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Asean

The anniversary of the 1999 Chinese embassy bombing

Author: Patrick Chin-Dahler, ANU On 7 May 1999, during the US-led NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, two US B2 bombers launched five 2000-pound missiles. Three of these bombs exploded near the Chinese embassy’s intelligence operations building in Belgrade, while two of them directly hit the embassy, killing three and injuring 23 Chinese citizens. The US claimed it targeted a Serbian arms depot, but aimed and hit the Chinese embassy due to outdated maps. The embassy bombing sparked a number of violent protests and nationalist outpouring within China directed against the US (and to a lesser extent, NATO). Key themes in the Chinese writings about the bombings included the century of national humiliation (1839 – 1949) and victor narratives (1949 – present) to interpret it; the uncritical acceptance that the bombing was deliberate and a logical progression in the historical humiliations directed against China by the West; and the privileging of unity and sovereignty as key to overturning national humiliation and restoring national strength. In writing its own history China has cast itself into the victor narrative overwriting the century of national humiliation. But the victim/victor dynamic — the interplay between the victim and victor discourses — has continued to shape Chinese nationalism, especially during the aftermath of the embassy bombing. Analysing how modern Chinese history has been written and the way in which Chinese people think about their history provides insight into Chinese nationalism today. Since 1991, China’s mass Patriotic Education Campaigns have promulgated the story of modern Chinese history as one of victimisation-to-victory. The century of national humiliation and victor narratives are framed in Chinese historical textbooks as a series of key chronological events. Starting from the First Opium War 1839-1842, the century of national humiliation includes the burning of the Old Summer Palace in 1860, the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, the Boxer Rebellion in 1905, the 21 Demands from the Japanese in 1921 and the War of Resistance from 1933 to 1945. From 1949, with the final wresting of control of Beijing from the Nationalists and China ‘standing up’ to foreign powers, the victor narrative succeeds the century of national humiliation. It highlights defeat of the US (imperialists) during the Korean War (1950- 1953) and the success of modernisation during the reform and opening era. The victor narrative overlooks discontinuities in China’s victory, of which the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution stand out as prominent examples. More recent accounts have extended China’s success to include the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, the hosting of the Olympic Games in 2008 and the successful emergence of China as a superpower. The century of national humiliation knits together all negative events of pre- revolutionary history that can be blamed on outsiders — military occupations, massacres, unequal treaties, economic extractions, violations of sovereignty and loss of territory — which all led to the humiliation of China. The Chinese nation-state is seen as the subject of history and maintaining China’s unity and sovereignty are highlighted as key to overturning national humiliation. China’s victor narrative overwrites the century of national humiliation and knits together all the positive events since 1949. The victor narrative echoes the lessons of the century of national humiliation, privileging unity and sovereignty as vital to China’s success. In the aftermath of the embassy bombing, nationalist writers claimed that the bombing was a logical extension of past humiliations directed against China by the West. They highlighted the importance of defending China’s sovereignty and unity as a means of overcoming this humiliation. China’s humiliation was thus seen to be recurring in the present, and China’s victory narrative was overlooked. Yet at the same time nationalists also subscribed to the logic that the victory narrative overwrote the century of national humiliation, highlighting the importance of unity and sovereignty as intrinsic to China’s successful modernisation and emergence as a superpower. There is therefore a coexistence between two strands of history, which shape Chinese nationalism: The teleological category of old-style Marxist history, in which there is an inevitable progression toward a preordained and scientifically discoverable future; and China’s deep historical consciousness wherein historical narratives are drawn upon as templates in which contemporary experience is processed and which assumes that situations recur in history. Unity and sovereignty are attached to both the century of national humiliation and victor narratives. The century of national humiliation insinuates into the victor narrative and the narratives exist as two sides of the same coin. By sharing the same themes, they become mutually reinforcing and further enculturated within Chinese society. Unless the importance of unity and sovereignty are de-emphasised within Chinese propaganda as vital to China’s strength, it is likely that the century of national humiliation and victor narratives will continue to shape how nationalists interpret future ‘crisis’ events in which a foreign power is involved. Patrick Chin-Dahler holds first class honours is Asian Studies and is currently studying a Masters of Public Policy (Economic Policy) at the Australian National University. Aso and Chinese history textbooks? Chinese multilateralism: implications for Sino-US relations Chinese capitalism: some lessons for India

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Author: Patrick Chin-Dahler, ANU

On 7 May 1999, during the US-led NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, two US B2 bombers launched five 2000-pound missiles.

