China
Australia’s Chinese diaspora faces a representation deficit
Author: Osmond Chiu, Per Capita
Australia’s 2022 federal election marked a turning point in the country’s politics. For the first time, the shifting voting patterns of non-European ethnic minorities — specifically Chinese–Australians — were pivotal to the overall result, as post-election reviews from the centre-left Labor Party and the conservative Liberal Party both acknowledged. While the possibility of a significant swing in the voting patterns of Chinese–Australians was canvassed pre-election, its impact was only taken seriously after the vote.
Yet this increasing focus has not translated into a serious discussion about representation — an important issue for a multicultural society such as Australia, where ongoing underrepresentation signals that structural barriers to equality remain.
Despite having the proportionally largest Chinese diaspora in the Western world, Chinese–Australian representation remains low in Australian politics. While representation at the federal level has improved, it does not mirror the 5.5 per cent of the population who have Chinese ancestry.
This issue is not unique to Australia — similar underrepresentation issues exist in New Zealand and Canada. Many potential explanations have been suggested, such as language, lower levels of political participation and racial bias.
Underrepresentation has consequences for Australia’s policy settings, especially as US–China tensions escalate. Greater diversity delivers better decision-making because ‘group think’ is less likely, different perspectives are included and it forces a more careful consideration of information.
The complexity of issues facing the Chinese diaspora make the perspectives drawn from lived experiences and personal knowledge even more valuable. While those from mainland China constitute a plurality of the Chinese Australian community, this community is far from homogenous. There is a range of opinions — shaped by migration journeys, history, and personal experiences — that reflect the breadth and diversity of the Chinese diaspora in Australia.
A lack of diverse representation leads to one-dimensional perspectives where policy issues associated with China come to be seen simply through the lens of national security and defence. This ignores the potential impacts of a strained Australia–China relationship on Australia’s Chinese diaspora and other unintended domestic consequences. This should not be misconstrued as a suggestion to excuse or downplay the seriousness of human rights abuses by China, surveillance and harassment of diaspora communities on Australian soil and foreign interference concerns.
Attempts to dismiss concerns about the impact of these issues on the Chinese diaspora as ‘hurt feelings’ rather than understanding the genuine fear many Chinese–Australians have has been counterproductive. Their fear arises out of the perceived risk of being the target of distrust and exclusion, or seen as a potential vector of foreign influence simply due to their cultural background or family ties.
It also fuels the perception that Chinese–Australians would be acceptable collateral damage in a conflict. Efforts to deny claims of growing racism during the COVID-19 pandemic by some politicians — because it was seen as a geopolitical tactic by China — was an example of this. Such actions undermine community confidence that Australia genuinely believes in equality and can undermine soft power attempts to emphasise the importance of democratic values internationally.
Research shows that growing racism is far from imagined. The Lowy Institute revealed that over a third of Chinese–Australians were treated differently or less favourably because of their Chinese heritage in 2020 and 2021. Quantitative surveying by the University of Melbourne comparing Australian and US attitudes also found that perceptions of China led to stronger negative feelings towards permanent residents of Chinese heritage in Australia. Polling conducted by the Australia–China Relations Institute in 2022 found that over four in ten respondents thought Australians of Chinese origin could be mobilised by China to undermine Australia’s interests and social cohesion.
No doubt these are complex and challenging issues to navigate, and Australia is not alone in trying to work through them. Comparable Western countries with sizeable Chinese diasporas such as Canada, the United States and New Zealand are experiencing similar debates. But navigating these issues requires a sober focus on policy solutions that are…
China
Exploring the Revamped China Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) Program: Potential Benefits for International Businesses
Companies in China must navigate compliance, trading, and reporting within the CCER framework, impacting operations and strategic objectives. The program focuses on afforestation, solar, wind power, and mangrove creation, offering opportunities for innovation and revenue streams while ensuring transparency and accuracy. The Ministry of Ecology and Environment oversees the program.
As companies navigate the complexities of compliance, trading, and reporting within the CCER framework, they must also contend with the broader implications for their operations, finances, and strategic objectives.
This article explores the multifaceted impact of the CCER program on companies operating in China, examining both the opportunities for innovation and growth, as well as the potential risks and compliance considerations.
Initially, the CCER will focus on four sectors: afforestation, solar thermal power, offshore wind power, and mangrove vegetation creation. Companies operating within these sectors can register their accredited carbon reduction credits in the CCER system for trading purposes. These sectors were chosen due to their reliance on carbon credit sales for profitability. For instance, offshore wind power generation, as more costly than onshore alternatives, stands to benefit from additional revenue streams facilitated by CCER transactions.
