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China

China’s charm offensive in Bangladesh

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China's President Xi Jinping (L) talks with Bangladesh's President Abdul Hamid (3rd R) during a meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, 8 November 2014 (Photo: Reuters/Parker Song).

Author: Asif Muztaba Hassan, Dhaka

China’s combative foreign conduct has many believing that the country has departed from former leader Deng Xiaoping’s philosophy ‘to leave brightness, embrace obscurity, and keep a low profile’ (tao guang yang hui) and is ready to assert it authority internationally. But China’s quiet charm offensive with Bangladesh lends a different character to its diplomacy.

China’s assertive behaviour, especially in the South China Sea, may run contrary to Deng’s philosophy. But as China faces increasing risks and challenges to its interests, it appears as if tao guang yang hui informs Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call for ‘fighting spirit’ in party officials — encouraging them to be bold, test limits, observe and wait for opportunities.

Lu Shaye, China’s Ambassador to France, best embodied this fighting spirit in June 2021 when he claimed ‘in the eyes of the Westerners, our diplomacy is on the offensive and aggressive, but the truth is, it is them who are on the offensive and aggressive. What we are doing is merely justified defence to protect our rights and interests’.

China’s tactics appear reactionary rather than a pre-emptive tool for coercive diplomacy. Neither Xi nor the Chinese Communist Party officials completely reveal the ‘shiny side of the blade’ but successfully communicate their message that China will not back down from a fight. But while the confrontational rhetoric dominates global headlines, Beijing’s quiet and nascent charm offensive often goes unnoticed. China has sought to cultivate and deepen commercial ties with many global players, including Bangladesh.

China’s economic and defence diplomacy surrounds Bangladesh. In addition to being Dhaka’s largest investor, China also agreed to allow duty-free access to 97 per cent of Bangladeshi products in late 2020. In contrast, the United States has consistently denied duty-free access to Bangladesh’s products, despite Bangladeshi diplomats tooth-and-nail lobbying.

Free-trade access largely influences Bangladeshi diplomacy. Many experts even termed Beijing’s charm offensive in Dhaka as the first step towards its coercive diplomacy. Yet China finds itself struggling, and at times failing, to court Bangladesh.

The United States has exported US$110 million worth of arms to Bangladesh since 2010, which is meagre compared to US$2.59 billion Bangladesh spent on Chinese military equipment. Yet in the face of a heated Sino-Indian relationship in 2020, the United States decided to pursue a proactive approach to court Bangladesh by proposing a military modernisation plan, starting with Apache helicopters and missiles. Deeper security cooperation is of ‘mutual interest, with full respect for Bangladesh’s sovereignty and independence of action’, wrote Laura Stone, then deputy assistant secretary with the US Department of State.

Beijing cannot achieve its desired foreign policy goals without respecting Bangladesh’s sovereignty and conduct of its international politics. The Chinese Ambassador to Dhaka, Li Jiming, was reprimanded by Bangladesh Foreign Minister AK Abdul Momen when Li warned of ‘damaging’ bilateral relations if Bangladesh chooses to ‘join’ the Quad.

Bangladesh’s foreign policy strength lies in its deep support for neighbour India and increasing engagement with the United States and Japan. From helping Bangladesh achieve liberation to shared counterterrorism efforts — India’s sphere of influence has been longstanding and strong. Beijing understands that it can only go so far with Dhaka and has resorted to building alternative alliances — like the International Forum on COVID-19 Vaccine Cooperation — and waiting for the ‘opportune moment’.

When India halted COVID-19 vaccine exports earlier this year to meet domestic demand, China swooped in, offering 100 thousand jabs as a gift to Bangladesh. Since March 2021, Bangladesh has received 9 million Sinopharm doses from China, with an additional 1.1 million doses as a gift. On 17 August, Bangladesh signed a deal to locally produce 5 million Sinopharm jabs each month.

To counter China’s growing vaccine diplomacy, Washington decided to send both Pfizer and Moderna vaccines to Dhaka. Bangladesh has received roughly 5.5 million vaccine doses from the United States as a gift, with 6 million more promised to be delivered by December 2021 under the COVAX initiative. Japan also sent over 3 million AstraZeneca doses in phases to Bangladesh.

Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs termed Bangladesh as the ‘

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Q1 2024 Brief on Transfer Pricing in Asia

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Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 on transfer pricing, consolidating various guidelines. The Directorate General of Taxes focuses on compliance, expanded arm’s length principle, and substance checks. Singapore’s Budget 2024 addresses economic challenges, operational costs, and sustainability, implementing global tax reforms like the Income Inclusion Rule and Domestic Top-up Tax.


Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) has released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 (“PMK-172”), which prevails as a unified transfer pricing guideline. PMK-172 consolidates various transfer pricing matters that were previously covered under separate regulations, including the application of the arm’s length principle, transfer pricing documentation requirements, transfer pricing adjustments, Mutual Agreement Procedure (“MAP”), and Advance Pricing Agreements (“APA”).

The Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes (DGT) has continued to focus on compliance with the ex-ante principle, the expanded scope of transactions subject to the arm’s length principle, and the reinforcement of substance checks as part of the preliminary stage, indicating the DGT’s expectation of meticulous and well-supported transfer pricing analyses conducted by taxpayers.

In conclusion, PMK-172 reflects the Indonesian government’s commitment to addressing some of the most controversial transfer pricing issues and promoting clarity and certainty. While it brings new opportunities, it also presents challenges. Taxpayers are strongly advised to evaluate the implications of these new guidelines on their businesses in Indonesia to navigate this transformative regulatory landscape successfully.

In a significant move to bolster economic resilience and sustainability, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Mr. Lawrence Wong, unveiled the ambitious Singapore Budget 2024 on February 16, 2024. Amidst global economic fluctuations and a pressing climate crisis, the Budget strategically addresses the dual challenges of rising operational costs and the imperative for sustainable development, marking a pivotal step towards fortifying Singapore’s position as a competitive and green economy.

In anticipation of global tax reforms, Singapore’s proactive steps to implement the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) and Domestic Top-up Tax (DTT) under the BEPS 2.0 framework demonstrate a forward-looking approach to ensure tax compliance and fairness. These measures reaffirm Singapore’s commitment to international tax standards while safeguarding its economic interests.

Transfer pricing highlights from the Singapore Budget 2024 include:

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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New Report from Dezan Shira & Associates: China Takes the Lead in Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024

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China has been the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 years, producing one-third of global manufacturing output. In the Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024, China ranks highest among eight emerging countries in the region. Challenges for these countries include global demand disparities affecting industrial output and export orders.


Known as the “World’s Factory”, China has held the title of the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 consecutive years, starting from 2010. Its factories churn out approximately one-third of the global manufacturing output, a testament to its industrial might and capacity.

China’s dominant role as the world’s sole manufacturing power is reaffirmed in Dezan Shira & Associates’ Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024 report (“EAMI 2024”), in which China secures the top spot among eight emerging countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The other seven economies are India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Bangladesh.

The EAMI 2024 aims to assess the potential of these eight economies, navigate the risks, and pinpoint specific factors affecting the manufacturing landscape.

In this article, we delve into the key findings of the EAMI 2024 report and navigate China’s advantages and disadvantages in the manufacturing sector, placing them within the Asia-Pacific comparative context.

Emerging Asia countries face various challenges, especially in the current phase of increased volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA). One notable challenge is the impact of global demand disparities on the manufacturing sector, affecting industrial output and export orders.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Is journalist Vicky Xu preparing to return to China?

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Chinese social media influencers have recently claimed that prominent Chinese-born Australian journalist Vicky Xu had posted a message saying she planned to return to China.

There is no evidence for this. The source did not provide evidence to support the claim, and Xu herself later confirmed to AFCL that she has no such plans.

Currently working as an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, or ASPI, Xu has previously written for both the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, or ABC, and The New York Times.

A Chinese language netizen on X initially claimed on March 31 that the changing geopolitical relations between Sydney and Beijing had caused Xu to become an expendable asset and that she had posted a message expressing a strong desire to return to China. An illegible, blurred photo of the supposed message accompanied the post. 

This claim was retweeted by a widely followed influencer on the popular Chinese social media site Weibo one day later, who additionally commented that Xu was a “traitor” who had been abandoned by Australian media. 

Rumors surfaced on X and Weibo at the end of March that Vicky Xu – a Chinese-born Australian journalist who exposed forced labor in Xinjiang – was returning to China after becoming an “outcast” in Australia. (Screenshots / X & Weibo)

Following the publication of an ASPI article in 2021 which exposed forced labor conditions in Xinjiang co-authored by Xu, the journalist was labeled “morally bankrupt” and “anti-China” by the Chinese state owned media outlet Global Times and subjected to an influx of threatening messages and digital abuse, eventually forcing her to temporarily close several of her social media accounts.

AFCL found that neither Xu’s active X nor LinkedIn account has any mention of her supposed return to China, and received the following response from Xu herself about the rumor:

“I can confirm that I don’t have plans to go back to China. I think if I do go back I’ll most definitely be detained or imprisoned – so the only career I’ll be having is probably going to be prison labor or something like that, which wouldn’t be ideal.”

Neither a keyword search nor reverse image search on the photo attached to the original X post turned up any text from Xu supporting the netizens’ claims.

Translated by Shen Ke. Edited by Shen Ke and Malcolm Foster.

Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) was established to counter disinformation in today’s complex media environment. We publish fact-checks, media-watches and in-depth reports that aim to sharpen and deepen our readers’ understanding of current affairs and public issues. If you like our content, you can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram and X.

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