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Asean

Anti-Mubarak protests in Malaysia: How Arab issues travel

Author: Farish A. Noor, RSIS The repercussions from the wave of unrest that has spread across Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Yemen have been felt in other countries with large Muslim populations. The effects have been felt as far as Southeast Asia with Islamists and pro-democracy activists in Malaysia taking the opportunity to join in the chorus of dissent to express their support for the protesters in Egypt. In the process, what began as an Arab concern has taken on a local meaning in the Malaysian context. On February 4, 2011, a large demonstration took place in Kuala Lumpur, where over 3,000 demonstrators took to the streets after performing their Friday prayers at two mosques close to the United States Embassy. After the prayers the crowds marched towards the embassy, which is a prominent landmark on Jalan Tun Razak — conspicuous by virtue of its size and the heavy security presence there. A memorandum was handed to American Embassy officials, calling on the United States to stop supporting Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak and to allow for the transition to democracy in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. Since the pro-Taliban rallies of 2002, the American Embassy has been the focal point of many anti-Western demonstrations in Malaysia, and the pattern of the demonstrations has been largely similar. In the latest incident, the anti-Mubarak demonstration led to the arrest of a small number of protesters and the use of water canons by the police to disperse the crowd. Several salient observations can be made about the 4 February demonstration in KL, which serves as an indicator of US-Malaysian relations at the moment and the level of anti-Americanism that may or may not be prevalent among Malaysians today. Firstly, many of the organisers of the demonstration came from the opposition parties of Malaysia, notably the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and the Malaysian Socialist Party (PSM). A small representation of Anwar Ibrahim’s People’s Justice Party (PKR) was also at the scene. Notwithstanding the visible support of the PSM Socialists and the secular NGOs, an overwhelming majority of those who took part were Malay-Muslims. Many of the spokesmen and leaders of the demonstration were also leaders of PAS, with its leaders, Muhammad Sabu, Ridhuan Mohd Nor and Salahudin Ayub, the most prominent. Secondly, it is interesting to note that while a PKR divisional chief, Badrul Hisham Shaharin, was present, there were no major PKR figures at the demonstration. Local media reports remained silent over the question of whether members and leaders of the other opposition party, the Chinese-based Democratic Action Party (DAP), were present. Thirdly, there were relatively few arrests and no reports of extreme violence during or after the demonstration. Many of the slogans and banners used Arabic terms and phrases such as ‘ Yahya al-Sha’ab ’ (Long Live the People) and expressed solidarity with the Arabs of Egypt. As the Egyptian crisis escalated, Malaysian authorities seemed more concerned about the need to evacuate an estimated 11,000 Malaysian students studying there, most of whom had been sent to Egypt by the Malaysian government to pursue religious studies. This indicates the extent of contact between the two countries, and may account for how and why Malaysians seemed well-informed of developments in Egypt. The reaction of the Malaysian government has thus far been muted, with Prime Minister Najib Razak noting that it was and remains the right of the Egyptian people to determine their future and choose their respective leaders. The pro-government Malay press has taken a rather dim view of the developments across the Arab world, with the two most prominent pro-UMNO newspapers, Utusan Malaysia and Berita Harian , describing the demonstrations as ‘anti-government activities’ that jeopardise the security and stability of Egypt. The Malaysian opposition — notably the Islamists of PAS — have naturally taken the opposite view and have shown their support for the Egyptian protesters, particularly their compatriots in the Egyptian Islamist movement, Ikhwanul Muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood). Prominent Malaysian religious leaders like the former Mufti of Perlis, Dr Asri Zainal Abidin, have also waded into the fray, condemning pro-government Egyptian ulama who have been supporting the beleaguered Egyptian leader. At this stage it is unlikely that the anti-Mubarak and anti-American protests in Malaysia will escalate any further (barring an escalation of violence in Cairo or elsewhere). But they serve as a convenient means to rally the opposition and to unite anti-government forces in a concerted effort to single out common opponents; in this case the US and its allies in the Arab world. But this does not necessarily suggest a heightened mood of anti-Americanism in Malaysia. Malaysian Islamists’ perception of the US has remained negative since 2001 and the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan the following year. Prime Minister Najib has stated that Kuala Lumpur ‘would not allow anything [similar] to happen here.’ Significantly, the ruling coalition — as well as the mainstream media — has refrained from showing any unconditional support to the demonstrators in the Arab world. Farish A. Noor is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. This article was originally published  here , as RSIS Commentary 13/2011. Can Mubarak follow South Korea’s path? Malaysia: the political tide runs out Malaysia’s Hulu Salangor by-election and harbingers of reform

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Author: Farish A. Noor, RSIS

The repercussions from the wave of unrest that has spread across Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Yemen have been felt in other countries with large Muslim populations.

