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China

China–Russia cooperation on missile attack early warning systems

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Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during their meeting on the sideline of the 11th edition of the BRICS Summit in Brasilia, Brazil, 13 November 2019 (Photo: Reuters/Sputnik/Ramil Sitdikov/Kremlin).

Author: Alexander Korolev, UNSW

According to some recent analyses, a new China–Russia missile attack early warning system is nearing completion. It will be based on the Russian Tundra satellites and Voronezh modular ground-based radar stations set up in Chinese territory.

The system will provide advance information on potential incoming missiles’ trajectory, speed, time-to-target and other critical information necessary for an effective interception. The integration of China and Russia’s missile attack early warning systems is predicted to make China–Russia military integration and interdependence match the level of the advanced alliance relationships the United States has developed with countries such as France and the United Kingdom.

On 3 October 2019, during the 16th annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi, Russia, President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was helping China to build its missile attack early warning system. Putin added that, ‘I don’t think I will reveal a big secret here. It will become known anyway’, but also acknowledged that this ‘will fundamentally enhance the defence capability of China because currently only the United States and Russia have such a system’.

Subsequently, China and Russia were reported to have signed contracts worth US$60 million to develop software for the new system. Sergei Boev, the chief designer of the missile attack early warning system and the General Director of the Russian Vimpel Interstate Corporation involved in the software project, later stated that cooperation with China in this area was ‘ongoing’ and that ‘we cannot provide more details since it has to do with confidential agreements’.

Cooperation between China and Russia in the area of strategic arms is not a ‘big secret’ but an outcome of the consistent and incremental consolidation of China–Russia strategic alignment since the end of the Cold War. In the area of missile attack early warning systems, cooperation can be traced back to at least May 2016, when China and Russia launched a new joint regular military exercise, Aerospace Security, which took place in the Central Research Institution of the Russian Armed Forces and became the first China–Russa computer-simulated missile defence drill.

The second joint drills of this type, Aerospace Security 2017, happened in Beijing in December 2017. According to China’s National Defense Ministry, these drills were meant to bolster bilateral cooperation and secure strategic balance in the Asia Pacific. The main task was ‘to work out joint planning of combat operations when organising air missile defences, operation and mutual fire support’.

The third such drill, Aerospace Security 2019, took place in Russia in 2019 with the main tasks being responding to potential ballistic and cruise missile strikes over the two countries’ territories. In this context, the announcement that Russia was helping China to build a missile attack early warning system is an indication of China–Russia long-term strategic cooperation entering a new, more advanced, but entirely expected stage.

Nevertheless, Russia sharing missile attack early warning capabilities with China is significant from both military–technical and geopolitical standpoints. It enhances China’s defence capabilities immensely because China obtains a powerful tool to protect itself from a hypothetical disarming first strike from the United States. Moreover, it opens avenues for the integration of China and Russia’s early warning systems. When warning stations in Russia and China are merged into a single complex, this increases the speed with which the two countries can be warned of and intercept a potential missile attack.

According to a retired deputy commander of Russia’s air force, Alexander Luzan, Russia will also benefit from such a merger because the creation of a unified information space and data exchange with Chinese radars will mean that ‘the security of our country [Russia] from the east will be better ensured’. Some Moscow-based defence analysts argue that integration of the two countries’ early warning systems facilitates further convergence of Russia and China’s defence strategies — resulting in the formation of a common defence policy.

Equally significant are the geopolitical implications. Strategic arms — and specifically missile attack early warning systems — are the most critical and sensitive aspect of any country’s defence capabilities. China and Russia extending their cooperation into this area is a…

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Q1 2024 Brief on Transfer Pricing in Asia

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Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 on transfer pricing, consolidating various guidelines. The Directorate General of Taxes focuses on compliance, expanded arm’s length principle, and substance checks. Singapore’s Budget 2024 addresses economic challenges, operational costs, and sustainability, implementing global tax reforms like the Income Inclusion Rule and Domestic Top-up Tax.


Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) has released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 (“PMK-172”), which prevails as a unified transfer pricing guideline. PMK-172 consolidates various transfer pricing matters that were previously covered under separate regulations, including the application of the arm’s length principle, transfer pricing documentation requirements, transfer pricing adjustments, Mutual Agreement Procedure (“MAP”), and Advance Pricing Agreements (“APA”).

The Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes (DGT) has continued to focus on compliance with the ex-ante principle, the expanded scope of transactions subject to the arm’s length principle, and the reinforcement of substance checks as part of the preliminary stage, indicating the DGT’s expectation of meticulous and well-supported transfer pricing analyses conducted by taxpayers.

