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China

How does the public perceive the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan?

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People walk past a Taiwanese flag amid COVID-19 in Taipei, Taiwan, 10 August 2020 (Photo: Reuters/Ann Wang).

Authors: Yao-Yuan Yeh, University of St Thomas, Charles KS Wu, Purdue University, Austin Wang, UNLV, and Fang-Yu Chen, Michigan State University

Observers of Taiwan’s foreign relations are well aware of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) perennial efforts to isolate Taiwan from the international community. Under the ‘One China’ policy, establishing diplomatic ties with Taiwan is tantamount to breaking up with the PRC.

 

 

Since President Tsai Ing-wen came into office, China has poached a number of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners. Taiwan is now left with just 15 national partners, including the Holy See, after seven states switched recognition to the PRC since 2016. Erosion of international recognition, while underway for a long time, still gradually weakens Taiwan’s assertions to sovereignty.

Despite the constant effort exerted by the Taiwanese government to voice concern and challenge the trend, how Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation is perceived by its own public is rarely brought up. Studying this offers insights for policy observers and policymakers on the future of cross-Strait relations. How citizens in Taiwan respond to China’s use of international pressure may also be of interest to citizens elsewhere, especially in Hong Kong, dealing with similar issues.

Ethnic identity in Taiwan is complicated due to the island’s unique history. After losing the civil war in 1949, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) retreated from mainland China to Taiwan, along with two million mainlanders under the banner of the Republic of China. During its rule, the Kuomintang suppressed indigenous Taiwanese identity in order to cultivate a Chinese one. This was to support its aim of eventually unifying with mainland China.

According to surveys conducted by the Election Study Center at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University, in 1992, at the beginning of democratisation, 46.4 per cent of respondents considered themselves ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese’. 25.5 per cent considered themselves soley ‘Chinese’ and 17.6 per cent thought of themselves as only ‘Taiwanese’.

A poll by the same institute in 2020 reflects a sharp change in identification in Taiwan. Over 67 per cent of respondents considered themselves only ‘Taiwanese’. Only 27.5 per cent and 2.4 per cent of the respondents regarded themselves as ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese’ and only ‘Chinese’, respectively.

Identity appears to have a strong relationship with how Taiwanese people perceive and evaluate Taiwan’s diplomatic challenges.

Those who consider themselves to be ‘both Chinese and Taiwanese’ or only ‘Chinese’ see the ‘Republic of China’ as crucial to their ethnic identity — the name reinforces and legitimates the existence of a Chinese identity in Taiwan. But those who consider themselves to be only ‘Taiwanese’ appear less likely to care as much about the Republic of China losing diplomatic partners, as they tend to consider ‘Republic of China’ to be out of touch with their identity.

To study the link between identity and public attitudes toward diplomatic relations, the authors designed a survey with the Pollcracy Lab at National Chengchi University. Between 6 and 8 January 2020, 1060 respondents answered the following two questions on Taiwan’s international isolation: ‘If our diplomatic partners kept declining, would it cause negative impacts on Taiwan?’ After reading recent news on other nations severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan, are you still confident with Taiwan’s diplomacy?’

32 per cent responded that losing partners represents a ‘serious negative impact’ for Taiwan, while 41 per cent and 27 per cent chose ‘somewhat negative’ and ‘no impact’, respectively. For the second question, 4.8 per cent of respondents felt more confident about Taiwan’s diplomacy, while 50 per cent and 45 per cent of the subjects expressed the same and less confidence on the matter, respectively. Overall most citizens considered losing diplomatic partners to be problematic.

The survey also asked citizens about their identity. 57 per cent of the respondents identified as solely ‘Taiwanese’, and 41 per cent considered themselves ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese’. 1.2 per cent of subjects thought of themselves as ‘Chinese’ only.

Among those identifying as only ‘Taiwanese’, 17 per cent worried that losing partners would carry a serious negative impact for Taiwan. The level of concern among those with dual identity and a ‘Chinese’-only identity was much higher, at 51 per cent and…

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Q1 2024 Brief on Transfer Pricing in Asia

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Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 on transfer pricing, consolidating various guidelines. The Directorate General of Taxes focuses on compliance, expanded arm’s length principle, and substance checks. Singapore’s Budget 2024 addresses economic challenges, operational costs, and sustainability, implementing global tax reforms like the Income Inclusion Rule and Domestic Top-up Tax.


Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) has released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 (“PMK-172”), which prevails as a unified transfer pricing guideline. PMK-172 consolidates various transfer pricing matters that were previously covered under separate regulations, including the application of the arm’s length principle, transfer pricing documentation requirements, transfer pricing adjustments, Mutual Agreement Procedure (“MAP”), and Advance Pricing Agreements (“APA”).

The Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes (DGT) has continued to focus on compliance with the ex-ante principle, the expanded scope of transactions subject to the arm’s length principle, and the reinforcement of substance checks as part of the preliminary stage, indicating the DGT’s expectation of meticulous and well-supported transfer pricing analyses conducted by taxpayers.

In conclusion, PMK-172 reflects the Indonesian government’s commitment to addressing some of the most controversial transfer pricing issues and promoting clarity and certainty. While it brings new opportunities, it also presents challenges. Taxpayers are strongly advised to evaluate the implications of these new guidelines on their businesses in Indonesia to navigate this transformative regulatory landscape successfully.

In a significant move to bolster economic resilience and sustainability, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Mr. Lawrence Wong, unveiled the ambitious Singapore Budget 2024 on February 16, 2024. Amidst global economic fluctuations and a pressing climate crisis, the Budget strategically addresses the dual challenges of rising operational costs and the imperative for sustainable development, marking a pivotal step towards fortifying Singapore’s position as a competitive and green economy.

In anticipation of global tax reforms, Singapore’s proactive steps to implement the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) and Domestic Top-up Tax (DTT) under the BEPS 2.0 framework demonstrate a forward-looking approach to ensure tax compliance and fairness. These measures reaffirm Singapore’s commitment to international tax standards while safeguarding its economic interests.

Transfer pricing highlights from the Singapore Budget 2024 include:

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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New Report from Dezan Shira & Associates: China Takes the Lead in Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024

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China has been the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 years, producing one-third of global manufacturing output. In the Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024, China ranks highest among eight emerging countries in the region. Challenges for these countries include global demand disparities affecting industrial output and export orders.


Known as the “World’s Factory”, China has held the title of the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 consecutive years, starting from 2010. Its factories churn out approximately one-third of the global manufacturing output, a testament to its industrial might and capacity.

China’s dominant role as the world’s sole manufacturing power is reaffirmed in Dezan Shira & Associates’ Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024 report (“EAMI 2024”), in which China secures the top spot among eight emerging countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The other seven economies are India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Bangladesh.

The EAMI 2024 aims to assess the potential of these eight economies, navigate the risks, and pinpoint specific factors affecting the manufacturing landscape.

In this article, we delve into the key findings of the EAMI 2024 report and navigate China’s advantages and disadvantages in the manufacturing sector, placing them within the Asia-Pacific comparative context.

Emerging Asia countries face various challenges, especially in the current phase of increased volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA). One notable challenge is the impact of global demand disparities on the manufacturing sector, affecting industrial output and export orders.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Is journalist Vicky Xu preparing to return to China?

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Chinese social media influencers have recently claimed that prominent Chinese-born Australian journalist Vicky Xu had posted a message saying she planned to return to China.

There is no evidence for this. The source did not provide evidence to support the claim, and Xu herself later confirmed to AFCL that she has no such plans.

Currently working as an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, or ASPI, Xu has previously written for both the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, or ABC, and The New York Times.

A Chinese language netizen on X initially claimed on March 31 that the changing geopolitical relations between Sydney and Beijing had caused Xu to become an expendable asset and that she had posted a message expressing a strong desire to return to China. An illegible, blurred photo of the supposed message accompanied the post. 

This claim was retweeted by a widely followed influencer on the popular Chinese social media site Weibo one day later, who additionally commented that Xu was a “traitor” who had been abandoned by Australian media. 

Rumors surfaced on X and Weibo at the end of March that Vicky Xu – a Chinese-born Australian journalist who exposed forced labor in Xinjiang – was returning to China after becoming an “outcast” in Australia. (Screenshots / X & Weibo)

Following the publication of an ASPI article in 2021 which exposed forced labor conditions in Xinjiang co-authored by Xu, the journalist was labeled “morally bankrupt” and “anti-China” by the Chinese state owned media outlet Global Times and subjected to an influx of threatening messages and digital abuse, eventually forcing her to temporarily close several of her social media accounts.

AFCL found that neither Xu’s active X nor LinkedIn account has any mention of her supposed return to China, and received the following response from Xu herself about the rumor:

“I can confirm that I don’t have plans to go back to China. I think if I do go back I’ll most definitely be detained or imprisoned – so the only career I’ll be having is probably going to be prison labor or something like that, which wouldn’t be ideal.”

Neither a keyword search nor reverse image search on the photo attached to the original X post turned up any text from Xu supporting the netizens’ claims.

Translated by Shen Ke. Edited by Shen Ke and Malcolm Foster.

Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) was established to counter disinformation in today’s complex media environment. We publish fact-checks, media-watches and in-depth reports that aim to sharpen and deepen our readers’ understanding of current affairs and public issues. If you like our content, you can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram and X.

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