China
Vietnam steps up South China Sea land reclamation
Vietnam has accelerated its island building in the South China Sea where China has fully militarized three of its artificial islands, with Hanoi reclaiming about 80% of new land in the last year, a new study found.
The report “Vietnam’s major Spratly expansion”, released by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, said however that Vietnam’s total reclamation area to date is still less than 20% of China’s.
“Vietnam has created 520 acres [210 hectares] of new land in the Spratlys in the last ten years while China built 3,200 acres [1,295 hectares],” Greg Poling, AMTI’s director, told RFA.
Six parties – Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam – hold conflicting claims over the South China Sea and the islands in the sea but China’s claims are by far the most expansive.
Only China, the Philippines and Vietnam are known to have been reclaiming land for further construction on their occupied islands and reefs. Beijing is believed to have finished the construction and militarization of three of its artificial islands – Subi, Fiery Cross and Mischief Reef – all within the Spratly archipelago.
China has also fully developed Woody Island in the Paracel archipelago and uses it as the military and administrative capital for all of its claims in the South China Sea.
Vietnam and Taiwan also claim sovereignty over some islands in the Paracels but China occupies all of them.
‘Defensive reclamation’
AMTI’s report said Vietnam has expanded dredging and landfill work at several of its outposts in the Spratly Islands, creating roughly 420 acres (170 hectares) of new land in 2020 alone and bringing its total in the last ten years to 540 acres (219 hectares).
Namyit Island, Pearson Reef, Sand Cay, and Tennent Reef, which are called respectively Nam Yet, Phan Vinh, Son Ca and Tien Nu in Vietnamese, are identified as the most significantly developed outposts.
The expansion allows the outposts to host larger vessels, including military ships, the report said.
It said that new dredging and landfill work has also begun at another five features in the Spratlys which up to now only host small rigs and platforms.
Vietnam has 49 or 51 outposts spread across 27 features, AMTI said, adding that there is evidence of reclamation at ten of the features.
The development process “involves the use of clamshell dredgers and construction equipment to scoop up sections of shallow reef and deposit the sediment on the area targeted for landfill,” according to the report.
“This is a more time consuming and less arbitrarily destructive process than the cutter suction dredging that China used to build its artificial islands,” it said.
AMTI’s Poling said that in his opinion, Vietnam’s methods are “considerably less damaging to the wider environment, though of course destroying 520 acres of coral reef is still quite bad for the environment and fisheries.”
“I wouldn’t describe this as nearly as destabilizing as what China did as what matters most is what they’re used for,” said the analyst, adding that “China uses its islands to harass and coerce Southeast Asian countries.”
“If Vietnam’s buildup remains defensive, then it really isn’t the same,” he said.
For its part, Beijing accused Hanoi of reinforcing “illegally-held features” by land reclamation and military deployment, as well as “setting up defenses and operating on these islands and reefs.”
A Chinese think-tank, the South China Sea Probing Initiative, said in a report that as Vietnam tries” to trumpet that the islands and reefs of the Spratly Islands held by it are for civilian uses, they actually have a strong military dimension.”
“As the Vietnamese troops and civilians have become increasingly active in the Vietnamese-held islands and reefs as well as the surrounding waters, the risk of any friction and conflict couldn’t be belittled,” the report said.
PCA opens in Hanoi
Vietnam and China, haven’t responded to the new findings in the report but previously, Vietnamese official channels insisted that Hanoi adhere strictly to the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, as well as agreements with China and other regional countries.
Hanoi also repeatedly claimed its “indisputable sovereignty” over islands and reefs in the South China Sea, as well as challenging Beijing’s maritime claims.
In July 2016, a U.N. arbitral tribunal ruled against China’s historic rights claims within its so-called “nine-dash line” that encircles almost 90% of the South China Sea.
The tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague issued this arbitral award in response to a legal challenge brought against China in 2013 by the Philippines. China refused to participate in the arbitration, rejected the PCA’s ruling, and has continued to defend its claims.
In the latest development, the PCA has just formally opened an office in Hanoi, its second office in Asia after Singapore and the fifth outside of its headquarters in The Hague, according to a Dec. 1 press release.
Vietnam has said it did not rule out a possibility of bringing Beijing before an international tribunal similar to the Philippines’ 2013 lawsuit.
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China
Exploring the Revamped China Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) Program: Potential Benefits for International Businesses
Companies in China must navigate compliance, trading, and reporting within the CCER framework, impacting operations and strategic objectives. The program focuses on afforestation, solar, wind power, and mangrove creation, offering opportunities for innovation and revenue streams while ensuring transparency and accuracy. The Ministry of Ecology and Environment oversees the program.
As companies navigate the complexities of compliance, trading, and reporting within the CCER framework, they must also contend with the broader implications for their operations, finances, and strategic objectives.
