China’s Sany Heavy is contemplating selling a stake in its Indian operations, signaling a potential strategic shift in its business approach within the country.

Sany Heavy’s Strategic Move

China’s Sany Heavy Industries is contemplating a stake sale in its Indian operations. This decision aligns with the company’s strategy to streamline its business and enhance operational efficiency in the competitive Indian market.

Implications for India’s Construction Sector

The potential stake sale could significantly impact India’s construction machinery landscape, as Sany is a prominent player in this sector. Investors are closely monitoring the situation, which could lead to increased capital infusion into the market.

Future Prospects

If the stake sale proceeds, it may open up opportunities for new partnerships and investments in the Indian construction industry. Sany’s decision reflects broader trends of foreign companies reassessing their positions in India’s evolving market.

Source : China’s Sany Heavy is considering stake sale in India business – MSN

China’s new year demands foreign companies navigate complex compliance and financial reporting processes. The updated “Guide to Accounting and Audit in China 2025” aids executives by detailing recent accounting changes, personal information protection audits, tax health checks, and HR audits to ensure compliance.

The start of a new year is a hectic time for foreign companies in China. To meet the various compliance deadlines throughout the year, they need to begin the long and complicated financial reporting process, months in advance. Failure to comply will risk them being hit with deteriorating credit, additional fines, and penalties, and such companies might not be able to remit their profits overseas.

China Briefing’s Guide to Accounting and Audit in China 2025 (3rd Edition), produced in collaboration with the audit experts at Dezan Shira & Associates, aims to walk foreign businesses through the annual audit and compliance process from start to finish, in addition to introducing China’s accounting framework in a comparative context. We hope this guide helps your business add value to its annual statutory audit and compliance reporting in China.

The guide covers the following:

This practical and easy-to-understand guidebook will be of invaluable use to all executives involved in handling company finances concerning China, including:

In this year’s updated version of Guide to Accounting and Audit in China, there are notable changes that require your attention:

New changes to China’s accounting system: In 2024, China made several significant changes to its accounting system, including the amended Accounting Law, the Interim Provisions on Accounting Treatment of Enterprise Data Resources, Interpretation No. 17 on the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises, and updates to the International Financial Reporting Standards and the Accounting System for Non-governmental Non-profit Organizations. We have updated the section “New Changes to China’s Accounting System” to reflect these changes and provide practical advice to help businesses prepare.
Legislative developments in personal information protection audits: Following the release of the Draft Measures for the Management of Personal Information Protection Compliance Audits in 2023, the National Information Security Standardization Technical Committee issued the national standard Data Security Technology – Personal Information Protection Compliance Audit Requirements (Draft for Comments) in July 2024. The Network Data Security Management Regulations, published on September 24, 2024, and effective from January 1, 2025, reaffirm the legal obligation for enterprises to conduct personal information protection compliance audits. However, as of this guide production, the draft measures and standards have not been formally adopted, and most enterprises are still in a wait-and-see mode. We have reflected these developments in the “Other Types of Special Purpose Reviews” section.
Tax health check: With tax compliance becoming more prominent in China, tax health checks, conducted either independently or by engaging professional institutions, have become a popular way for businesses to identify and correct non-compliance issues in their tax handling. This reduces the risk of tax penalties and avoids potential financial and reputational losses. We have included a general overview of the tax health check in the “Other Types of Special Purpose Reviews” section.
Human resources and payroll audit: An HR audit can uncover hidden HR-related problems and errors, as well as potential compliance issues, especially given China’s ever-evolving regulations. This enables organizations to establish best practices, thereby mitigating operational and legal risks. We have added a brief introduction to this type of special-purpose audit, including the suggested frequency and methods.

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Trump invited Xi Jinping to his inauguration, aiming to involve China in Ukraine ceasefire talks. However, China’s support for Russia complicates its willingness to assist in negotiations, benefiting from ongoing conflict.

US president-elect Donald Trump has invited China’s president Xi Jinping to his inauguration on January 20 in a surprise move which appears to be part of a plan to involve Beijing in ceasefire negotiations in Ukraine.

Just after his recent meeting with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris, Trump posted, “There should be an immediate ceasefire and negotiations should begin,” and “China can help.” That latter remark has suddenly gained more significance after Trump extended the unusual invitation for the foreign leader to attend the January 20 ceremony.

