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China

Regional cooperation to bring clean air to South Korea

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Cho Eun-hye takes a rest while walking her Korean Jindo dog, both wearing masks, on a poor air quality day in Incheon, South Korea, 15 March 2019 (Photo: Reuters/Hyun Young Yi).

Author: Tae Yong Jung, Yonsei

South Korea’s air quality has improved remarkably over the past 20 years. The annual average concentrations of particulate matter (PM) of 10 micrometres or less in diameter (PM10) nationwide and of PM2.5 in Seoul have decreased. The concentration of fine dust has also gradually decreased but still remains twice as high as other developed countries and the number of days with high concentrations of fine dust has been increasing.

In response, the government has implemented a variety of emergency fine dust reduction measures, such as restricting the operation of vehicles in high-density cities since 2018. But there is a limit to how much air quality can improve when such one-off measures are taken because the concentration of fine dust has already increased and is partly caused by winds blowing foreign sources in from the west of the Korean Peninsula.

The unprecedented disaster-level fine dust outbreak on 1 March 2019 led the National Assembly to call for the establishment of a national organisation for coping with dust and climate change through international cooperation. President Moon Jae-in’s administration officially launched the National Council on Climate and Air Quality (NCCA) on 29 April. Key policy measures in three major source sectors — industrial, power generation and transport — are being implemented.

The industrial sector consumes the most fossil fuel energy after the power generation sector and emits the highest amount of pollutants. Large workplaces emit 62.7 per cent of total industrial pollutants. To investigate these large workplaces, a public-private joint inspection team of over 1000 people focussed on 44 industrial complexes and densely populated areas.

Strong financial support and customised technical support teams were planned to help some small- and medium-sized businesses to reduce fine dust and harmful gases. Taking into consideration the characteristics of each industry, a concrete reduction plan by industry type was designed. Periodic evaluation and real-time disclosure of results began last December to build public trust and spur further reductions in PM emissions.

The power generation sector could be regulated through the shutdown of coal-fired plants, adjustment of operation rates and management of demand, especially during high concentration seasons. Power generation accounted for 12 per cent of South Korea’s total fine dust emissions in 2016, mostly from coal-fired power plants. The government is working to eliminate old coal power plants, reduce operation of all coal power plants and promote policies to prohibit the construction of new coal power plants in favour of liquefied natural gas (LNG) instead. The tax system for bituminous coal and LNG has been adjusted to be more advantageous for LNG power plants.

The transportation sector accounted for 29 per cent of total PM emissions in 2016. Diesel vehicles, construction machinery and ships are the main sources of emissions, accounting for over 90 per cent of the sector’s emissions. Central and local governments are limiting vehicle operations and implementing an automobile emissions rating system to reduce air pollution. The government classifies all vehicles into five grades based on pollutant emissions by age and fuel type. The Seoul Metropolitan Government designated Hanyang Doseong (downtown) as a green traffic promotion zone and restricts the operation of emission level five vehicles that emit a lot of fine dust in the area.

Fine dust and air pollution are transboundary issues that require regional cooperation. But in Northeast Asia, regional cooperation measures similar to the European Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution are unlikely to be applied in the short term. In order to establish institutional multilateral cooperation, it is necessary to first recognise that regional cooperation is needed to solve the fine dust problem at the local, national and regional levels.

Various collaborative measures have already been arranged between China and South Korea. The two countries have carried out cooperative projects based on agreements signed between 1993–2019 including the Korea–China air quality joint research group and operation of a real-time sharing system of air quality information. Future efforts should be made to establish a joint action cooperation system.

The two countries need to establish an action system to reduce fine dust during high concentration seasons by establishing a network to actively share information on high concentration forecasts,…

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Q1 2024 Brief on Transfer Pricing in Asia

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Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 on transfer pricing, consolidating various guidelines. The Directorate General of Taxes focuses on compliance, expanded arm’s length principle, and substance checks. Singapore’s Budget 2024 addresses economic challenges, operational costs, and sustainability, implementing global tax reforms like the Income Inclusion Rule and Domestic Top-up Tax.


Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) has released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 (“PMK-172”), which prevails as a unified transfer pricing guideline. PMK-172 consolidates various transfer pricing matters that were previously covered under separate regulations, including the application of the arm’s length principle, transfer pricing documentation requirements, transfer pricing adjustments, Mutual Agreement Procedure (“MAP”), and Advance Pricing Agreements (“APA”).

The Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes (DGT) has continued to focus on compliance with the ex-ante principle, the expanded scope of transactions subject to the arm’s length principle, and the reinforcement of substance checks as part of the preliminary stage, indicating the DGT’s expectation of meticulous and well-supported transfer pricing analyses conducted by taxpayers.

