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China

US–China competition after RCEP

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US President Joe Biden holds a semiconductor chip as he speaks prior to signing an executive order, aimed at addressing a global semiconductor chip shortage, in the State Dining Room at the White House in Washington, United States, 24 February, 2021 (Photo: REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst/File Photo).

Author: Yuhan Zhang, UC Berkeley

In November 2020, 15 countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) amid a backdrop of deglobalisation and trade protectionism. While RCEP demonstrates the success of ASEAN’s middle-power diplomacy and promotes regional trade and economic development, it also serves China’s national interests and will make the region’s largest economy more powerful economically and politically.

China is estimated to see the largest export benefits from RCEP of US$244–248 billion by 2030, followed by Japan (US$128–135 billion) and South Korea (US$63–64 billion). This means that the increase in Chinese exports will account for nearly 50 per cent of the total export growth of all RCEP members. Although these benefits may not offset the total losses of a persisting US–China trade war, they help soften the blow to China and reduce export reliance on the United States.

RCEP also strengthens the division of labour across regional supply chains and help upgrade China’s industrial structure. Low labour costs in ASEAN countries have seen Chinese trade surpluses with ASEAN shrink since 2015, indicating an emerging supply chain relocation from China to Southeast Asia. China’s tariff-elimination commitments under RCEP further accelerates this process. China’s imports of labour-intensive goods from ASEAN countries are set to grow significantly. The inflows of these goods might increase competition with Chinese firms and generate adjustment costs that could drive them towards capital and technology-intensive manufacturing and production.

RCEP will help bring inflows of foreign investment into China. Liberalisation under RCEP includes reductions in behind-the-border barriers such as discriminatory treatment against foreign investment. The Chinese government has also promised to reduce limitations on market access and further open up a number of service and non-service sectors to multinational corporations (MNC).

Many MNCs have been wary of China’s intellectual property rights (IPR) infringements. RCEP is expected to have positive effects on IPR protection in China. RCEP’s IP chapter does have its limitations, and the majority of the provisions have already been implemented in China, but articles 11.15, 11.17 and 11.62 help the Chinese government take stricter measures. There will be stronger measures to protect digital rights management information, increase the use of non-infringing computer software and destroy pirated goods and counterfeit materials. Foreign MNCs may be more attracted to committing resources to the country, including bringing international financing and technologies. They will enhance local Chinese production, engineering and design capabilities.

China will benefit tremendously from RCEP geopolitically. First, China’s involvement in RCEP reassures neighbouring countries. Engaging actively in Asian multilateralism signals its commitment to preserving peace and promoting regional growth. Participation in RCEP demonstrates that China is willing to further open its market and be bound by common regional rules. This helps allay geopolitical suspicion among neighbours.

Second, China’s political power in the region will strengthen. RCEP reinforces economic interdependence between China and other participating countries. This will further push the region into China’s economic and political orbit, and enable Beijing to exert influence on regulations and standards within the bloc.

China seeks to conclude a trilateral free trade agreement (FTA) with South Korea and Japan to strengthen economic connectedness and build political trust. RCEP could play a catalytic role in the negotiation process, boosting the determination of China, Japan and South Korea to make a political decision. Chinese President Xi Jinping promised to speed up negotiations for the trilateral FTA in November 2020. It is expected that leaders will meet to discuss later this year.

Following the signing of RCEP, competition between the United States and China could intensify. China’s participation in RCEP further leverages its economic and political clout and impel the United States to respond in the effort to vie for geopolitical primacy in the region. The United States may be expected to maintain its trade tariffs on Chinese goods, accelerate technological decoupling with China and adopt additional strategies to advance its own industries and technologies. No matter what path the United States ultimately takes, China will continue to ramp up cooperation with countries…

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Q1 2024 Brief on Transfer Pricing in Asia

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Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 on transfer pricing, consolidating various guidelines. The Directorate General of Taxes focuses on compliance, expanded arm’s length principle, and substance checks. Singapore’s Budget 2024 addresses economic challenges, operational costs, and sustainability, implementing global tax reforms like the Income Inclusion Rule and Domestic Top-up Tax.


Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) has released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 (“PMK-172”), which prevails as a unified transfer pricing guideline. PMK-172 consolidates various transfer pricing matters that were previously covered under separate regulations, including the application of the arm’s length principle, transfer pricing documentation requirements, transfer pricing adjustments, Mutual Agreement Procedure (“MAP”), and Advance Pricing Agreements (“APA”).

The Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes (DGT) has continued to focus on compliance with the ex-ante principle, the expanded scope of transactions subject to the arm’s length principle, and the reinforcement of substance checks as part of the preliminary stage, indicating the DGT’s expectation of meticulous and well-supported transfer pricing analyses conducted by taxpayers.

In conclusion, PMK-172 reflects the Indonesian government’s commitment to addressing some of the most controversial transfer pricing issues and promoting clarity and certainty. While it brings new opportunities, it also presents challenges. Taxpayers are strongly advised to evaluate the implications of these new guidelines on their businesses in Indonesia to navigate this transformative regulatory landscape successfully.

In a significant move to bolster economic resilience and sustainability, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Mr. Lawrence Wong, unveiled the ambitious Singapore Budget 2024 on February 16, 2024. Amidst global economic fluctuations and a pressing climate crisis, the Budget strategically addresses the dual challenges of rising operational costs and the imperative for sustainable development, marking a pivotal step towards fortifying Singapore’s position as a competitive and green economy.

In anticipation of global tax reforms, Singapore’s proactive steps to implement the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) and Domestic Top-up Tax (DTT) under the BEPS 2.0 framework demonstrate a forward-looking approach to ensure tax compliance and fairness. These measures reaffirm Singapore’s commitment to international tax standards while safeguarding its economic interests.

Transfer pricing highlights from the Singapore Budget 2024 include:

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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New Report from Dezan Shira & Associates: China Takes the Lead in Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024

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China has been the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 years, producing one-third of global manufacturing output. In the Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024, China ranks highest among eight emerging countries in the region. Challenges for these countries include global demand disparities affecting industrial output and export orders.


Known as the “World’s Factory”, China has held the title of the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 consecutive years, starting from 2010. Its factories churn out approximately one-third of the global manufacturing output, a testament to its industrial might and capacity.

China’s dominant role as the world’s sole manufacturing power is reaffirmed in Dezan Shira & Associates’ Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024 report (“EAMI 2024”), in which China secures the top spot among eight emerging countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The other seven economies are India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Bangladesh.

The EAMI 2024 aims to assess the potential of these eight economies, navigate the risks, and pinpoint specific factors affecting the manufacturing landscape.

In this article, we delve into the key findings of the EAMI 2024 report and navigate China’s advantages and disadvantages in the manufacturing sector, placing them within the Asia-Pacific comparative context.

Emerging Asia countries face various challenges, especially in the current phase of increased volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA). One notable challenge is the impact of global demand disparities on the manufacturing sector, affecting industrial output and export orders.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Is journalist Vicky Xu preparing to return to China?

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Chinese social media influencers have recently claimed that prominent Chinese-born Australian journalist Vicky Xu had posted a message saying she planned to return to China.

There is no evidence for this. The source did not provide evidence to support the claim, and Xu herself later confirmed to AFCL that she has no such plans.

Currently working as an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, or ASPI, Xu has previously written for both the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, or ABC, and The New York Times.

A Chinese language netizen on X initially claimed on March 31 that the changing geopolitical relations between Sydney and Beijing had caused Xu to become an expendable asset and that she had posted a message expressing a strong desire to return to China. An illegible, blurred photo of the supposed message accompanied the post. 

This claim was retweeted by a widely followed influencer on the popular Chinese social media site Weibo one day later, who additionally commented that Xu was a “traitor” who had been abandoned by Australian media. 

Rumors surfaced on X and Weibo at the end of March that Vicky Xu – a Chinese-born Australian journalist who exposed forced labor in Xinjiang – was returning to China after becoming an “outcast” in Australia. (Screenshots / X & Weibo)

Following the publication of an ASPI article in 2021 which exposed forced labor conditions in Xinjiang co-authored by Xu, the journalist was labeled “morally bankrupt” and “anti-China” by the Chinese state owned media outlet Global Times and subjected to an influx of threatening messages and digital abuse, eventually forcing her to temporarily close several of her social media accounts.

AFCL found that neither Xu’s active X nor LinkedIn account has any mention of her supposed return to China, and received the following response from Xu herself about the rumor:

“I can confirm that I don’t have plans to go back to China. I think if I do go back I’ll most definitely be detained or imprisoned – so the only career I’ll be having is probably going to be prison labor or something like that, which wouldn’t be ideal.”

Neither a keyword search nor reverse image search on the photo attached to the original X post turned up any text from Xu supporting the netizens’ claims.

Translated by Shen Ke. Edited by Shen Ke and Malcolm Foster.

Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) was established to counter disinformation in today’s complex media environment. We publish fact-checks, media-watches and in-depth reports that aim to sharpen and deepen our readers’ understanding of current affairs and public issues. If you like our content, you can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram and X.

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