This article explores the multifaceted impact of the CCER program on companies operating in China, examining both the opportunities for innovation and growth, as well as the potential risks and compliance considerations.
Initially, the CCER will focus on four sectors: afforestation, solar thermal power, offshore wind power, and mangrove vegetation creation. Companies operating within these sectors can register their accredited carbon reduction credits in the CCER system for trading purposes. These sectors were chosen due to their reliance on carbon credit sales for profitability. For instance, offshore wind power generation, as more costly than onshore alternatives, stands to benefit from additional revenue streams facilitated by CCER transactions.
Currently, primary buyers are expected to be high-emission enterprises seeking to offset their excess emissions and companies aiming to demonstrate corporate social responsibility by contributing to environmental conservation. Eventually, the program aims to allow individuals to purchase credits to offset their carbon footprints. Unlike the mandatory national ETS, the revamped CCER scheme permits any enterprise to buy carbon credits, thereby expanding the market scope.
The Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) oversees the CCER program, having assumed responsibility for climate change initiatives from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2018. Verification agencies and project operators are mandated to ensure transparency and accuracy in disclosing project details and carbon reduction practices.
On the second day after the launch on January 23, the first transaction in China’s voluntary carbon market saw the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the country’s largest offshore oil and gas producer, purchase 250,000 tons of carbon credits to offset its emissions.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
China Implements New Policies to Boost Foreign Investment in Science and Technology Companies
China’s Ministry of Commerce announced new policy measures on April 19, 2023, to encourage foreign investment in the technology sector. The measures include facilitating bond issuance, improving the investment environment, and simplifying procedures for foreign institutions to access the Chinese market.
On April 19, 2023, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) along with nine other departments announced a new set of policy measures (hereinafter, “new measures”) aimed at encouraging foreign investment in its technology sector.
Among the new measures, China intends to facilitate the issuance of RMB bonds by eligible overseas institutions and encourage both domestic and foreign-invested tech companies to raise funds through bond issuance.
In this article, we offer an overview of the new measures and their broader significance in fostering international investment and driving innovation-driven growth, underscoring China’s efforts to instill confidence among foreign investors.
The new measures contain a total of sixteen points aimed at facilitating foreign investment in China’s technology sector and improving the overall investment environment.
Divided into four main chapters, the new measures address key aspects including:
Firstly, China aims to expedite the approval process for QFII and RQFII, ensuring efficient access to the Chinese market. Moreover, the government promises to simplify procedures, facilitating operational activities and fund management for foreign institutions.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
Q1 2024 Brief on Transfer Pricing in Asia
Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 on transfer pricing, consolidating various guidelines. The Directorate General of Taxes focuses on compliance, expanded arm’s length principle, and substance checks. Singapore’s Budget 2024 addresses economic challenges, operational costs, and sustainability, implementing global tax reforms like the Income Inclusion Rule and Domestic Top-up Tax.
Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) has released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 (“PMK-172”), which prevails as a unified transfer pricing guideline. PMK-172 consolidates various transfer pricing matters that were previously covered under separate regulations, including the application of the arm’s length principle, transfer pricing documentation requirements, transfer pricing adjustments, Mutual Agreement Procedure (“MAP”), and Advance Pricing Agreements (“APA”).
The Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes (DGT) has continued to focus on compliance with the ex-ante principle, the expanded scope of transactions subject to the arm’s length principle, and the reinforcement of substance checks as part of the preliminary stage, indicating the DGT’s expectation of meticulous and well-supported transfer pricing analyses conducted by taxpayers.
In conclusion, PMK-172 reflects the Indonesian government’s commitment to addressing some of the most controversial transfer pricing issues and promoting clarity and certainty. While it brings new opportunities, it also presents challenges. Taxpayers are strongly advised to evaluate the implications of these new guidelines on their businesses in Indonesia to navigate this transformative regulatory landscape successfully.
In a significant move to bolster economic resilience and sustainability, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Mr. Lawrence Wong, unveiled the ambitious Singapore Budget 2024 on February 16, 2024. Amidst global economic fluctuations and a pressing climate crisis, the Budget strategically addresses the dual challenges of rising operational costs and the imperative for sustainable development, marking a pivotal step towards fortifying Singapore’s position as a competitive and green economy.
In anticipation of global tax reforms, Singapore’s proactive steps to implement the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) and Domestic Top-up Tax (DTT) under the BEPS 2.0 framework demonstrate a forward-looking approach to ensure tax compliance and fairness. These measures reaffirm Singapore’s commitment to international tax standards while safeguarding its economic interests.
Transfer pricing highlights from the Singapore Budget 2024 include:
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
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- China Implements New Policies to Boost Foreign Investment in Science and Technology Companies
- Q1 2024 Brief on Transfer Pricing in Asia
- New Report from Dezan Shira & Associates: China Takes the Lead in Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024
- Is journalist Vicky Xu preparing to return to China?
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