Connect with us
//pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/js/adsbygoogle.js (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});

China

China Adds a Spyglass in Space, Hints at More to Come

Matt Durnin is a Beijing-based researcher at the World Security Institute’s China Program and associate editor of the policy journal China Security. He specializes in China’s defense modernization and space programs. China launched two satellites Wednesday as part of a decade-long rapid expansion of earth-monitoring capabilities that also buttress the country’s growing military prowess. Yaogan-12, the primary cargo of the launch, is the twelfth model in a series of “remote sensing” satellites that many analysts believe are tasked with gathering military intelligence. China, which has never acknowledged a defense-related launch, claims that the satellite will be used for “scientific experiments, land survey, crop yield assessment, and disaster monitoring.” Piggybacking on the ride was Tianxun-1, a 35-kg micro-satellite with a low-resolution camera. A 2010 paper in China Science and Technology Review described the satellite’s design as “low-observable,” suggesting it may be a test bed for basic stealth technology that could make small satellites even harder to track from the ground. Since China’s controversial shoot-down of one of its weather satellites in early 2007, the U.S. defense community has churned with speculation about Beijing’s military intentions in space. China has recently shown more concerted focus on military reconnaissance satellites, which are key components of its plans for a more integrated and aware People’s Liberation Army. This is a change from the 1990s when Chinese satellites were often dual-use, serving both military and civilian functions. According to Kevin Pollpeter, deputy director of Defense Group Inc.’s East Asia Program, China’s satellite projects have since split into distinctly different groups. “You see on one side China’s satellites becoming more solely devoted to national security purposes,” he says. “On the other hand, on the civilian side they have been increasingly open with other countries.” Earth-monitoring satellites will contribute to Chinese weather prediction, disaster relief and civil planning, but dedicated military variants will also amplify the effectiveness of PLA weapons. Roger Cliff, a senior fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, says that such assets provide the PLA with crucial situational awareness. “Ten years ago, if they had wanted to use their ballistic missiles to attack an airfield, they would have essentially been firing blind,” he says. “That’s not true anymore.” Today China’s better reconnaissance satellites are thought to have ground resolutions under two meters, and perhaps as low as half a meter. Though these specifications pale in comparison to U.S. spy satellite capabilities, they are likely good enough for China’s defense needs. According to Pollpeter, focus on basic yet proven technologies is likely an effective and intentional Chinese strategy. “A lot of time with U.S. defense technology we go for the platinum-plated version, but you don’t actually have to do that all the time,” he says. “In our own weapon systems we usually demand solutions that work in 100 percent of circumstances, when often the 80 percent solution might suffice.” Though the price tags of Chinese reconnaissance satellites are not publicly known, they are thought to be a fraction of the cost of U.S. spy satellite programs, which frequently reach into the billions of dollars . The relative low cost of Chinese satellite programs is complimented by a rapid launch tempo. Last year China successfully launched 15 rockets, matching the U.S. total for the first time . This year China may soar past that number. Yuan Jiajun, deputy general director of China Aerospace and Technology Corp., told the state-run Xinhua news agency last week that China is scheduled to launch 25 satellites on 20 rockets in 2011. Since 13 rockets have carried 14 Chinese satellites into orbit so far this year, and one more has failed, Yuan’s comments imply that 10 more satellites could reach space by the end of December. Yet it is perhaps too easy to be starstruck by China’s achievements in space. Cliff warns that although China has passed some impressive milestones, its limitations must be kept in perspective. He points out that China’s satellite programs seem to have hit road bumps in several areas, including radar satellites that have failed in orbit or have been repeatedly delayed. “We shouldn’t make Chinese technological capabilities out to be ten feet tall,” he says. “The things that they are doing are not cutting edge in the first place and they’re not always going smoothly either.”

Published

on

Matt Durnin is a Beijing-based researcher at the World Security Institute’s China Program and associate editor of the policy journal China Security. He specializes in China’s defense modernization and space programs.

China launched two satellites Wednesday as part of a decade-long rapid expansion of earth-monitoring capabilities that also buttress the country’s growing military prowess.

Yaogan-12, the primary cargo of the launch, is the twelfth model in a series of “remote sensing” satellites that many analysts believe are tasked with gathering military intelligence. China, which has never acknowledged a defense-related launch, claims that the satellite will be used for “scientific experiments, land survey, crop yield assessment, and disaster monitoring.”

Piggybacking on the ride was Tianxun-1, a 35-kg micro-satellite with a low-resolution camera. A 2010 paper in China Science and Technology Review described the satellite’s design as “low-observable,” suggesting it may be a test bed for basic stealth technology that could make small satellites even harder to track from the ground.

Since China’s controversial shoot-down of one of its weather satellites in early 2007, the U.S. defense community has churned with speculation about Beijing’s military intentions in space.

