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China

Countering China and North Korea’s mad dash for missiles

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A Dongfeng-41 intercontinental strategic nuclear missiles group formation marches to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in Beijing, 1 October 2019 (Photo: Reuters).

Author: Jaganath Sankaran, University of Texas

China and North Korea have accumulated a significant arsenal of ballistic missiles. China is estimated to possess as many as 1500 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and 450 medium-range ballistic missiles. These missiles could target the United States and allied military bases in a Taiwan Strait confrontation. North Korea has close to 1000 SRBMs and approximately 300 medium-range ballistic missiles that can reach targets in South Korea and Japan.

In 2017, former director of US National Intelligence Daniel Coats testified to the US Congress that North Korea has developed precision conventional ballistic missile capabilities. The US Department of Defense 2019 Missile Defense Review also declares China’s regional ballistic missiles as a prominent weapons system in its ‘efforts to counter US military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific’ and ‘deny the United States the capability and freedom of action to protect US allies and partners in Asia’. Fortunately for Washington, it has paths towards mitigating these threats.

The United States and its allies could respond in kind and deploy missiles arrayed against Chinese and North Korean assets to establish deterrence. They could expand missile defences in the Asia Pacific region to mitigate the threat. Finally, the United States could attempt arms control mechanisms to contain, and potentially reverse, the proliferation of missiles. All of these options offer possibilities and challenges.

Understanding the motivations behind Chinese and North Korean missile pursuits will enable the evaluation of the effectiveness of these options. Beijing and Pyongyang have different ideas about the role missiles play in deterrence and warfare. Engaging in arms control, deploying countervailing offensive arms, and preparing a robust missile defence against China and North Korea present unique challenges.

North Korea does not see its missiles as a means towards reunification or as assets in a prolonged war. Rather, they are instruments of coercion and leverage to, for example, dissuade Japanese leaders from offering material or military support to South Korea or the United States in a military contingency. North Koreans hope to successfully do what the Iraqis failed to achieve in the 1991 Gulf War. The Iraqis had fired several missiles into Israel and threatened chemical weapons attacks on Israel, attempting unsuccessfully to unravel the broad coalition under US command.

The North Koreans hope to unravel Japanese support for a US-led military campaign using the threat of missile bombardment. The North Koreans also aim to use their missile arsenal to target major military airbases and naval disembarkation ports in the Asia Pacific region to prevent the assembling of US and allied forces to foreclose a Desert Storm-style military operation against it.

For North Korea, their regional missiles are tools of deterrence and defence to avoid catastrophic military defeat. Consequently, they may be unwilling to engage in standalone arms control or reductions in conventional ballistic missile arsenals unless there is a significant shift in the nature of the country’s relationship with the United States. This means that, in the near term, a combination of hardened population shelters and limited missile defences may be the most viable countermeasure to the North Korean missile threat.

Meanwhile, China has articulated a robust war-fighting strategy using its conventional ballistic missiles. Chinese military doctrine documents discuss ‘penetrating the enemy’s air defence system, striking the enemy’s in-depth targets, and seizing air and naval dominance in future local wars’. These documents speculate a missile campaign designed to degrade US and allied air defence operations, followed by an air campaign that uses cheaper precision-guided munitions to exact significant operational damage to US and allied operations.

These are still speculative concepts and may not be easily achieved by Chinese rocket forces. But evidence indicates that China is training to execute these styles of campaigns and that Chinese rocket forces have attained limited ability to execute pre-planned joint fire against targets in the Pacific theatre.

China has integrated its conventional ballistic missiles within its regional military strategy. In the near term, arms control measures such as a version of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty seem improbable. US regional missile defence deployments and other defensive measures will have to deter and…

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Q1 2024 Brief on Transfer Pricing in Asia

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Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 on transfer pricing, consolidating various guidelines. The Directorate General of Taxes focuses on compliance, expanded arm’s length principle, and substance checks. Singapore’s Budget 2024 addresses economic challenges, operational costs, and sustainability, implementing global tax reforms like the Income Inclusion Rule and Domestic Top-up Tax.


Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) has released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 (“PMK-172”), which prevails as a unified transfer pricing guideline. PMK-172 consolidates various transfer pricing matters that were previously covered under separate regulations, including the application of the arm’s length principle, transfer pricing documentation requirements, transfer pricing adjustments, Mutual Agreement Procedure (“MAP”), and Advance Pricing Agreements (“APA”).

The Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes (DGT) has continued to focus on compliance with the ex-ante principle, the expanded scope of transactions subject to the arm’s length principle, and the reinforcement of substance checks as part of the preliminary stage, indicating the DGT’s expectation of meticulous and well-supported transfer pricing analyses conducted by taxpayers.

