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China

The right angle of the Quadrilateral

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Sailors aboard the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) stand by as the ship goes alongside the Indian navy fleet oiler INS Shakti (A57) during the Malabar naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, 13 April 2012 (Photo: Reuters/Abaca Press).

Author: Mason Richey, HUFS

The leaders of the United States, Japan, Australia and India met virtually on 12 March in their strategic mini-lateral grouping known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad. This was an inaugural leader-level summit for the grouping, following its upgrade to a stand-alone ministerial-level meeting in 2020.

Contrary to expectations that the Quad might continue as an Indo-Pacific ‘talk shop’, the Joint Statement after the summit envisions deliverables over the short- to medium-term. Two initiatives are notable. First, the Quad has devised a division of labour for developing, financing, manufacturing and distributing one billion COVID-19 vaccine doses for Southeast Asia. Second, the Quad is establishing resilient rare-earth metal supply chains. Less concretely, it envisions working groups on climate and emerging technology. Presumably the Quad will also continue Malabar combined naval exercises, which Australia joined in 2020 for the first time in 13 years.

Sensible though these collaborations are, the Quad is nevertheless weakened by two problems. The first is conceptual and strategic incoherence vis-a-vis China. The second is a lack of deep security cooperation among the Quad’s non-US members. Interestingly, improving the latter could help mitigate the former.

The obvious problem is that the Quad’s grand design — strengthening the ‘rules-based order’ of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) — is underdetermined with respect to matching means to ends. The crux of the difficulty is that the Quad’s nebulous, gauzy strategic mission obscures what general consensus believes is the actual objective of the grouping for the United States — countering China. Whether Japanese, Australian, and Indian leaders share that assessment is irrelevant to this perception of the role of the Quad. The perception matters and is baked into the Quad cake. The ostensible ambition to counter or contain China in the Indo-Pacific is outstripped by the Quad’s inability to do so, a state of affairs rooted in both China’s regional economic weight and its growing military capabilities. The Quad also does not acknowledge anti-China strategic objectives despite consensus belief to the contrary. More pointedly, China itself views the Quad as a direct challenge to its regional ambitions.

The Joint Statement’s headline initiatives — COVID-19 vaccine production and distribution, and rare-earth metal supply chain diversification — both signal pushback against elements of Chinese global and regional power (such as Beijing’s vaccine diplomacy and geo-economic use of raw materials). The Quad’s reference to ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ values and maritime security, with four-party Malabar naval exercises lurking in the background, confronts maritime revisionism and underlines the point that the Quad is seemingly directed toward China, despite the rhetoric of the Joint Statement and official denial.

China has never hidden distrust of the Quad. The dialogue’s first iteration sputtered out in 2007 after China pressured the four parties prior to meetings and naval exercises, convincing Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd to withdraw. Quad 2.0 was revived in 2017 under the Trump administration as a clear demarcation in a great power competition between Washington and Beijing. China views the Biden administration as continuing this Trumpian anti-China spirit.

Doubtless there is bad faith in Beijing. There is likely no reasonable step the Quad could take to allay Beijing’s professed anxiety about encirclement. But that is, nonetheless, the crux of the problem of the Quad’s incoherence. Either the Quad is directed against China but lacks the means to accomplish its objectives, or the Biden administration has convinced itself that the Quad really is not about China, yet will not get credit for it.

Beijing is convinced of the former, but the Quad’s origins were far from anti-China. It originally sprung out of the Tsunami Core Group formed by the United States, Japan, Australia and India to coordinate humanitarian assistance and disaster relief following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. This origin story leads to two observations relevant for the present.

First, the Quad is most likely to succeed as a mini-lateral group addressing functional security domains — human, cyber, environmental, counterterrorism — rather than diffuse strategic concerns, which are better served by regional alliances. The Quad’s COVID-19 vaccine initiative is a model in this regard. Focusing…

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New Report from Dezan Shira & Associates: China Takes the Lead in Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024

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China has been the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 years, producing one-third of global manufacturing output. In the Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024, China ranks highest among eight emerging countries in the region. Challenges for these countries include global demand disparities affecting industrial output and export orders.


Known as the “World’s Factory”, China has held the title of the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 consecutive years, starting from 2010. Its factories churn out approximately one-third of the global manufacturing output, a testament to its industrial might and capacity.

China’s dominant role as the world’s sole manufacturing power is reaffirmed in Dezan Shira & Associates’ Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024 report (“EAMI 2024”), in which China secures the top spot among eight emerging countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The other seven economies are India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Bangladesh.