Three of these bombs exploded near the Chinese embassy’s intelligence operations building in Belgrade, while two of them directly hit the embassy, killing three and injuring 23 Chinese citizens. The US claimed it targeted a Serbian arms depot, but aimed and hit the Chinese embassy due to outdated maps.

The embassy bombing sparked a number of violent protests and nationalist outpouring within China directed against the US (and to a lesser extent, NATO). Key themes in the Chinese writings about the bombings included the century of national humiliation (1839 – 1949) and victor narratives (1949 – present) to interpret it; the uncritical acceptance that the bombing was deliberate and a logical progression in the historical humiliations directed against China by the West; and the privileging of unity and sovereignty as key to overturning national humiliation and restoring national strength.

In writing its own history China has cast itself into the victor narrative overwriting the century of national humiliation. But the victim/victor dynamic — the interplay between the victim and victor discourses — has continued to shape Chinese nationalism, especially during the aftermath of the embassy bombing.

Analysing how modern Chinese history has been written and the way in which Chinese people think about their history provides insight into Chinese nationalism today. Since 1991, China’s mass Patriotic Education Campaigns have promulgated the story of modern Chinese history as one of victimisation-to-victory. The century of national humiliation and victor narratives are framed in Chinese historical textbooks as a series of key chronological events.

Starting from the First Opium War 1839-1842, the century of national humiliation includes the burning of the Old Summer Palace in 1860, the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, the Boxer Rebellion in 1905, the 21 Demands from the Japanese in 1921 and the War of Resistance from 1933 to 1945.

From 1949, with the final wresting of control of Beijing from the Nationalists and China ‘standing up’ to foreign powers, the victor narrative succeeds the century of national humiliation. It highlights defeat of the US (imperialists) during the Korean War (1950- 1953) and the success of modernisation during the reform and opening era. The victor narrative overlooks discontinuities in China’s victory, of which the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution stand out as prominent examples. More recent accounts have extended China’s success to include the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, the hosting of the Olympic Games in 2008 and the successful emergence of China as a superpower.

The century of national humiliation knits together all negative events of pre- revolutionary history that can be blamed on outsiders — military occupations, massacres, unequal treaties, economic extractions, violations of sovereignty and loss of territory — which all led to the humiliation of China. The Chinese nation-state is seen as the subject of history and maintaining China’s unity and sovereignty are highlighted as key to overturning national humiliation. China’s victor narrative overwrites the century of national humiliation and knits together all the positive events since 1949. The victor narrative echoes the lessons of the century of national humiliation, privileging unity and sovereignty as vital to China’s success.

In the aftermath of the embassy bombing, nationalist writers claimed that the bombing was a logical extension of past humiliations directed against China by the West. They highlighted the importance of defending China’s sovereignty and unity as a means of overcoming this humiliation. China’s humiliation was thus seen to be recurring in the present, and China’s victory narrative was overlooked. Yet at the same time nationalists also subscribed to the logic that the victory narrative overwrote the century of national humiliation, highlighting the importance of unity and sovereignty as intrinsic to China’s successful modernisation and emergence as a superpower.

There is therefore a coexistence between two strands of history, which shape Chinese nationalism: The teleological category of old-style Marxist history, in which there is an inevitable progression toward a preordained and scientifically discoverable future; and China’s deep historical consciousness wherein historical narratives are drawn upon as templates in which contemporary experience is processed and which assumes that situations recur in history.

Unity and sovereignty are attached to both the century of national humiliation and victor narratives. The century of national humiliation insinuates into the victor narrative and the narratives exist as two sides of the same coin. By sharing the same themes, they become mutually reinforcing and further enculturated within Chinese society. Unless the importance of unity and sovereignty are de-emphasised within Chinese propaganda as vital to China’s strength, it is likely that the century of national humiliation and victor narratives will continue to shape how nationalists interpret future ‘crisis’ events in which a foreign power is involved.

Patrick Chin-Dahler holds first class honours is Asian Studies and is currently studying a Masters of Public Policy (Economic Policy) at the Australian National University.

  1. Aso and Chinese history textbooks?
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The anniversary of the 1999 Chinese embassy bombing

Asean

ASEAN weathering the COVID-19 typhoon

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Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc addresses a special video conference with leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), in Hanoi 14 April, 2020 (Photo:Reuters/Manan Vatsyayana).