In conclusion, PMK-172 reflects the Indonesian government’s commitment to addressing some of the most controversial transfer pricing issues and promoting clarity and certainty. While it brings new opportunities, it also presents challenges. Taxpayers are strongly advised to evaluate the implications of these new guidelines on their businesses in Indonesia to navigate this transformative regulatory landscape successfully.

In a significant move to bolster economic resilience and sustainability, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Mr. Lawrence Wong, unveiled the ambitious Singapore Budget 2024 on February 16, 2024. Amidst global economic fluctuations and a pressing climate crisis, the Budget strategically addresses the dual challenges of rising operational costs and the imperative for sustainable development, marking a pivotal step towards fortifying Singapore’s position as a competitive and green economy.

In anticipation of global tax reforms, Singapore’s proactive steps to implement the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) and Domestic Top-up Tax (DTT) under the BEPS 2.0 framework demonstrate a forward-looking approach to ensure tax compliance and fairness. These measures reaffirm Singapore’s commitment to international tax standards while safeguarding its economic interests.

Transfer pricing highlights from the Singapore Budget 2024 include:

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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New Report from Dezan Shira & Associates: China Takes the Lead in Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024

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China has been the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 years, producing one-third of global manufacturing output. In the Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024, China ranks highest among eight emerging countries in the region. Challenges for these countries include global demand disparities affecting industrial output and export orders.


Known as the “World’s Factory”, China has held the title of the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 consecutive years, starting from 2010. Its factories churn out approximately one-third of the global manufacturing output, a testament to its industrial might and capacity.

China’s dominant role as the world’s sole manufacturing power is reaffirmed in Dezan Shira & Associates’ Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024 report (“EAMI 2024”), in which China secures the top spot among eight emerging countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The other seven economies are India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Bangladesh.

The EAMI 2024 aims to assess the potential of these eight economies, navigate the risks, and pinpoint specific factors affecting the manufacturing landscape.

In this article, we delve into the key findings of the EAMI 2024 report and navigate China’s advantages and disadvantages in the manufacturing sector, placing them within the Asia-Pacific comparative context.

Emerging Asia countries face various challenges, especially in the current phase of increased volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA). One notable challenge is the impact of global demand disparities on the manufacturing sector, affecting industrial output and export orders.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Is journalist Vicky Xu preparing to return to China?

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Chinese social media influencers have recently claimed that prominent Chinese-born Australian journalist Vicky Xu had posted a message saying she planned to return to China.

There is no evidence for this. The source did not provide evidence to support the claim, and Xu herself later confirmed to AFCL that she has no such plans.

Currently working as an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, or ASPI, Xu has previously written for both the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, or ABC, and The New York Times.

A Chinese language netizen on X initially claimed on March 31 that the changing geopolitical relations between Sydney and Beijing had caused Xu to become an expendable asset and that she had posted a message expressing a strong desire to return to China. An illegible, blurred photo of the supposed message accompanied the post. 

This claim was retweeted by a widely followed influencer on the popular Chinese social media site Weibo one day later, who additionally commented that Xu was a “traitor” who had been abandoned by Australian media. 

Rumors surfaced on X and Weibo at the end of March that Vicky Xu – a Chinese-born Australian journalist who exposed forced labor in Xinjiang – was returning to China after becoming an “outcast” in Australia. (Screenshots / X & Weibo)

Following the publication of an ASPI article in 2021 which exposed forced labor conditions in Xinjiang co-authored by Xu, the journalist was labeled “morally bankrupt” and “anti-China” by the Chinese state owned media outlet Global Times and subjected to an influx of threatening messages and digital abuse, eventually forcing her to temporarily close several of her social media accounts.

AFCL found that neither Xu’s active X nor LinkedIn account has any mention of her supposed return to China, and received the following response from Xu herself about the rumor:

“I can confirm that I don’t have plans to go back to China. I think if I do go back I’ll most definitely be detained or imprisoned – so the only career I’ll be having is probably going to be prison labor or something like that, which wouldn’t be ideal.”

Neither a keyword search nor reverse image search on the photo attached to the original X post turned up any text from Xu supporting the netizens’ claims.

Translated by Shen Ke. Edited by Shen Ke and Malcolm Foster.

Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) was established to counter disinformation in today’s complex media environment. We publish fact-checks, media-watches and in-depth reports that aim to sharpen and deepen our readers’ understanding of current affairs and public issues. If you like our content, you can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram and X.

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