China has recently shown more concerted focus on military reconnaissance satellites, which are key components of its plans for a more integrated and aware People’s Liberation Army. This is a change from the 1990s when Chinese satellites were often dual-use, serving both military and civilian functions.

According to Kevin Pollpeter, deputy director of Defense Group Inc.’s East Asia Program, China’s satellite projects have since split into distinctly different groups. “You see on one side China’s satellites becoming more solely devoted to national security purposes,” he says. “On the other hand, on the civilian side they have been increasingly open with other countries.”

Earth-monitoring satellites will contribute to Chinese weather prediction, disaster relief and civil planning, but dedicated military variants will also amplify the effectiveness of PLA weapons.

Roger Cliff, a senior fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, says that such assets provide the PLA with crucial situational awareness.

“Ten years ago, if they had wanted to use their ballistic missiles to attack an airfield, they would have essentially been firing blind,” he says. “That’s not true anymore.”

Today China’s better reconnaissance satellites are thought to have ground resolutions under two meters, and perhaps as low as half a meter. Though these specifications pale in comparison to U.S. spy satellite capabilities, they are likely good enough for China’s defense needs.

According to Pollpeter, focus on basic yet proven technologies is likely an effective and intentional Chinese strategy. “A lot of time with U.S. defense technology we go for the platinum-plated version, but you don’t actually have to do that all the time,” he says. “In our own weapon systems we usually demand solutions that work in 100 percent of circumstances, when often the 80 percent solution might suffice.”

Though the price tags of Chinese reconnaissance satellites are not publicly known, they are thought to be a fraction of the cost of U.S. spy satellite programs, which frequently reach into the billions of dollars.

The relative low cost of Chinese satellite programs is complimented by a rapid launch tempo. Last year China successfully launched 15 rockets, matching the U.S. total for the first time. This year China may soar past that number.

Yuan Jiajun, deputy general director of China Aerospace and Technology Corp., told the state-run Xinhua news agency last week that China is scheduled to launch 25 satellites on 20 rockets in 2011. Since 13 rockets have carried 14 Chinese satellites into orbit so far this year, and one more has failed, Yuan’s comments imply that 10 more satellites could reach space by the end of December.

Yet it is perhaps too easy to be starstruck by China’s achievements in space. Cliff warns that although China has passed some impressive milestones, its limitations must be kept in perspective. He points out that China’s satellite programs seem to have hit road bumps in several areas, including radar satellites that have failed in orbit or have been repeatedly delayed.

“We shouldn’t make Chinese technological capabilities out to be ten feet tall,” he says. “The things that they are doing are not cutting edge in the first place and they’re not always going smoothly either.”

China’s economy during the past 30 years has changed from a centrally planned system that was largely closed to international trade to a more market-oriented economy that has a rapidly growing private sector and is a major player in the global economy.

Deterioration in the environment – notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table, especially in the north – is another long-term problem.

China is also the second largest trading nation in the world and the largest exporter and second largest importer of goods.
The PRC government’s decision to permit China to be used by multinational corporations as an export platform has made the country a major competitor to other Asian export-led economies, such as South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia.

Available energy is insufficient to run at fully installed industrial capacity, and the transport system is inadequate to move sufficient quantities of such critical items as coal.

Agricultural output has been vulnerable to the effects of weather, while industry has been more directly influenced by the government.

China has acquired some highly sophisticated production facilities through trade and also has built a number of advanced engineering plants capable of manufacturing an increasing range of sophisticated equipment, including nuclear weapons and satellites, but most of its industrial output still comes from relatively ill-equipped factories.

Over the years, large subsidies were built into the price structure, and these subsidies grew substantially in the late 1970s and 1980s.

The ministry made the announcements during a press conference held in Xiamen on the upcoming United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Forum and the 14th China International Fair for Investment and Trade.

In 2009, global ODI volume reached $1.1 trillion, and China contributed about 5.1 percent of the total.

China reiterated the nation’s goals for the next decade – increasing market share of pure-electric and plug-in electric autos, building world-competitive auto makers and parts manufacturers in the energy-efficient auto sector as well as raising fuel-efficiency to world levels.

In large part as a result of economic liberalization policies, the GDP quadrupled between 1978 and 1998, and foreign investment soared during the 1990s.

Even with these improvements, agriculture accounts for only 20% of the nation’s gross national product.

In terms of cash crops, China ranks first in cotton and tobacco and is an important producer of oilseeds, silk, tea, ramie, jute, hemp, sugarcane, and sugar beets.

Horses, donkeys, and mules are work animals in the north, while oxen and water buffalo are used for plowing chiefly in the south.

China is one of the world’s major mineral-producing countries.

There are large deposits of uranium in the northwest, especially in Xinjiang; there are also mines in Jiangxi and Guangdong provs.

