China
INTERVIEW: Politics is the same as selling insurance, says Taiwan heiress
Shin Kong heiress and Taiwan People’s Party vice-presidential nominee Cynthia Wu didn’t say much when she was announced as the running mate for transplant surgeon Ko Wen-je in next month’s election, putting down the microphone after a few brief words.
Yet during a recent interview with RFA Mandarin’s “Asia Wants to Talk” chat show, the U.S.-born Wu switched easily among Mandarin, Taiwanese and English to chat non-stop about her experiences on the campaign trail and her vision for Taiwan’s future.
Until she joined the presidential race in a decision that she says surprised even her, Wu was mostly known as an appointed member of the self-governing island’s Legislative Yuan and the granddaughter of Wu Ho-su, who founded the Wu family’s Shin Kong business empire.
From humble beginnings as a department store in Taiwan, Shin Kong grew into a conglomerate spanning the financial, security, manufacturing, consumer, medical and philanthropy sectors.
“Total surprise,” Wu told host Simon Tai, when asked for her reaction to her nomination, which came soon after talks between Ko’s “White Camp” Taiwan People’s Party and the “Blue Camp” opposition Kuomintang broke down with no agreement on Nov. 24.
“The Blue and White camps didn’t get together, so each party had to pick its own candidate for vice president,” Wu said. “I only heard about it on day 50 [of the campaign], on the Friday afternoon, like everybody else.”
Wu likened the surprise to that she felt when becoming a mother earlier this year at the age of 45.
She added: “You’ve just got to get on with it.”
Business princess
Wu once held dual U.S. and Taiwanese citizenships but renounced her U.S. citizenship in 2014, and has been considered a surprising choice by many in Taiwan, who saw her as more of a business heiress and “princess” unfit for the cut-and-thrust of political life.
Asked if she was a “princess,” Wu replied: “Why only label me as one thing? I’m also a mother, an insurance salesperson, I hold a financial analyst certificate issued in London, and I’m also a person who loves Taiwan.”
She said she accepts who she is calmly, despite what she termed “political manipulation” that she said seeks to make her seem out-of-place in politics and even spoiled.
Wu doesn’t just hold financial certifications — she graduated as a double major in international relations and art history from Wesleyan College in Connecticut, and holds a master’s degree in literature from the Courtauld Institute of Art in London.
Her resume includes stints as an investment analyst for a brokerage, and as assistant to former U.K. Conservative Party lawmaker Peter Lilley, now known as Lord Lilley.
Since returning to settle in Taiwan at the age of 25, she has also held a number of executive posts in Shin Kong subsidiaries, including vice president of its insurance division and executive director of its Shin Kong Life Foundation, experience she said is useful on the campaign trail.
Chinese influence claims
Wu says that trying to win votes is a lot like selling insurance.
“The process is the same — either you are trying to turn an opportunity into a sold policy, or you’re trying to turn it into a vote,” she said. “You have to leave no stone unturned.”
Slated by her critics as an amateur due to her many gaffes, including misnaming government ministries and describing herself as “Chinese,” Wu said Ko had told her that she should see the media as akin to sharks circling for a feed.
“He talks a lot, has a great sense of humor and won’t form a personal relationship with you,” Wu said. “But he told me that I should be myself … and even feed the sharks occasionally.”
She has also been warned by colleagues in the Legislative Yuan that being in politics means being forced to cope with the fact that people gossip about you.
More seriously, Wu has been accused of being part of the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front outreach and influence operation, after being named among “China’s 100 Outstanding Women Entrepreneurs” in 2010.
Asked at the time if she was Chinese or Taiwanese, Wu told journalists that she was both.
“Chinese culture is in my DNA,” Wu told Radio Free Asia. “I am a citizen of the Republic of China, but my ancestors are also from China.”
The majority of Taiwan’s 23 million residents identify as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, and have no wish to give up their democratic way of life to be ruled by Beijing, according to opinion polls.
Nonetheless, Wu has appeared to strongly endorse the status quo, in which Taiwan, which has never been ruled by the Chinese Communist Party nor formed part of the People’s Republic of China, continues to govern itself as a democracy.
“I think Taiwan must maintain its peaceful and independent life,” Wu said. “If China is willing to make way for communication and discussion with us, then it’s likely we will talk to them.”
Beyond that, she referred voters to Ko’s maxim that peace across the Taiwan Strait is the best guarantee of the status quo.
“The status quo is being maintained, but what is up for negotiation is to restart talks,” Wu said.
Cross-strait relations
Like Ko, Wu described the “1992 Consensus” agreed by Taipei and Beijing as “vague.”
Beijing has repeatedly castigated Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen for allegedly departing from the agreement by seeking a greater role for Taiwan on the world stage, and because she insists on government-to-government status as a prerequisite for talks with Beijing — something Chinese officials would never agree to.