Currently, primary buyers are expected to be high-emission enterprises seeking to offset their excess emissions and companies aiming to demonstrate corporate social responsibility by contributing to environmental conservation. Eventually, the program aims to allow individuals to purchase credits to offset their carbon footprints. Unlike the mandatory national ETS, the revamped CCER scheme permits any enterprise to buy carbon credits, thereby expanding the market scope.
The Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) oversees the CCER program, having assumed responsibility for climate change initiatives from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2018. Verification agencies and project operators are mandated to ensure transparency and accuracy in disclosing project details and carbon reduction practices.
On the second day after the launch on January 23, the first transaction in China’s voluntary carbon market saw the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the country’s largest offshore oil and gas producer, purchase 250,000 tons of carbon credits to offset its emissions.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
China Implements New Policies to Boost Foreign Investment in Science and Technology Companies
China’s Ministry of Commerce announced new policy measures on April 19, 2023, to encourage foreign investment in the technology sector. The measures include facilitating bond issuance, improving the investment environment, and simplifying procedures for foreign institutions to access the Chinese market.
On April 19, 2023, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) along with nine other departments announced a new set of policy measures (hereinafter, “new measures”) aimed at encouraging foreign investment in its technology sector.
Among the new measures, China intends to facilitate the issuance of RMB bonds by eligible overseas institutions and encourage both domestic and foreign-invested tech companies to raise funds through bond issuance.
In this article, we offer an overview of the new measures and their broader significance in fostering international investment and driving innovation-driven growth, underscoring China’s efforts to instill confidence among foreign investors.
The new measures contain a total of sixteen points aimed at facilitating foreign investment in China’s technology sector and improving the overall investment environment.
Divided into four main chapters, the new measures address key aspects including:
Firstly, China aims to expedite the approval process for QFII and RQFII, ensuring efficient access to the Chinese market. Moreover, the government promises to simplify procedures, facilitating operational activities and fund management for foreign institutions.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
Q1 2024 Brief on Transfer Pricing in Asia
Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 on transfer pricing, consolidating various guidelines. The Directorate General of Taxes focuses on compliance, expanded arm’s length principle, and substance checks. Singapore’s Budget 2024 addresses economic challenges, operational costs, and sustainability, implementing global tax reforms like the Income Inclusion Rule and Domestic Top-up Tax.
Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) has released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 (“PMK-172”), which prevails as a unified transfer pricing guideline. PMK-172 consolidates various transfer pricing matters that were previously covered under separate regulations, including the application of the arm’s length principle, transfer pricing documentation requirements, transfer pricing adjustments, Mutual Agreement Procedure (“MAP”), and Advance Pricing Agreements (“APA”).
The Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes (DGT) has continued to focus on compliance with the ex-ante principle, the expanded scope of transactions subject to the arm’s length principle, and the reinforcement of substance checks as part of the preliminary stage, indicating the DGT’s expectation of meticulous and well-supported transfer pricing analyses conducted by taxpayers.
In conclusion, PMK-172 reflects the Indonesian government’s commitment to addressing some of the most controversial transfer pricing issues and promoting clarity and certainty. While it brings new opportunities, it also presents challenges. Taxpayers are strongly advised to evaluate the implications of these new guidelines on their businesses in Indonesia to navigate this transformative regulatory landscape successfully.
In a significant move to bolster economic resilience and sustainability, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Mr. Lawrence Wong, unveiled the ambitious Singapore Budget 2024 on February 16, 2024. Amidst global economic fluctuations and a pressing climate crisis, the Budget strategically addresses the dual challenges of rising operational costs and the imperative for sustainable development, marking a pivotal step towards fortifying Singapore’s position as a competitive and green economy.
In anticipation of global tax reforms, Singapore’s proactive steps to implement the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) and Domestic Top-up Tax (DTT) under the BEPS 2.0 framework demonstrate a forward-looking approach to ensure tax compliance and fairness. These measures reaffirm Singapore’s commitment to international tax standards while safeguarding its economic interests.
Transfer pricing highlights from the Singapore Budget 2024 include:
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
- Exploring the Revamped China Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) Program: Potential Benefits for International Businesses
- China Implements New Policies to Boost Foreign Investment in Science and Technology Companies
- Q1 2024 Brief on Transfer Pricing in Asia
- New Report from Dezan Shira & Associates: China Takes the Lead in Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024
- Is journalist Vicky Xu preparing to return to China?
- Guide for Foreign Residents: Obtaining a Certificate of No Criminal Record in China