The effects have been felt as far as Southeast Asia with Islamists and pro-democracy activists in Malaysia taking the opportunity to join in the chorus of dissent to express their support for the protesters in Egypt. In the process, what began as an Arab concern has taken on a local meaning in the Malaysian context.

On February 4, 2011, a large demonstration took place in Kuala Lumpur, where over 3,000 demonstrators took to the streets after performing their Friday prayers at two mosques close to the United States Embassy.

After the prayers the crowds marched towards the embassy, which is a prominent landmark on Jalan Tun Razak — conspicuous by virtue of its size and the heavy security presence there. A memorandum was handed to American Embassy officials, calling on the United States to stop supporting Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak and to allow for the transition to democracy in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world.

Since the pro-Taliban rallies of 2002, the American Embassy has been the focal point of many anti-Western demonstrations in Malaysia, and the pattern of the demonstrations has been largely similar. In the latest incident, the anti-Mubarak demonstration led to the arrest of a small number of protesters and the use of water canons by the police to disperse the crowd.

Several salient observations can be made about the 4 February demonstration in KL, which serves as an indicator of US-Malaysian relations at the moment and the level of anti-Americanism that may or may not be prevalent among Malaysians today.

Firstly, many of the organisers of the demonstration came from the opposition parties of Malaysia, notably the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and the Malaysian Socialist Party (PSM). A small representation of Anwar Ibrahim’s People’s Justice Party (PKR) was also at the scene. Notwithstanding the visible support of the PSM Socialists and the secular NGOs, an overwhelming majority of those who took part were Malay-Muslims. Many of the spokesmen and leaders of the demonstration were also leaders of PAS, with its leaders, Muhammad Sabu, Ridhuan Mohd Nor and Salahudin Ayub, the most prominent.

Secondly, it is interesting to note that while a PKR divisional chief, Badrul Hisham Shaharin, was present, there were no major PKR figures at the demonstration. Local media reports remained silent over the question of whether members and leaders of the other opposition party, the Chinese-based Democratic Action Party (DAP), were present.

Thirdly, there were relatively few arrests and no reports of extreme violence during or after the demonstration. Many of the slogans and banners used Arabic terms and phrases such as ‘Yahya al-Sha’ab’ (Long Live the People) and expressed solidarity with the Arabs of Egypt. As the Egyptian crisis escalated, Malaysian authorities seemed more concerned about the need to evacuate an estimated 11,000 Malaysian students studying there, most of whom had been sent to Egypt by the Malaysian government to pursue religious studies. This indicates the extent of contact between the two countries, and may account for how and why Malaysians seemed well-informed of developments in Egypt.

The reaction of the Malaysian government has thus far been muted, with Prime Minister Najib Razak noting that it was and remains the right of the Egyptian people to determine their future and choose their respective leaders. The pro-government Malay press has taken a rather dim view of the developments across the Arab world, with the two most prominent pro-UMNO newspapers, Utusan Malaysia and Berita Harian, describing the demonstrations as ‘anti-government activities’ that jeopardise the security and stability of Egypt.

The Malaysian opposition — notably the Islamists of PAS — have naturally taken the opposite view and have shown their support for the Egyptian protesters, particularly their compatriots in the Egyptian Islamist movement, Ikhwanul Muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood). Prominent Malaysian religious leaders like the former Mufti of Perlis, Dr Asri Zainal Abidin, have also waded into the fray, condemning pro-government Egyptian ulama who have been supporting the beleaguered Egyptian leader.

At this stage it is unlikely that the anti-Mubarak and anti-American protests in Malaysia will escalate any further (barring an escalation of violence in Cairo or elsewhere). But they serve as a convenient means to rally the opposition and to unite anti-government forces in a concerted effort to single out common opponents; in this case the US and its allies in the Arab world.

But this does not necessarily suggest a heightened mood of anti-Americanism in Malaysia. Malaysian Islamists’ perception of the US has remained negative since 2001 and the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan the following year.

Prime Minister Najib has stated that Kuala Lumpur ‘would not allow anything [similar] to happen here.’ Significantly, the ruling coalition — as well as the mainstream media — has refrained from showing any unconditional support to the demonstrators in the Arab world.

