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China

The ‘new’ Taiwan beyond cross-strait relations

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A military honour guard holds a Taiwanese national flag at the flag-raising ceremony at Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Taipei, Taiwan, 16 March 2018 (Photo: Reuters/Tyrone Siu).

Authors: Alan Hao Yang and Jeremy Huai-Che Chiang, TAEF

Beijing has been increasing pressure on Taiwan recently. From a move to ban individual travel permits for Chinese visitors to Taiwan to two large-scale military drills close to the Taiwan Strait, China appears to be ramping up efforts to influence Taiwan’s upcoming 2020 presidential elections.

This is nothing new. Since Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s inauguration in 2016, China has not given Taiwan a day of rest in its battle to preserve autonomy. China’s diplomatic offensives have already cost Taiwan five allies, while Beijing’s ‘31 measures’ and other pro-unification incentives have polarised attitudes across the island towards its gigantic neighbour. Cyber operatives and grassroots United Front activities have also damaged Taiwan’s democracy.

Despite this pressure, a ‘new’ Taiwan has emerged that is increasingly willing to think beyond cross-strait mechanisms and to embrace a new regional role. This new Taiwan embodies progressive liberal values while seeking to display a stabilising role in the emerging Indo-Pacific theatre. This is not a sudden transformation but an incremental process that has been in the making for years.

Starting with its New Southbound Policy in 2016, Taiwan has been working relentlessly to expand ties with its southern neighbours. While Taiwan had similar policies before 2016, previous initiatives focused on traditional economic cooperation. The New Southbound Policy includes comprehensive engagement efforts in diverse areas. Taiwan has already set up agricultural demonstration farms and provided related technological training to local organisations in Indonesia, with the Philippines and Vietnam to follow.

Taiwan’s vibrant civil society has also contributed immensely in garnering domestic support for the policy, while also extending Taiwan’s outreach regionally. The New Southbound Policy is more ‘strategic and comprehensive’ than any of Taiwan’s previous policies directed towards Asia.

While Taiwan’s economic dependence on China continues, investment in China has been gradually slowing as a result of the US–China trade war. Taiwan’s total trade with New Southbound countries climbed from US$96 billion in 2016 to US$117.1 billion in 2018. The number of students in Taiwan also rose from 32,318 to 51,970 during the same period.

The New Southbound Policy has also made significant progress in tourism. Chinese tourists peaked at around 4.1 million in 2015 but have steadily declined after Tsai’s inauguration. In 2018, only 2.5 million Chinese tourists visited. Taiwan still had a record 11.07 million foreign visitors in 2018. A total of 2.42 million visits from Southeast Asia accounted for 21.89 per cent of 2018’s foreign visits. This increase of Southeast Asian visitors represented a remarkable growth of 13.8 per cent from 2017.

Taiwan and the United States are also enjoying their warmest ties in decades. The Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy shares similar goals with Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy and both sides are eager to cooperate. Various new pieces of US legislation, such as the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2019, have also confirmed Washington’s commitment to the island’s security and democracy. US President Donald Trump has approved a US$2.2 billion arms sale to Taiwan, while the administration is also moving forward with a US$8 billion sale of 66 F-16V fighter jets.

With bipartisan support for toughened competition with China emerging in the United States, Taiwan’s strategic importance has steadily increased. Tsai’s administration has taken full advantage of this trend, adopting multiple measures to strengthen the island’s role as not only one of the leading liberal democracies in Asia but also a critical security partner in the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan’s relations with like-minded countries such as Japan and India are also showing similar positive trends.

Besides these prominent international efforts, there are also several interesting dynamics unfolding on the island itself. As the trade war continues to create ruptures throughout existing global supply chains, low-end production by Taiwanese firms is moving into Southeast Asia, while high-end manufacturing firms are considering relocating back to Taiwan. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has approved investment this year valued around US$16.03 billion for Taiwanese firms seeking to return. If these investments materialise, they might provide key stimulus for the industrial sector and middle-level technical…

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Q1 2024 Brief on Transfer Pricing in Asia

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Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 on transfer pricing, consolidating various guidelines. The Directorate General of Taxes focuses on compliance, expanded arm’s length principle, and substance checks. Singapore’s Budget 2024 addresses economic challenges, operational costs, and sustainability, implementing global tax reforms like the Income Inclusion Rule and Domestic Top-up Tax.


Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) has released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 (“PMK-172”), which prevails as a unified transfer pricing guideline. PMK-172 consolidates various transfer pricing matters that were previously covered under separate regulations, including the application of the arm’s length principle, transfer pricing documentation requirements, transfer pricing adjustments, Mutual Agreement Procedure (“MAP”), and Advance Pricing Agreements (“APA”).

The Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes (DGT) has continued to focus on compliance with the ex-ante principle, the expanded scope of transactions subject to the arm’s length principle, and the reinforcement of substance checks as part of the preliminary stage, indicating the DGT’s expectation of meticulous and well-supported transfer pricing analyses conducted by taxpayers.

In conclusion, PMK-172 reflects the Indonesian government’s commitment to addressing some of the most controversial transfer pricing issues and promoting clarity and certainty. While it brings new opportunities, it also presents challenges. Taxpayers are strongly advised to evaluate the implications of these new guidelines on their businesses in Indonesia to navigate this transformative regulatory landscape successfully.

In a significant move to bolster economic resilience and sustainability, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Mr. Lawrence Wong, unveiled the ambitious Singapore Budget 2024 on February 16, 2024. Amidst global economic fluctuations and a pressing climate crisis, the Budget strategically addresses the dual challenges of rising operational costs and the imperative for sustainable development, marking a pivotal step towards fortifying Singapore’s position as a competitive and green economy.

In anticipation of global tax reforms, Singapore’s proactive steps to implement the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) and Domestic Top-up Tax (DTT) under the BEPS 2.0 framework demonstrate a forward-looking approach to ensure tax compliance and fairness. These measures reaffirm Singapore’s commitment to international tax standards while safeguarding its economic interests.

Transfer pricing highlights from the Singapore Budget 2024 include:

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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New Report from Dezan Shira & Associates: China Takes the Lead in Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024

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China has been the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 years, producing one-third of global manufacturing output. In the Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024, China ranks highest among eight emerging countries in the region. Challenges for these countries include global demand disparities affecting industrial output and export orders.


Known as the “World’s Factory”, China has held the title of the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 consecutive years, starting from 2010. Its factories churn out approximately one-third of the global manufacturing output, a testament to its industrial might and capacity.

China’s dominant role as the world’s sole manufacturing power is reaffirmed in Dezan Shira & Associates’ Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024 report (“EAMI 2024”), in which China secures the top spot among eight emerging countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The other seven economies are India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Bangladesh.

The EAMI 2024 aims to assess the potential of these eight economies, navigate the risks, and pinpoint specific factors affecting the manufacturing landscape.

In this article, we delve into the key findings of the EAMI 2024 report and navigate China’s advantages and disadvantages in the manufacturing sector, placing them within the Asia-Pacific comparative context.

Emerging Asia countries face various challenges, especially in the current phase of increased volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA). One notable challenge is the impact of global demand disparities on the manufacturing sector, affecting industrial output and export orders.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Is journalist Vicky Xu preparing to return to China?

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Chinese social media influencers have recently claimed that prominent Chinese-born Australian journalist Vicky Xu had posted a message saying she planned to return to China.

There is no evidence for this. The source did not provide evidence to support the claim, and Xu herself later confirmed to AFCL that she has no such plans.

Currently working as an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, or ASPI, Xu has previously written for both the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, or ABC, and The New York Times.

A Chinese language netizen on X initially claimed on March 31 that the changing geopolitical relations between Sydney and Beijing had caused Xu to become an expendable asset and that she had posted a message expressing a strong desire to return to China. An illegible, blurred photo of the supposed message accompanied the post. 

This claim was retweeted by a widely followed influencer on the popular Chinese social media site Weibo one day later, who additionally commented that Xu was a “traitor” who had been abandoned by Australian media. 

Rumors surfaced on X and Weibo at the end of March that Vicky Xu – a Chinese-born Australian journalist who exposed forced labor in Xinjiang – was returning to China after becoming an “outcast” in Australia. (Screenshots / X & Weibo)

Following the publication of an ASPI article in 2021 which exposed forced labor conditions in Xinjiang co-authored by Xu, the journalist was labeled “morally bankrupt” and “anti-China” by the Chinese state owned media outlet Global Times and subjected to an influx of threatening messages and digital abuse, eventually forcing her to temporarily close several of her social media accounts.

AFCL found that neither Xu’s active X nor LinkedIn account has any mention of her supposed return to China, and received the following response from Xu herself about the rumor:

“I can confirm that I don’t have plans to go back to China. I think if I do go back I’ll most definitely be detained or imprisoned – so the only career I’ll be having is probably going to be prison labor or something like that, which wouldn’t be ideal.”

Neither a keyword search nor reverse image search on the photo attached to the original X post turned up any text from Xu supporting the netizens’ claims.

Translated by Shen Ke. Edited by Shen Ke and Malcolm Foster.

Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) was established to counter disinformation in today’s complex media environment. We publish fact-checks, media-watches and in-depth reports that aim to sharpen and deepen our readers’ understanding of current affairs and public issues. If you like our content, you can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram and X.

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