In conclusion, PMK-172 reflects the Indonesian government’s commitment to addressing some of the most controversial transfer pricing issues and promoting clarity and certainty. While it brings new opportunities, it also presents challenges. Taxpayers are strongly advised to evaluate the implications of these new guidelines on their businesses in Indonesia to navigate this transformative regulatory landscape successfully.

In a significant move to bolster economic resilience and sustainability, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Mr. Lawrence Wong, unveiled the ambitious Singapore Budget 2024 on February 16, 2024. Amidst global economic fluctuations and a pressing climate crisis, the Budget strategically addresses the dual challenges of rising operational costs and the imperative for sustainable development, marking a pivotal step towards fortifying Singapore’s position as a competitive and green economy.

In anticipation of global tax reforms, Singapore’s proactive steps to implement the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) and Domestic Top-up Tax (DTT) under the BEPS 2.0 framework demonstrate a forward-looking approach to ensure tax compliance and fairness. These measures reaffirm Singapore’s commitment to international tax standards while safeguarding its economic interests.

Transfer pricing highlights from the Singapore Budget 2024 include:

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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New Report from Dezan Shira & Associates: China Takes the Lead in Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024

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China has been the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 years, producing one-third of global manufacturing output. In the Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024, China ranks highest among eight emerging countries in the region. Challenges for these countries include global demand disparities affecting industrial output and export orders.


Known as the “World’s Factory”, China has held the title of the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 consecutive years, starting from 2010. Its factories churn out approximately one-third of the global manufacturing output, a testament to its industrial might and capacity.

China’s dominant role as the world’s sole manufacturing power is reaffirmed in Dezan Shira & Associates’ Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024 report (“EAMI 2024”), in which China secures the top spot among eight emerging countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The other seven economies are India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Bangladesh.

The EAMI 2024 aims to assess the potential of these eight economies, navigate the risks, and pinpoint specific factors affecting the manufacturing landscape.

In this article, we delve into the key findings of the EAMI 2024 report and navigate China’s advantages and disadvantages in the manufacturing sector, placing them within the Asia-Pacific comparative context.

Emerging Asia countries face various challenges, especially in the current phase of increased volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA). One notable challenge is the impact of global demand disparities on the manufacturing sector, affecting industrial output and export orders.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Is journalist Vicky Xu preparing to return to China?

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Chinese social media influencers have recently claimed that prominent Chinese-born Australian journalist Vicky Xu had posted a message saying she planned to return to China.

There is no evidence for this. The source did not provide evidence to support the claim, and Xu herself later confirmed to AFCL that she has no such plans.

Currently working as an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, or ASPI, Xu has previously written for both the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, or ABC, and The New York Times.

A Chinese language netizen on X initially claimed on March 31 that the changing geopolitical relations between Sydney and Beijing had caused Xu to become an expendable asset and that she had posted a message expressing a strong desire to return to China. An illegible, blurred photo of the supposed message accompanied the post. 

This claim was retweeted by a widely followed influencer on the popular Chinese social media site Weibo one day later, who additionally commented that Xu was a “traitor” who had been abandoned by Australian media. 

Rumors surfaced on X and Weibo at the end of March that Vicky Xu – a Chinese-born Australian journalist who exposed forced labor in Xinjiang – was returning to China after becoming an “outcast” in Australia. (Screenshots / X & Weibo)

Following the publication of an ASPI article in 2021 which exposed forced labor conditions in Xinjiang co-authored by Xu, the journalist was labeled “morally bankrupt” and “anti-China” by the Chinese state owned media outlet Global Times and subjected to an influx of threatening messages and digital abuse, eventually forcing her to temporarily close several of her social media accounts.

AFCL found that neither Xu’s active X nor LinkedIn account has any mention of her supposed return to China, and received the following response from Xu herself about the rumor:

“I can confirm that I don’t have plans to go back to China. I think if I do go back I’ll most definitely be detained or imprisoned – so the only career I’ll be having is probably going to be prison labor or something like that, which wouldn’t be ideal.”

Neither a keyword search nor reverse image search on the photo attached to the original X post turned up any text from Xu supporting the netizens’ claims.

Translated by Shen Ke. Edited by Shen Ke and Malcolm Foster.

Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) was established to counter disinformation in today’s complex media environment. We publish fact-checks, media-watches and in-depth reports that aim to sharpen and deepen our readers’ understanding of current affairs and public issues. If you like our content, you can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram and X.

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