Farish A. Noor is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

This article was originally published here, as RSIS Commentary 13/2011.

  1. Can Mubarak follow South Korea’s path?
  2. Malaysia: the political tide runs out
  3. Malaysia’s Hulu Salangor by-election and harbingers of reform

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Anti-Mubarak protests in Malaysia: How Arab issues travel

Asean

ASEAN weathering the COVID-19 typhoon

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Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc addresses a special video conference with leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), in Hanoi 14 April, 2020 (Photo:Reuters/Manan Vatsyayana).

Author: Sandra Seno-Alday, Sydney University

The roughly 20 typhoons that hit Southeast Asia each year pale in comparison to the impact on the region of COVID-19 — a storm of a very different sort striking not just Southeast Asia but the world.

 

Just how badly is the COVID-19 typhoon thrashing the region? And what might the post-crisis recovery and reconstruction look like? To answer these questions, it is necessary to investigate the strengths and vulnerabilities of Southeast Asia’s pre-COVID-19 economic infrastructure.

Understanding the structure of the region’s economic house requires going back to 1967, when Southeast Asian countries decided to pledge friendship to one another under the ASEAN framework. While other integrated regions such as NAFTA and the European Union have aggressively broken down trade barriers and significantly boosted intra-regional trade, ASEAN regional economic integration has chugged along slower.

Southeast Asian countries have not viewed trade between each other as a top priority. The trade agreements in the region have been forged around suggestions for ASEAN countries to lower tariffs on intra-regional trade to within a certain range and across limited industries. This has lowered but not eliminated barriers to intra-regional trade. Consequently, a relatively significant share of Southeast Asian trade is with countries outside the region. This active extra-regional engagement has resulted in ASEAN countries’ successful integration into global value chain networks.

A historically outward-facing region, in 2010 around 75 per cent of Southeast Asian commodity imports and exports came from countries outside of ASEAN. This share of extra-regional trade nudged closer to 80 per cent in 2018. This indicates that ASEAN’s global value chain network embeddedness has deepened over time.

Around 40 per cent of ASEAN’s extra-regional trade is with the rest of Asia. From 2010 to 2018 Southeast Asian countries forged major trade relationships with four Asian countries: China, Japan, South Korea and India. Outside Asia, the United States is the region’s major trading partner. ASEAN’s trade focus on Asia’s largest markets is not surprising. Countries tend to establish trade relationships with large, geographically close, and culturally similar markets.

Fostering deep relationships with a few large markets, however, is a double-edged sword. While it has allowed ASEAN to benefit from integration in global value chains, it has also resulted in increased vulnerability to the shocks affecting its network connections.

ASEAN’s participation in global value chains has allowed it to transition from a net regional importer in 1990 to a net regional exporter in 2018. But the region’s deep embeddedness in a small and tightly-coupled network cluster of extra-regional global value chain partners has exposed it to disruption to any and all of its external partners. By contrast, ASEAN’s intra-regional trade network structure is much more loosely-coupled: a consequence of persistent intra-regional trade barriers and thus lower intra-regional trade intensity.

In the pre-COVID-19 period, ASEAN built for itself an economic house held up by just five extra-regional markets, while doing less to expand and diversify its intra-regional trade network. The data shows that ASEAN trade became increasingly concentrated in these few external markets between 2010 and 2018.

This dependence on a handful of markets does not bode well for risk and crisis management. All of the region’s major trading partners have been significantly affected by COVID-19 and this in turn is blowing the ASEAN economic house down.

What are the ways forward? The immediate task at hand is to get a better picture of the region’s position in global value chain networks and to get on top of managing its network risk exposure. Already there are red flags around the region’s food security arising from its position in food value chains. It is critical to look for ways to introduce flexibility into existing supply chains for greater agility in responding to crises.

It is also an opportune time for ASEAN to harness the technology transfer gains of global value chain participation and invest in innovation-driven diversification of products and markets. The region’s embeddedness in global value chain networks certainly places it in a strong position to readily access large export markets not just in Asia but also Europe and the Americas.

Over the longer term, ASEAN is faced with the question of whether it should seriously look…

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Asean

Can Asia maintain growth with an ever ageing population ?

To boost productivity in the future, Asian governments will have to implement well-targeted structural reforms today.

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Asia has been the world champion of economic growth for decades, and this year will be no exception. According to the latest International Monetary Fund Regional Economic Outlook(REO), the Asia-Pacific region’s GDP is projected to increase by 5.5% in 2017 and 5.4% in 2018. (more…)

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