The “Consensus” has been widely criticized as meaning different things to different people — for Beijing, it appears to mean that Taiwan’s 23 million people should stop insisting on a distinctly Taiwanese identity, something China views as “pro-independence.”
“If he gets into power, Chairman Ko would want to clarify the definitions [in the Consensus],” Wu said.
But asked if she believed Chinese President Xi Jinping when he said there was no timetable for invading Taiwan by force, Wu replied: “Taiwan can’t put its…
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China
2024 Tax Incentives for Manufacturing Companies in China
China offers various tax incentives to boost the manufacturing industry. The Ministry of Finance and State Tax Administration provide guidelines on eligibility and policies. VAT exemptions and refunds are available for companies producing specific goods or services, with a monthly refund option for deferred taxes.
China implements a wide range of preferential tax policies to encourage the development of the country’s manufacturing industry. We summarize some of the main manufacturing tax incentives in China and explain the basic eligibility requirements that companies must meet to enjoy them.
China’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) and State Tax Administration (STA) have released guidelines on the main preferential tax and fee policies available to the manufacturing industry in China. The guidelines consolidate the main preferential policies currently in force and explain the main eligibility requirements to enjoy them.
To further assist companies in identifying the preferential policies available to them, we have outlined some of the main policies currently available in the manufacturing industry, including links to further resources.
For instance, VAT is exempted for:
Companies providing the following products and services can enjoy immediate VAT refunds:
Companies in the manufacturing industry that meet the conditions for deferring tax refunds can enjoy a VAT credit refund policy. The policy allows companies to receive the accumulated deferred tax amount every month and the remaining deferred tax amount in a lump sum.
The policy is not exclusive to the manufacturing industry and is also available to companies in scientific research and technical services, utilities production and supply, software and IT services, and many more.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
Exploring the Revamped China Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) Program: Potential Benefits for International Businesses
Companies in China must navigate compliance, trading, and reporting within the CCER framework, impacting operations and strategic objectives. The program focuses on afforestation, solar, wind power, and mangrove creation, offering opportunities for innovation and revenue streams while ensuring transparency and accuracy. The Ministry of Ecology and Environment oversees the program.
As companies navigate the complexities of compliance, trading, and reporting within the CCER framework, they must also contend with the broader implications for their operations, finances, and strategic objectives.
This article explores the multifaceted impact of the CCER program on companies operating in China, examining both the opportunities for innovation and growth, as well as the potential risks and compliance considerations.
Initially, the CCER will focus on four sectors: afforestation, solar thermal power, offshore wind power, and mangrove vegetation creation. Companies operating within these sectors can register their accredited carbon reduction credits in the CCER system for trading purposes. These sectors were chosen due to their reliance on carbon credit sales for profitability. For instance, offshore wind power generation, as more costly than onshore alternatives, stands to benefit from additional revenue streams facilitated by CCER transactions.
Currently, primary buyers are expected to be high-emission enterprises seeking to offset their excess emissions and companies aiming to demonstrate corporate social responsibility by contributing to environmental conservation. Eventually, the program aims to allow individuals to purchase credits to offset their carbon footprints. Unlike the mandatory national ETS, the revamped CCER scheme permits any enterprise to buy carbon credits, thereby expanding the market scope.
The Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) oversees the CCER program, having assumed responsibility for climate change initiatives from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2018. Verification agencies and project operators are mandated to ensure transparency and accuracy in disclosing project details and carbon reduction practices.
On the second day after the launch on January 23, the first transaction in China’s voluntary carbon market saw the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the country’s largest offshore oil and gas producer, purchase 250,000 tons of carbon credits to offset its emissions.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
China Implements New Policies to Boost Foreign Investment in Science and Technology Companies
China’s Ministry of Commerce announced new policy measures on April 19, 2023, to encourage foreign investment in the technology sector. The measures include facilitating bond issuance, improving the investment environment, and simplifying procedures for foreign institutions to access the Chinese market.
On April 19, 2023, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) along with nine other departments announced a new set of policy measures (hereinafter, “new measures”) aimed at encouraging foreign investment in its technology sector.
Among the new measures, China intends to facilitate the issuance of RMB bonds by eligible overseas institutions and encourage both domestic and foreign-invested tech companies to raise funds through bond issuance.
In this article, we offer an overview of the new measures and their broader significance in fostering international investment and driving innovation-driven growth, underscoring China’s efforts to instill confidence among foreign investors.
The new measures contain a total of sixteen points aimed at facilitating foreign investment in China’s technology sector and improving the overall investment environment.
Divided into four main chapters, the new measures address key aspects including:
Firstly, China aims to expedite the approval process for QFII and RQFII, ensuring efficient access to the Chinese market. Moreover, the government promises to simplify procedures, facilitating operational activities and fund management for foreign institutions.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
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- Exploring the Revamped China Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) Program: Potential Benefits for International Businesses
- China Implements New Policies to Boost Foreign Investment in Science and Technology Companies
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- New Report from Dezan Shira & Associates: China Takes the Lead in Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024
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