How do Israel and Iran’s nuclear status differ under international law?

Amid heightened Middle Eastern tensions, a debate arises over Israel’s nuclear weapons and Iran’s restrictions. This relates to international law, particularly the NPT, which differentiates nuclear-weapon states from non-nuclear ones.

At a time when military tensions in the Middle East have further intensified in recent weeks, in the context of operations conducted by the United States and Israel and renewed concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme, a recurring question has re-emerged in public debate: why does Israel possess nuclear weapons while Iran is legally prohibited from acquiring them?

Often framed in terms of unequal treatment or “double standards,” this question actually relates to the very structure of the international legal regime governing nuclear weapons.

International law is a legal order created by states and for states. As such, it is grounded in the consent of states, which derives from their sovereignty. This fundamental principle also applies to the legal regime governing nuclear weapons: the possession of nuclear weapons – or the decision to renounce them – is a matter of sovereign choice. In other words, only a state may consent to limiting its military capabilities by renouncing possession of such weapons of mass destruction.

This state voluntarism is clearly reflected in the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

This treaty constitutes one of the pillars of collective security in international law. Its purpose is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons – in particular to additional states – in order to promote nuclear disarmament, and encourage safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The NPT distinguishes between nuclear-weapon states (United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China) and non-nuclear-weapon states. More specifically, it defines nuclear-weapon states as those that had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967, while the other parties are classified as non-nuclear-weapon states and have agreed to forswear the possession of nuclear weapons.

In a context marked by Cold War tensions and fears of an uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear powers, the spread of nuclear weapons to an increasing number of states was perceived in 1968 as a major factor of international instability and a heightened risk of nuclear conflict. Against this backdrop, the compromise at the heart of the NPT was accepted, based on a differentiated allocation of obligations between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states.

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