In conclusion, PMK-172 reflects the Indonesian government’s commitment to addressing some of the most controversial transfer pricing issues and promoting clarity and certainty. While it brings new opportunities, it also presents challenges. Taxpayers are strongly advised to evaluate the implications of these new guidelines on their businesses in Indonesia to navigate this transformative regulatory landscape successfully.

In a significant move to bolster economic resilience and sustainability, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Mr. Lawrence Wong, unveiled the ambitious Singapore Budget 2024 on February 16, 2024. Amidst global economic fluctuations and a pressing climate crisis, the Budget strategically addresses the dual challenges of rising operational costs and the imperative for sustainable development, marking a pivotal step towards fortifying Singapore’s position as a competitive and green economy.

In anticipation of global tax reforms, Singapore’s proactive steps to implement the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) and Domestic Top-up Tax (DTT) under the BEPS 2.0 framework demonstrate a forward-looking approach to ensure tax compliance and fairness. These measures reaffirm Singapore’s commitment to international tax standards while safeguarding its economic interests.

Transfer pricing highlights from the Singapore Budget 2024 include:

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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New Report from Dezan Shira & Associates: China Takes the Lead in Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024

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China has been the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 years, producing one-third of global manufacturing output. In the Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024, China ranks highest among eight emerging countries in the region. Challenges for these countries include global demand disparities affecting industrial output and export orders.


Known as the “World’s Factory”, China has held the title of the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 consecutive years, starting from 2010. Its factories churn out approximately one-third of the global manufacturing output, a testament to its industrial might and capacity.

China’s dominant role as the world’s sole manufacturing power is reaffirmed in Dezan Shira & Associates’ Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024 report (“EAMI 2024”), in which China secures the top spot among eight emerging countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The other seven economies are India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Bangladesh.

The EAMI 2024 aims to assess the potential of these eight economies, navigate the risks, and pinpoint specific factors affecting the manufacturing landscape.

In this article, we delve into the key findings of the EAMI 2024 report and navigate China’s advantages and disadvantages in the manufacturing sector, placing them within the Asia-Pacific comparative context.

Emerging Asia countries face various challenges, especially in the current phase of increased volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA). One notable challenge is the impact of global demand disparities on the manufacturing sector, affecting industrial output and export orders.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Is journalist Vicky Xu preparing to return to China?

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Chinese social media influencers have recently claimed that prominent Chinese-born Australian journalist Vicky Xu had posted a message saying she planned to return to China.

There is no evidence for this. The source did not provide evidence to support the claim, and Xu herself later confirmed to AFCL that she has no such plans.

Currently working as an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, or ASPI, Xu has previously written for both the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, or ABC, and The New York Times.

A Chinese language netizen on X initially claimed on March 31 that the changing geopolitical relations between Sydney and Beijing had caused Xu to become an expendable asset and that she had posted a message expressing a strong desire to return to China. An illegible, blurred photo of the supposed message accompanied the post. 

This claim was retweeted by a widely followed influencer on the popular Chinese social media site Weibo one day later, who additionally commented that Xu was a “traitor” who had been abandoned by Australian media. 

Rumors surfaced on X and Weibo at the end of March that Vicky Xu – a Chinese-born Australian journalist who exposed forced labor in Xinjiang – was returning to China after becoming an “outcast” in Australia. (Screenshots / X & Weibo)

Following the publication of an ASPI article in 2021 which exposed forced labor conditions in Xinjiang co-authored by Xu, the journalist was labeled “morally bankrupt” and “anti-China” by the Chinese state owned media outlet Global Times and subjected to an influx of threatening messages and digital abuse, eventually forcing her to temporarily close several of her social media accounts.

AFCL found that neither Xu’s active X nor LinkedIn account has any mention of her supposed return to China, and received the following response from Xu herself about the rumor:

“I can confirm that I don’t have plans to go back to China. I think if I do go back I’ll most definitely be detained or imprisoned – so the only career I’ll be having is probably going to be prison labor or something like that, which wouldn’t be ideal.”

Neither a keyword search nor reverse image search on the photo attached to the original X post turned up any text from Xu supporting the netizens’ claims.

Translated by Shen Ke. Edited by Shen Ke and Malcolm Foster.

Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) was established to counter disinformation in today’s complex media environment. We publish fact-checks, media-watches and in-depth reports that aim to sharpen and deepen our readers’ understanding of current affairs and public issues. If you like our content, you can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram and X.

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