In addition, implementation of some reforms was stalled by fears of social dislocation and by political opposition, but by 2007 economic changes had become so great that the Communist party added legal protection for private property rights (while preserving state ownership of all land) and passed a labor law designed to improve the protection of workers’ rights (the law was passed amid a series of police raids that freed workers engaged in forced labor).

Brick, tile, cement, and food-processing plants are found in almost every province.

See more here:
China Adds a Spyglass in Space, Hints at More to Come

China

2024 Tax Incentives for Manufacturing Companies in China

Published

on

China offers various tax incentives to boost the manufacturing industry. The Ministry of Finance and State Tax Administration provide guidelines on eligibility and policies. VAT exemptions and refunds are available for companies producing specific goods or services, with a monthly refund option for deferred taxes.


China implements a wide range of preferential tax policies to encourage the development of the country’s manufacturing industry. We summarize some of the main manufacturing tax incentives in China and explain the basic eligibility requirements that companies must meet to enjoy them.

China’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) and State Tax Administration (STA) have released guidelines on the main preferential tax and fee policies available to the manufacturing industry in China. The guidelines consolidate the main preferential policies currently in force and explain the main eligibility requirements to enjoy them.

To further assist companies in identifying the preferential policies available to them, we have outlined some of the main policies currently available in the manufacturing industry, including links to further resources.

For instance, VAT is exempted for:

Companies providing the following products and services can enjoy immediate VAT refunds:

Companies in the manufacturing industry that meet the conditions for deferring tax refunds can enjoy a VAT credit refund policy. The policy allows companies to receive the accumulated deferred tax amount every month and the remaining deferred tax amount in a lump sum.

The policy is not exclusive to the manufacturing industry and is also available to companies in scientific research and technical services, utilities production and supply, software and IT services, and many more.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

Continue Reading

China

Exploring the Revamped China Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) Program: Potential Benefits for International Businesses

Published

on

Companies in China must navigate compliance, trading, and reporting within the CCER framework, impacting operations and strategic objectives. The program focuses on afforestation, solar, wind power, and mangrove creation, offering opportunities for innovation and revenue streams while ensuring transparency and accuracy. The Ministry of Ecology and Environment oversees the program.


As companies navigate the complexities of compliance, trading, and reporting within the CCER framework, they must also contend with the broader implications for their operations, finances, and strategic objectives.

This article explores the multifaceted impact of the CCER program on companies operating in China, examining both the opportunities for innovation and growth, as well as the potential risks and compliance considerations.

Initially, the CCER will focus on four sectors: afforestation, solar thermal power, offshore wind power, and mangrove vegetation creation. Companies operating within these sectors can register their accredited carbon reduction credits in the CCER system for trading purposes. These sectors were chosen due to their reliance on carbon credit sales for profitability. For instance, offshore wind power generation, as more costly than onshore alternatives, stands to benefit from additional revenue streams facilitated by CCER transactions.

Currently, primary buyers are expected to be high-emission enterprises seeking to offset their excess emissions and companies aiming to demonstrate corporate social responsibility by contributing to environmental conservation. Eventually, the program aims to allow individuals to purchase credits to offset their carbon footprints. Unlike the mandatory national ETS, the revamped CCER scheme permits any enterprise to buy carbon credits, thereby expanding the market scope.

The Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) oversees the CCER program, having assumed responsibility for climate change initiatives from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2018. Verification agencies and project operators are mandated to ensure transparency and accuracy in disclosing project details and carbon reduction practices.

On the second day after the launch on January 23, the first transaction in China’s voluntary carbon market saw the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the country’s largest offshore oil and gas producer, purchase 250,000 tons of carbon credits to offset its emissions.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

Continue Reading

China

China Implements New Policies to Boost Foreign Investment in Science and Technology Companies

Published

on

China’s Ministry of Commerce announced new policy measures on April 19, 2023, to encourage foreign investment in the technology sector. The measures include facilitating bond issuance, improving the investment environment, and simplifying procedures for foreign institutions to access the Chinese market.


On April 19, 2023, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) along with nine other departments announced a new set of policy measures (hereinafter, “new measures”) aimed at encouraging foreign investment in its technology sector.

Among the new measures, China intends to facilitate the issuance of RMB bonds by eligible overseas institutions and encourage both domestic and foreign-invested tech companies to raise funds through bond issuance.

In this article, we offer an overview of the new measures and their broader significance in fostering international investment and driving innovation-driven growth, underscoring China’s efforts to instill confidence among foreign investors.

The new measures contain a total of sixteen points aimed at facilitating foreign investment in China’s technology sector and improving the overall investment environment.

Divided into four main chapters, the new measures address key aspects including:

Firstly, China aims to expedite the approval process for QFII and RQFII, ensuring efficient access to the Chinese market. Moreover, the government promises to simplify procedures, facilitating operational activities and fund management for foreign institutions.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

Continue Reading