China
Does the China factor still matter to Taiwanese voters?
Author: Hsien-Ming Lin, National Open University
After a competitive election campaign lasting nearly half a year, the 2022 Taiwanese local elections wrapped up on 26 November 2022. The election outcome disappointed supporters of the current ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which won only five of 22 city and county mayor’s positions. The major opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), won 13 mayoral positions, including the four metropolitan cities of Taipei, New Taipei, Taoyuan and Taichung.
The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), a small opposition party with indirect political support from the KMT, won its first mayoral position in Hsinchu city. Chung Tung-chin, elected as mayor of Miaoli County, also has KMT party membership. Taking Hsinchu city and Miaoli County into account, the KMT will directly or indirectly control the governance of 15 Taiwanese cities. All told, the election was an overwhelming victory for the KMT.
Taiwan does not have exit polls that could inform analysis of voting behaviour. But it is likely that poor governance, economic crisis during the COVID-19 pandemic and the failure to motivate young supporters to vote were critical factors behind the DPP’s election losses.
Taiwan managed the pandemic successfully in 2020–2021 when there was only a limited number of confirmed cases. But President Tsai Ing-wen’s government had difficulties obtaining adequate COVID-19 vaccines due to the political boycott from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the domestic political competition between the DPP and KMT. As the number of confirmed cases increased, many Facebook users expressed their discontent and left angry messages on the Ministry of Health and Welfare webpage.
Taiwan’s high inflation was another critical issue. Average food inflation between January and June 2022 reached a peak of 5.83 per cent, much higher than Taiwan’s major East Asian counterparts Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Hong Kong. In June 2022 President Tsai Ing-wen’s disapproval rating surpassed even her earlier approval rating upon taking office for her second term in May 2020.
The DPP’s loss of support in the election was reflected in the low turnout rate, particularly among the younger generations. The turnout rate in the election was only 59.86 per cent, the lowest figure since 2008. The DPP has the highest support of any major political party among under 40s at about 30 per cent. The failure to motivate these young supporters to go to vote was an important reason behind the DPP’s loss. The defeat of the recent constitutional referendum to lower the voting age to 18 years old was a further reflection of the DPP’s declining support among young voters. Re-motivating young supporters will be one of the critical challenges for the DPP in the upcoming 2024 national elections.
Many observers have argued that although anti-China sentiment has frequently been used by the DPP and the more pro-independence ‘pan-Green’ parties to elicit support, the DPP failed to capitalise on anti-China sentiment this election. But while anti-China sentiment has been critical to winning political positions at the national level, foreign policy is not a key factor in local elections.
This is not to say that the China factor is no longer essential or that attitudes toward China have changed. Cross-Strait relations are an important issue in national elections every four years. The KMT tends to emphasise the so-called ‘1992 Consensus’, while the DPP stresses a sense of ‘national subjugation’ (wáng guógǎn). Both the KMT and the DPP like to use cross-Strait and regional issues, such as Taiwan–US–China relations, in national-level elections to gain voters’ support and cast doubts on their competitors’ loyalty to the country and attitudes toward China.
In a poll taken after the CCP government began to increased military pressure on Taiwan by sending military aircraft and naval ships around the island, 73 per cent of respondents indicated that they could not accept the CCP’s provocative military behaviour and expected a tough response from the Tsai administration.
The China factor and cross-Strait relations will be critical in the 2024 presidential and the national elections. The KMT may use the ‘local compassing central’ (dì fāng bāo wéi zhōng yang) strategy to ask local mayors to put greater pressure on Tsai’s government to accept the 1992 Consensus or modify her current policy toward China.
One KMT politician — Chen Yu-Jen from the island of Kinmen — has already done…
China
China Unveils Plan to Upgrade Industrial Equipment
China unveiled a comprehensive action plan for upgrading industrial equipment, with a focus on driving technological innovation and economic growth. The plan, released on April 9, 2024, aims to enhance competitiveness and sustainability within the manufacturing sector through extensive investment and regulatory support.
China announced an ambitious action plan for industrial equipment upgrading, which aims to drive technological innovation and economic growth through extensive investment and regulatory support.
On April 9, 2024, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and six other departments jointly released a notice introducing the Implementation Plan for Promoting Equipment Renewal in the Industrial Sector (hereafter referred to as the “action plan”).
Finalized earlier on March 23, 2024, this comprehensive action plan addresses critical issues related to technological innovation and economic development. It reflects China’s proactive stance in enhancing competitiveness and sustainability within its manufacturing sector. The initiative underscores the recognition of industrial equipment upgrading as a top policy priority.
The scope of China’s action plan to upgrade industrial equipment in manufacturing, is extensive, covering various aspects such as:
In line with China’s ambitious goals for industrial modernization and sustainable development, the action plan outlines several key objectives aimed at driving substantial advancements in the industrial sector by 2027.
These objectives encompass a wide range of areas, from increasing investment to enhancing digitalization and promoting innovation, including:
The objectives and key actions proposed in the action plan are summarized below.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
China deepens engagement with new Indonesian president as top diplomat visits Jakarta
China’s top diplomat met the outgoing Indonesian president and his successor in Jakarta on Thursday, as Beijing deepened its engagement with future leader Prabowo Subianto, amid a competition for regional influence with the United States.
The meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was part of a joint commitment to advance the partnership between the two countries, said Prabowo, who visited Beijing in early April after his landslide win in the February general election.
“It is a great honor for me to welcome him [Wang] today. Thank you for the kind reception I received in Beijing a few weeks ago,” Prabowo said, according to an Indonesian defense ministry statement.
Chinese President Xi Jinping had invited Prabowo to visit, and the latter accepting the invitation raised eyebrows in Indonesia because no president-elect had made a foreign visit such as this one without being sworn in. China is Indonesia’s largest trading partner.
Wang, too, mentioned Prabowo’s Beijing trip, according to the same statement.
“We really appreciate and welcome Defense Minister Prabowo’s visit to China,” he said.
“We are committed to continuing to increase bilateral cooperation with Indonesia, both in the defense sector and other fields such as economic, social and cultural.”
Wang is scheduled to go to East Nusa Tenggara province on Friday to attend the China-Indonesia High-Level Dialogue Cooperation Mechanism, a process to support more effective bilateral cooperation. His Jakarta stop was the first of a six-day tour that also includes Cambodia and Papua New Guinea.
Prabowo and Wang discussed cooperation in the defense industry and sector, with potential measures such as educational and training collaboration, as well as joint exercises, said Brig. Gen. Edwin Adrian Sumantha, spokesman at the Indonesian defense ministry.
In fact, the ministry statement said that “China is Indonesia’s close partner and has had close bilateral relations, especially in the defense sector, for a long time.”
Of course, China has also invested billions of U.S. dollars in infrastructure projects in Indonesia, including as part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative – the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed train, which began commercial operations in October 2023, is one such BRI project.
The two countries have drawn closer during outgoing President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s two terms, and Beijing would like that to continue as the U.S. tries to catch up with China’s gargantuan influence in Southeast Asia, analysts have said.
Indonesia, China call for ceasefire in Gaza
Both Indonesia and China shared the same position on Israel’s devastating attacks on Gaza, said Wang’s Indonesian counterpart, Retno Marsudi.
Israel’s air and ground strikes have killed more than 33,000 Palestinians following the Oct. 7 attack on the Jewish state by Palestinian militant group Hamas, which killed around 1,100 Israelis.
“We … have the same view regarding the importance of a ceasefire in Gaza and resolving the Palestinian problem fairly through two state solutions,” Retno told reporters in a joint press conference after meeting with Wang.
“Indonesia will support full Palestinian membership in the U.N. Middle East stability will not be realized without resolving the Palestinian issue.”
For his part, Wang slammed Washington for repeatedly vetoing resolutions calling for Israel to end the attacks on the Palestinian territory it occupies.
“The conflict in Gaza has lasted for half a year and caused a rare humanitarian tragedy in the 21st century,” Wang told the media at the same press conference, according to the Associated Press.
“The United Nations Security Council responded to the call of the international community and continued to review the resolution draft on the cease-fire in Gaza, but it was repeatedly vetoed by the United States.”
The conflict in the Middle East offered a strategic opportunity for China to further expand its influence in Southeast Asia, said Muhamad Arif, a lecturer in international relations at the University of Indonesia.
“China is trying to strengthen its position as a key player in the region,” Arief told BenarNews.
China could present an alternative approach to the conflict in Gaza, he said, which may find approval in Southeast Asia’s largest country, Indonesia, and other Mulism-majority states in the region, such as Malaysia and Brunei.
BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated online news organization.
Read the rest of this article here >>> China deepens engagement with new Indonesian president as top diplomat visits Jakarta
China
New Publication: A Guide for Foreign Investors on Navigating China’s New Company Law
The sixth revision of China’s Company Law is the most extensive amendment in history, impacting foreign invested enterprises with stricter rules on capital injection and corporate governance. Most FIEs must align with the New Company Law by July 1, 2024, with a deadline of December 31, 2024 for adjustments. Contact Dezan Shira & Associates for assistance.
The sixth revision of China’s Company Law represents the most extensive amendment in its history. From stricter capital injection rules to enhanced corporate governance, the changes introduced in the New Company Law have far-reaching implications for businesses, including foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) operating in or entering the China market.
Since January 1, 2020, the Company Law has governed both wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) and joint ventures (JVs), following the enactment of the Foreign Investment Law (FIL). Most FIEs must align with the provisions of the New Company Law from July 1, 2024, while those established before January 1, 2020 have bit more time for adjustments due to the five-year grace period provided by the FIL. The final deadline for their alignment is December 31, 2024.
In this publication, we guide foreign investors through the implications of the New Company Law for existing and new FIEs and relevant stakeholders. We begin with an overview of the revision’s background and objectives, followed by a summary of key changes. Our in-depth analysis, from a foreign stakeholder perspective, illuminates the practical implications. Lastly, we explore tax impacts alongside the revisions, demonstrating how the New Company Law may shape future business transactions and arrangements.
If you or your company require assistance with Company Law adjustments in China, please do not hesitate to contact Dezan Shira & Associates. For more information, feel free to reach us via email at china@dezshira.com.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
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- China deepens engagement with new Indonesian president as top diplomat visits Jakarta
- New Publication: A Guide for Foreign Investors on Navigating China’s New Company Law
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