China
Australia’s vision of leadership in the Indo-Pacific
Author: Bradley Wood, ANU
The recent speech by Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne was an implicit message to the United States — Australia and the Indo-Pacific region can no longer wait for its leadership. Australia has signalled to the region and the next US administration that it is prepared to lead by example while the United States gets its house in order.
At the heart of Payne’s address was a policy announcement about the importance of multilateralism and the role international institutions should play in global crises like COVID-19.
After an extensive audit of its engagement with key multilateral institutions, Australia has decided that multilateral institutions are the best way to ‘preserve peace and curb excessive use of power’. But Payne also acknowledged that ‘multilateral institutions are experiencing unprecedented strain from a new era of strategic competition’.
China has used its growing influence to divide members of regional institutions such as ASEAN, weakening collective leadership on important issues like the South China Sea. More broadly, China has brought its influence to bear on global institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO) to cater more to its interests and limit the extent of the United States’ influence.
Payne’s speech was an explicit signal to China about an alternative vision for the region. It called out China on its disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining democracy in the region and Australia’s economy by warning Chinese students to reconsider Australia as an education destination.
But more importantly, the speech didn’t mention the United States.
This is a departure from the approach taken by Payne’s predecessor, Julie Bishop, whose 2017 landmark address on ‘Change and Uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific’ was aimed directly at the United States. Bishop’s speech was also an important message delivered at a critical time. Australia and the region were looking for a sign of leadership from the new Trump administration.
In that speech, Bishop made clear to the Trump administration that the region was in ‘a strategic holding pattern and waiting to see whether the United States and its security allies’ would continue to play a leading role in the region. Bishop called on the Trump administration to ‘play an even greater role as the indispensable strategic power in the Indo-Pacific’.
But it appears that after three years these calls have gone unanswered.
Since then, the Trump administration has chosen to shake down alliance partners in an effort to get them to contribute more to their security. And given that the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the United States) alliance remains fundamental to Australia’s security, the last thing Australia wants to do is offend the temperamental Trump administration by calling it out again.
Australia has proposed an alternative vision of leadership for the Indo-Pacific that strives to protect the multilateral system in the absence of US leadership and in the face of China’s revisionist agenda. This vision looks like the last few decades of US leadership but emphasises, for the time being, collective leadership by small and middle powers as the gatekeepers of the rules-based order.
This type of leadership approach fits the appetite of Australia’s immediate region. It’s as if this leadership vision was lifted from the website of multilateral institutions such as ASEAN which has underpinned peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia and thus Australia for decades.
Australia has determined that the best way to promote and protect Australia’s interests is to preserve, and bring its influence to bear on, multilateral institutions which have always been an important diplomatic amplifier of Australia’s foreign policy.
This is not only diplomatic leadership but also strategic leadership. The 2020 Defence Strategic Update prioritises shaping the Indo-Pacific region as the primary objective of Australia’s defence policy. This places diplomacy and engagement at the forefront of Australia’s foreign and defence policies.
But it remains to be seen whether Australia yields the same influence it once had on the international stage without the United States. Australia and its like-minded small and middle power neighbours will have less resources to wield instruments of national power to navigate the post-COVID-19 world unscathed from great power competition.
While Australia has committed AU$575 billion (US$400 billion) over the next decade, including AU$270 billion (US$188 billion) in…
China
Exploring the Revamped China Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) Program: Potential Benefits for International Businesses
Companies in China must navigate compliance, trading, and reporting within the CCER framework, impacting operations and strategic objectives. The program focuses on afforestation, solar, wind power, and mangrove creation, offering opportunities for innovation and revenue streams while ensuring transparency and accuracy. The Ministry of Ecology and Environment oversees the program.
As companies navigate the complexities of compliance, trading, and reporting within the CCER framework, they must also contend with the broader implications for their operations, finances, and strategic objectives.
This article explores the multifaceted impact of the CCER program on companies operating in China, examining both the opportunities for innovation and growth, as well as the potential risks and compliance considerations.
Initially, the CCER will focus on four sectors: afforestation, solar thermal power, offshore wind power, and mangrove vegetation creation. Companies operating within these sectors can register their accredited carbon reduction credits in the CCER system for trading purposes. These sectors were chosen due to their reliance on carbon credit sales for profitability. For instance, offshore wind power generation, as more costly than onshore alternatives, stands to benefit from additional revenue streams facilitated by CCER transactions.
