Japan’s China Strategy Starts from Within

Japan–China relations have entered a distinctly colder phase following the re-election of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in February 2026. But the real shift in bilateral relations is unfolding in Japanese homes and streets. Everyday encounters increasingly shape public perceptions and tether Japan’s foreign policy to domestic social debates.

Bilateral relations have been tense since the formation of the First Takaichi Cabinet in October 2025 and especially following Takaichi’s remarks in the Diet in early November 2025 that a contingency in Taiwan could constitute an existential crisis situation that permits the use of collective self-defence. Political tension has spilled over into the sphere of people-to-people exchange — according to the Japan National Tourism Organisation, the number of Chinese visitors to Japan fell by 45 per cent in December 2025 and 60 per cent in January 2026 compared to the previous year.

This sharp decline may appear disastrous for Japan’s economy, but the domestic reaction is more nuanced. Some local communities and businesses in the country have expressed a sense of relief, noting that they no longer need to worry about the ‘disruptive behaviour’ often associated with large tour groups. Such sentiments highlight a critical shift — the Japanese view of China is no longer formed solely by international diplomacy, but by the lived experience of Chinese tourists’ and residents’ presence within Japan itself.

This cooling of sentiment is hardly unprecedented. Three major events — the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations and the 2012 escalation of disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands — have left lasting imprints on the Japanese psyche. The Cabinet Office’s 2025 public poll on diplomacy underscored this fragility, showing that only 16.1 per cent of respondents felt affinity towards China. By contrast, 68.5 per cent viewed Japan–Taiwan relations positively in a 2025 survey conducted by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office.

But a monolithic view of China no longer exists in Japan. Perceptions vary drastically across generations. Older Japanese tend to follow Chinese politics through traditional media, viewing the nation as an assertive security threat. In contrast, younger Japanese are increasingly drawn to Chinese grassroots culture, as typified by the craze for Labubu dolls and the ubiquitous influence of TikTok. This generational divide suggests that, beneath the frosty political surface, there remains fertile ground for grassroots rapport, provided it is not stifled by geopolitical rhetoric.

Source : Japan’s China policy begins at home