Author: Sandra Seno-Alday, Sydney University

The roughly 20 typhoons that hit Southeast Asia each year pale in comparison to the impact on the region of COVID-19 — a storm of a very different sort striking not just Southeast Asia but the world.

 

Just how badly is the COVID-19 typhoon thrashing the region? And what might the post-crisis recovery and reconstruction look like? To answer these questions, it is necessary to investigate the strengths and vulnerabilities of Southeast Asia’s pre-COVID-19 economic infrastructure.

Understanding the structure of the region’s economic house requires going back to 1967, when Southeast Asian countries decided to pledge friendship to one another under the ASEAN framework. While other integrated regions such as NAFTA and the European Union have aggressively broken down trade barriers and significantly boosted intra-regional trade, ASEAN regional economic integration has chugged along slower.

Southeast Asian countries have not viewed trade between each other as a top priority. The trade agreements in the region have been forged around suggestions for ASEAN countries to lower tariffs on intra-regional trade to within a certain range and across limited industries. This has lowered but not eliminated barriers to intra-regional trade. Consequently, a relatively significant share of Southeast Asian trade is with countries outside the region. This active extra-regional engagement has resulted in ASEAN countries’ successful integration into global value chain networks.

A historically outward-facing region, in 2010 around 75 per cent of Southeast Asian commodity imports and exports came from countries outside of ASEAN. This share of extra-regional trade nudged closer to 80 per cent in 2018. This indicates that ASEAN’s global value chain network embeddedness has deepened over time.

Around 40 per cent of ASEAN’s extra-regional trade is with the rest of Asia. From 2010 to 2018 Southeast Asian countries forged major trade relationships with four Asian countries: China, Japan, South Korea and India. Outside Asia, the United States is the region’s major trading partner. ASEAN’s trade focus on Asia’s largest markets is not surprising. Countries tend to establish trade relationships with large, geographically close, and culturally similar markets.

Fostering deep relationships with a few large markets, however, is a double-edged sword. While it has allowed ASEAN to benefit from integration in global value chains, it has also resulted in increased vulnerability to the shocks affecting its network connections.

ASEAN’s participation in global value chains has allowed it to transition from a net regional importer in 1990 to a net regional exporter in 2018. But the region’s deep embeddedness in a small and tightly-coupled network cluster of extra-regional global value chain partners has exposed it to disruption to any and all of its external partners. By contrast, ASEAN’s intra-regional trade network structure is much more loosely-coupled: a consequence of persistent intra-regional trade barriers and thus lower intra-regional trade intensity.

In the pre-COVID-19 period, ASEAN built for itself an economic house held up by just five extra-regional markets, while doing less to expand and diversify its intra-regional trade network. The data shows that ASEAN trade became increasingly concentrated in these few external markets between 2010 and 2018.

This dependence on a handful of markets does not bode well for risk and crisis management. All of the region’s major trading partners have been significantly affected by COVID-19 and this in turn is blowing the ASEAN economic house down.

What are the ways forward? The immediate task at hand is to get a better picture of the region’s position in global value chain networks and to get on top of managing its network risk exposure. Already there are red flags around the region’s food security arising from its position in food value chains. It is critical to look for ways to introduce flexibility into existing supply chains for greater agility in responding to crises.

It is also an opportune time for ASEAN to harness the technology transfer gains of global value chain participation and invest in innovation-driven diversification of products and markets. The region’s embeddedness in global value chain networks certainly places it in a strong position to readily access large export markets not just in Asia but also Europe and the Americas.

Over the longer term, ASEAN is faced with the question of whether it should seriously look…

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Markets

Tiger Trade Launches SGX Trading, Meeting Demand from Asian Investors

Access to the Singapore Exchange (SGX) adds to Tiger Brokers’ current menu of stock exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Nasdaq Stock Market (NASDAQ), the world’s two largest stock exchanges, as well as the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX).

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SINGAPORE (ACN Newswire) – Tiger Trade, a one-stop mobile and online trading application by Tiger Brokers, has launched access to the Singapore Exchange (SGX).

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Asean

Can Asia maintain growth with an ever ageing population ?

To boost productivity in the future, Asian governments will have to implement well-targeted structural reforms today.

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Asia has been the world champion of economic growth for decades, and this year will be no exception. According to the latest International Monetary Fund Regional Economic Outlook(REO), the Asia-Pacific region’s GDP is projected to increase by 5.5% in 2017 and 5.4% in 2018. (more…)

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