Currently, primary buyers are expected to be high-emission enterprises seeking to offset their excess emissions and companies aiming to demonstrate corporate social responsibility by contributing to environmental conservation. Eventually, the program aims to allow individuals to purchase credits to offset their carbon footprints. Unlike the mandatory national ETS, the revamped CCER scheme permits any enterprise to buy carbon credits, thereby expanding the market scope.
The Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) oversees the CCER program, having assumed responsibility for climate change initiatives from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2018. Verification agencies and project operators are mandated to ensure transparency and accuracy in disclosing project details and carbon reduction practices.
On the second day after the launch on January 23, the first transaction in China’s voluntary carbon market saw the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the country’s largest offshore oil and gas producer, purchase 250,000 tons of carbon credits to offset its emissions.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
China Implements New Policies to Boost Foreign Investment in Science and Technology Companies
China’s Ministry of Commerce announced new policy measures on April 19, 2023, to encourage foreign investment in the technology sector. The measures include facilitating bond issuance, improving the investment environment, and simplifying procedures for foreign institutions to access the Chinese market.
On April 19, 2023, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) along with nine other departments announced a new set of policy measures (hereinafter, “new measures”) aimed at encouraging foreign investment in its technology sector.
Among the new measures, China intends to facilitate the issuance of RMB bonds by eligible overseas institutions and encourage both domestic and foreign-invested tech companies to raise funds through bond issuance.
In this article, we offer an overview of the new measures and their broader significance in fostering international investment and driving innovation-driven growth, underscoring China’s efforts to instill confidence among foreign investors.
The new measures contain a total of sixteen points aimed at facilitating foreign investment in China’s technology sector and improving the overall investment environment.
Divided into four main chapters, the new measures address key aspects including:
Firstly, China aims to expedite the approval process for QFII and RQFII, ensuring efficient access to the Chinese market. Moreover, the government promises to simplify procedures, facilitating operational activities and fund management for foreign institutions.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
Q1 2024 Brief on Transfer Pricing in Asia
Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 on transfer pricing, consolidating various guidelines. The Directorate General of Taxes focuses on compliance, expanded arm’s length principle, and substance checks. Singapore’s Budget 2024 addresses economic challenges, operational costs, and sustainability, implementing global tax reforms like the Income Inclusion Rule and Domestic Top-up Tax.
Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) has released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 (“PMK-172”), which prevails as a unified transfer pricing guideline. PMK-172 consolidates various transfer pricing matters that were previously covered under separate regulations, including the application of the arm’s length principle, transfer pricing documentation requirements, transfer pricing adjustments, Mutual Agreement Procedure (“MAP”), and Advance Pricing Agreements (“APA”).
The Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes (DGT) has continued to focus on compliance with the ex-ante principle, the expanded scope of transactions subject to the arm’s length principle, and the reinforcement of substance checks as part of the preliminary stage, indicating the DGT’s expectation of meticulous and well-supported transfer pricing analyses conducted by taxpayers.
In conclusion, PMK-172 reflects the Indonesian government’s commitment to addressing some of the most controversial transfer pricing issues and promoting clarity and certainty. While it brings new opportunities, it also presents challenges. Taxpayers are strongly advised to evaluate the implications of these new guidelines on their businesses in Indonesia to navigate this transformative regulatory landscape successfully.
In a significant move to bolster economic resilience and sustainability, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Mr. Lawrence Wong, unveiled the ambitious Singapore Budget 2024 on February 16, 2024. Amidst global economic fluctuations and a pressing climate crisis, the Budget strategically addresses the dual challenges of rising operational costs and the imperative for sustainable development, marking a pivotal step towards fortifying Singapore’s position as a competitive and green economy.
In anticipation of global tax reforms, Singapore’s proactive steps to implement the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) and Domestic Top-up Tax (DTT) under the BEPS 2.0 framework demonstrate a forward-looking approach to ensure tax compliance and fairness. These measures reaffirm Singapore’s commitment to international tax standards while safeguarding its economic interests.
Transfer pricing highlights from the Singapore Budget 2024 include:
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
- Exploring the Revamped China Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) Program: Potential Benefits for International Businesses
- China Implements New Policies to Boost Foreign Investment in Science and Technology Companies
- Q1 2024 Brief on Transfer Pricing in Asia
- New Report from Dezan Shira & Associates: China Takes the Lead in Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024
- Is journalist Vicky Xu preparing to return to China?
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