Author: Yawei Liu, Carter Centre No Chinese Communist leader has ever said democracy is a bad thing. When asked how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would avoid the notorious dynastic cycles of the previous emperors, Mao Zedong proudly said that the CCP had found a miraculous mechanism to keep them away: democracy. Deng Xiaoping repeatedly said that the ultimate reform was political reform. Without political reform, there is no way to sustain economic reform. Deng even predicted that China might adopt national presidential elections by 2050 after she overcame gaps in wealth and education between urban dwellers and rural residents . Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao at the past four CCP national congresses touted ‘four democracies’ at the grassroots level, namely democratic elections, democratic decision-making, democratic management and democratic supervision in official and public affairs. Nevertheless, it is Premier Wen Jiabao who has in recent years turned the vague rhetoric of adopting democracy into a real action plan-cum-timetable. In Wen’s design, China’s democracy is made up of three components: first, direct elections moving up from villages to towns and to counties; second, restraining government power via independent judiciary oversight; and third, enhancing government accountability through a freer and more autonomous media. Wen’s repeated calls for meaningful political reform have not only fallen on deaf ears within the top echelons of the CCP, but also disillusioned the broad masses, as the latter have not seen any tangible action being taken. Some even label Wen as the best actor in China’s theatre of politics. If people see Wen as merely being a good actor, many CCP movers and shakers may perceive his utterance on initiating political transformation as an unfathomable threat to the political consensus and a devious plot to influence power transition at the upcoming 18 th CCP National Congress. In response Wu Bangguo, who is ranked second in the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, seems to have attempted to put the brakes on Wen’s runaway train by making a solemn ‘six nos’ declaration at the recent annual session of the National People’s Congress in Beijing. The now infamous ‘six nos’ are no multiple party system, no diversity in ideology, no checks and balances, no two-chamber parliament, no federal republic and no privatisation. If Wu indeed wanted to shut down Wen’s vision for political reform, he is missing the target by a wide margin because none of the ‘six nos’ are remotely applicable to Wen’s proposals. In fact, if the CCP does have political reform (or democracy with Chinese characteristics) in mind, its engineers do not need to ‘westernise’ anything for now. Although these reform measures do eventually require amending the Constitution and relevant laws, most of them will fall into China’s current legal framework. In order to implement democratic reform, first, direct village election measures need to be put in place for the election of deputies to town and country people’s congresses. China has about four million elected people’s deputies at five levels (town, county, municipal, provincial and national) and the elections at the town and county levels are direct. Adopting village elections measures at these two levels means free nomination of candidates, unrestricted campaigns by candidates, multiple candidates and secret ballots. These elected local people’s deputies will not only elect township and county magistrates but also deputies at the next higher level. Competitive, open and free elections at these two levels will change the dynamics of China’s politics overnight. Yes, CCP candidates may dominate the process as the system now exists, but it does provide an avenue for non-party candidates to compete free of hassle by the CCP apparatus. This first step needs no major amendments to the Constitution and laws. Second, is to allow people’s congress deputies at all levels (during the trial period, it may first be limited to the bottom two levels) to use their authority to the fullest extent, as stipulated by the law. Their authority includes electing executive leadership of the government at the same level, approving budgets and expenditure, auditing reports by the judicial and law enforcement branches of government, and voting on all major decisions of government. This requires no change whatsoever to existing law but certainly requires the CCP to cede lower level control and stop manipulating or interfering in the proceedings of people’s congresses. This seems to be the biggest hurdle for an empowered and accountable people’s congress system to take shape. Third, is for the people’s deputies to be responsible, responsive and respectful to the people who elect them. Their number should be significantly reduced and their representation determined by geography. For example, a Chinese scholar suggests that the NPC cannot function unless its number is cut from the current number of about 3,000 to about 800. No one of the 800 should come from the central government or the military but strictly from the provinces. They must be elected by the provincial legislature (similar to the way that US senators were chosen before the 1920s). This measure does require significant amendment of the laws in China. These three measures are interconnected and intertwined. No single measure will work unless the other two are in place and enforceable. The first two of the three measures are already stipulated in the law but not even remotely enforced. The real adoption of these measures will have no Western writing on the wall and does not require the CCP to allow other political parties to compete on the same level playing field for now. In other words, these measures are not designed to undermine the supremacy of the CCP, despite their having not been tolerated by the CCP and being perceived by many CCP leaders as potential harbingers of chaos and even civil war. The adoption of these three measures will not necessarily mean China meets the benchmarks of a real and vibrant democracy, but they would make a meaningful beginning. It is a process that is not drastic and unlikely to trigger radical political activism . These measures are a touchstone as to whether the CCP is taking political reform into serious consideration . They are also a countermeasure against the most powerful and persuasive excuse against democratisation: ordinary Chinese people are not ready to engage in democracy and political stability is paramount. I am hopeful Wen Jiabao and Wu Bangguo can reach a compromise on this issue with full backing from Hu Jintao. They only have 17 months of their term left to do so. Yawei Liu is Director of The Carter Center’s China Program and is the Founder and Editor of China Elections and Governance (www.chinaelections.org and www.chinaelectionsblog.net). Malaysia’s democratic deficit Reimagining Chinese Indonesians in democratic Indonesia Malaysia’s democratic deficit