAN’s extra-regional trade is with the rest of Asia. From 2010 to 2018 Southeast Asian countries forged major trade relationships with four Asian countries: China, Japan, South Korea and India. Outside Asia, the United States is the region’s major trading partner. ASEAN’s trade focus on Asia’s largest markets is not surprising. Countries tend to establish trade relationships with large, geographically close, and culturally similar markets.

Fostering deep relationships with a few large markets, however, is a double-edged sword. While it has allowed ASEAN to benefit from integration in global value chains, it has also resulted in increased vulnerability to the shocks affecting its network connections.

ASEAN’s participation in global value chains has allowed it to transition from a net regional importer in 1990 to a net regional exporter in 2018. But the region’s deep embeddedness in a small and tightly-coupled network cluster of extra-regional global value chain partners has exposed it to disruption to any and all of its external partners. By contrast, ASEAN’s intra-regional trade network structure is much more loosely-coupled: a consequence of persistent intra-regional trade barriers and thus lower intra-regional trade intensity.

In the pre-COVID-19 period, ASEAN built for itself an economic house held up by just five extra-regional markets, while doing less to expand and diversify its intra-regional trade network. The data shows that ASEAN trade became increasingly concentrated in these few external markets between 2010 and 2018.

This dependence on a handful of markets does not bode well for risk and crisis management. All of the region’s major trading partners have been significantly affected by COVID-19 and this in turn is blowing the ASEAN economic house down.

What are the ways forward? The immediate task at hand is to get a better picture of the region’s position in global value chain networks and to get on top of managing its network risk exposure. Already there are red flags around the region’s food security arising from its position in food value chains. It is critical to look for ways to introduce flexibility into existing supply chains for greater agility in responding to crises.

It is also an opportune time for ASEAN to harness the technology transfer gains of global value chain participation and invest in innovation-driven diversification of products and markets. The region’s embeddedness in global value chain networks certainly places it in a strong position to readily access large export markets not just in Asia but also Europe and the Americas.

Over the longer term, ASEAN is faced with the question of whether it should seriously look…

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Tiger Trade Launches SGX Trading, Meeting Demand from Asian Investors

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Asean

Can Asia maintain growth with an ever ageing population ?

To boost productivity in the future, Asian governments will have to implement well-targeted structural reforms today.

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Asia has been the world champion of economic growth for decades, and this year will be no exception. According to the latest International Monetary Fund Regional Economic Outlook(REO), the Asia-Pacific region’s GDP is projected to increase by 5.5% in 2017 and 5.4% in 2018. (more…)

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