Leaving aside whether Xi will accept Trump’s invitation to Washington DC (he probably won’t), the more important question is whether he would indeed help Trump end the Russian war against Ukraine.

China has had a strong economic and trading relationship with Russia throughout the war, and has refrained from criticising Putin. While it has denied providing Moscow with military assistance, reports suggest that China has allowed some goods that have battlefield use to be sent to Russia.

On the surface, Trump’s initiative and what China has most recently put on the table with Brazil look like two reasonably well-alligned peace proposals.

Both call for a ceasefire along the current frontlines, followed by negotiations on a permanent settlement. Both seem to accept Russia’s demand to freeze the territorial status quo, which would mean Ukraine would lose the near-20% of its territory that Moscow’s forces have illegally occupied since 2014.

Kyiv and Beijing

Ukraine and most of its western partners continue to reject this as unacceptable. Before Trump’s election victory, this was a sustainable position because the west was able to prevent Ukraine from being militarily defeated on the battlefield.

Trump has invited Xi Jingping to his inauguration.

This position may be slowly changing, but it is not clear that it would suddenly make China a welcome partner for the west in any peace negotiations – least of all for Ukraine.

Kyiv has always been wary of China and its international policies, from the economic and trade Belt and Road Initiative to the recent peace proposal. Zelensky called the China-Brazil peace initiative “destructive”. He also accused China and Brazil of being “pro-Russian”.

Zelensky is personally deeply invested in his own peace plan, particularly as Ukrainians have made enormous sacrifices in the war so far. This does not rule out compromises, but it makes concessions to China, widely seen by Ukrainians as one of Russia’s main supporters in the war, very unlikely.

Even if there was a sudden change of heart in Kyiv, it is highly doubtful that a Trump-brokered deal would serve Beijing’s interests. For Xi it is always about strengthening China’s role and influence as a global power. China will be concerned if the war is over, the US may become even more focused on its trade war with Beijing.

Read more:
Why China is worried about a second Trump presidency – and how Beijing might react

So far, the war in Ukraine has allowed China to benefit from the strain that it has put on the west.

US suggestions that it will pull back on its alliance commitments in Europe have raised doubts over the dependability of the US as an ally for Ukraine. This is becoming more acute as Trump prepares to move into the White House.

The longer the war in Ukraine continues in this way, the longer China will reap the benefits from the reduction of the relative weight of the United States as its main geopolitical and geo-economic rival.

A carefully managed continuation of the war against Ukraine, by contrast, benefits China in asserting its global leadership.

China’s approach to managing the “Ukraine crisis” was reiterarated by Xi at the recent Brics summit in Kazan, Russia, and in a meeting with former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev in Beijing on December 12 2024. It is focused on upholding “three key principles: no expansion of the battlefields, no escalation of hostilities, and no fanning flames, and [striving] for swift deescalation of the situation”.

What’s in it for China?

This is a far cry from an end to the war as envisaged by Trump. A Trump-brokered deal would likely lift sanctions and provide a possibility of renewed, more cooperative relations between the west and Russia.

It would significantly strengthen Putin’s position, contribute to Russia’s international rehabilitation, reduce his country’s dependence on China, and potentially rekindle historical Russia-China rivalries. Trump’s claim that he wants to “un-unite” Russia and China will not have gone unnoticed in Beijing.

And even if Trump did not manage to drive a wedge between Russia and China, a stronger Kremlin would mean a shift of the power dynamic in the partnership between Moscow and Beijing, potentially elevating Putin from a junior partner to Xi’s peer.

From a Chinese perspective, helping Trump to broker a deal between Russia and Ukraine offers few incentives, except potentially toning down the US trade and tariffs war against it. Draining the west’s resources in defending Ukraine keeps it away from the Indo-Pacific region in which most of the competition between China and the US will play out.

Xi has no interest in seeing Putin being strategically defeated in Ukraine, but keeping Russia bogged down in its war against Ukraine will ensure that the partnership between Beijing and Moscow will stay on current terms with the balance of power tilted towards China.

Keeping the war in Ukraine going, rather than helping Trump to end it, therefore is the most likely choice that Beijing will make.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.