The EAMI 2024 aims to assess the potential of these eight economies, navigate the risks, and pinpoint specific factors affecting the manufacturing landscape.

In this article, we delve into the key findings of the EAMI 2024 report and navigate China’s advantages and disadvantages in the manufacturing sector, placing them within the Asia-Pacific comparative context.

Emerging Asia countries face various challenges, especially in the current phase of increased volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA). One notable challenge is the impact of global demand disparities on the manufacturing sector, affecting industrial output and export orders.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Is journalist Vicky Xu preparing to return to China?

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Chinese social media influencers have recently claimed that prominent Chinese-born Australian journalist Vicky Xu had posted a message saying she planned to return to China.

There is no evidence for this. The source did not provide evidence to support the claim, and Xu herself later confirmed to AFCL that she has no such plans.

Currently working as an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, or ASPI, Xu has previously written for both the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, or ABC, and The New York Times.

A Chinese language netizen on X initially claimed on March 31 that the changing geopolitical relations between Sydney and Beijing had caused Xu to become an expendable asset and that she had posted a message expressing a strong desire to return to China. An illegible, blurred photo of the supposed message accompanied the post. 

This claim was retweeted by a widely followed influencer on the popular Chinese social media site Weibo one day later, who additionally commented that Xu was a “traitor” who had been abandoned by Australian media. 

Rumors surfaced on X and Weibo at the end of March that Vicky Xu – a Chinese-born Australian journalist who exposed forced labor in Xinjiang – was returning to China after becoming an “outcast” in Australia. (Screenshots / X & Weibo)

Following the publication of an ASPI article in 2021 which exposed forced labor conditions in Xinjiang co-authored by Xu, the journalist was labeled “morally bankrupt” and “anti-China” by the Chinese state owned media outlet Global Times and subjected to an influx of threatening messages and digital abuse, eventually forcing her to temporarily close several of her social media accounts.

AFCL found that neither Xu’s active X nor LinkedIn account has any mention of her supposed return to China, and received the following response from Xu herself about the rumor:

“I can confirm that I don’t have plans to go back to China. I think if I do go back I’ll most definitely be detained or imprisoned – so the only career I’ll be having is probably going to be prison labor or something like that, which wouldn’t be ideal.”

Neither a keyword search nor reverse image search on the photo attached to the original X post turned up any text from Xu supporting the netizens’ claims.

Translated by Shen Ke. Edited by Shen Ke and Malcolm Foster.

Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) was established to counter disinformation in today’s complex media environment. We publish fact-checks, media-watches and in-depth reports that aim to sharpen and deepen our readers’ understanding of current affairs and public issues. If you like our content, you can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram and X.

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Guide for Foreign Residents: Obtaining a Certificate of No Criminal Record in China

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Foreign residents in China can request a criminal record check from their local security bureau. This certificate may be required for visa applications or job opportunities. Requirements and procedures vary by city. In Shanghai, foreigners must have lived there for 180 days with a valid visa to obtain the certificate.


Foreign residents living in China can request a criminal record check from the local security bureau in the city in which they have lived for at least 180 days. Certificates of no criminal record may be required for people leaving China, or those who are starting a new position in China and applying for a new visa or residence permit. Taking Shanghai as an example, we outline the requirements for obtaining a China criminal record check.

Securing a Certificate of No Criminal Record, often referred to as a criminal record or criminal background check, is a crucial step for various employment opportunities, as well as visa applications and residency permits in China. Nevertheless, navigating the process can be a daunting task due to bureaucratic procedures and language barriers.

In this article, we use Shanghai as an example to explore the essential information and steps required to successfully obtain a no-criminal record check. Requirements and procedures may differ in other cities and counties in China.

Note that foreigners who are not currently living in China and need a criminal record check to apply for a Chinese visa must obtain the certificate from their country of residence or nationality, and have it notarized by a Chinese embassy or consulate in that country.

Foreigners who have a valid residence permit and have lived in Shanghai for at least 180 days can request a criminal record check in the city. This means that the applicant will also need to currently have a work, study, or other form of visa or stay permit that allows them to live in China long-term.

If a foreigner has lived in another part of China and is planning to or has recently moved to Shanghai, they will need to request a criminal record check in the place where they previously spent at least 180 days.

There are two steps to obtaining a criminal record certificate in Shanghai: requesting the criminal record check from the Public Security Bureau (PSB) and getting the resulting Certificate of No Criminal Record notarized by an authorized notary agency.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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