China
Reimagining Chinese Indonesians in democratic Indonesia
Author: Ray Hervandi, East-West Center Indonesia’s initiation of democratic reforms in May 1998 did not portend well for Chinese Indonesians. Constituting less than 5 percent of Indonesia’s 240 million people and concentrated in urban areas, Chinese Indonesians were, at that point, still reeling from the anti-Chinese riots that had occurred just before Suharto’s fall. Scarred by years of repression and forced assimilation under Suharto, many Chinese Indonesians were uncertain — once again — about what the ‘new’ Indonesia had in store for them. Yet, the transition to an open Indonesia has also resulted in greater space to be Chinese Indonesian. Laws and regulations discriminating against Chinese Indonesians have been repealed. Chinese culture has grown visible in Indonesia. Mandarin Chinese, rarely the language of this minority in the past, evolved into a novel emblem of Chinese Indonesians’ public identity. Notwithstanding the considerably expanded toleration post-Suharto Indonesia has shown Chinese Indonesians, their delicate integration into Indonesian society is a work in progress. Failure to foster full integration would condemn Chinese Indonesians to a continued precarious existence in Indonesia and leave them vulnerable to violence at the next treacherous point in Indonesian politics. This undermines Indonesia’s ideals that celebrate all its citizens. Moreover, Chinese Indonesians’ journey of integration would remain incomplete, unless Indonesians — Chinese Indonesians included — restart a civil conversation that examines how this minority fits in Indonesia’s ongoing state- and nation-building project. In the process, this conversation will have to reconsider Chinese Indonesians’ locus in the nation. Once Chinese, Now Indonesian In the social structure of the Dutch East Indies, sojourners, and later migrants, from China occupied the middleman position that served as a buffer between the few Dutch colonials and the many indigenous peoples of the East Indies. However, political adherence of East Indies Chinese was arrayed along a wide spectrum: from devotion to Chinese nationalism in its Nationalist or Communist variants, to encouraging the preservation of the colonial status quo, to unambiguous support for the Indonesian nationalists. Indonesia’s botched coup of 1965 and the ensuing anti-Communist purges left Indonesian Chinese in an increasingly untenable position. Alleged links between China, Indonesian Communists, and ethnic Chinese communities behind the failed coup emphasized the paranoia that Indonesian Chinese are unchangingly committed to China and thus disloyal to Indonesia. The Suharto-era obsession with the so-called ‘triangular threats’ laid the foundation for anti-Chinese discrimination because, as an Indonesian expression has it, ‘once Chinese, always Chinese’. But a funny thing happened on the way to Reformasi . While the ethnic Chinese had always been under the process of acculturation in the East Indies and later Indonesia, Suharto’s policy of forced assimilation — for better or worse — decisively sped up the process that transformed Indonesian Chinese into Chinese Indonesians. Generations of young ethnic Chinese in Indonesia grew up with no real or imagined bonds with China. They spoke Indonesian or the local regional language. They embraced one of the five officially sanctioned religions of Indonesia, most likely Christianity or Buddhism. (Reform-era Indonesia eventually recognised the sixth official religion, Confucianism, in 2000.) From Olympian badminton player Susi Susanti to singer Agnes Monica, they shared in Indonesia’s national life. They came to identify Indonesia as their homeland and themselves as Indonesians. Reconstructing the Chinese Indonesian’s image Indigenous and Chinese Indonesians are not that different. Their dysfunctions are Indonesian, their challenges parallel, and their histories tightly intertwined. Consider, for example, the charge that Chinese Indonesians encourage corruption in Indonesia. In an echo of the old colonial structure, the Suharto years were infamous for the corrupt Ali-Baba partnership, which describes a nexus between the crooked indigenous official, Ali, and his greedy Chinese businessman, Baba. The ill effects of these inequitable partnerships were, however, blamed rarely on Ali, who brought political cover to the partnership, but always on Baba, who faced the heat. Or take the accusation that Chinese Indonesians arrogantly refuse to integrate into local society. In fact, palpable animosity and anti-Chinese prejudice are what leads many Chinese Indonesians to keep to themselves. As illustrated in the cases of the Javanese in Aceh, the Madurese in Central Borneo, or the Buginese on Tarakan — all cases of severe social conflict between newly arrived and local indigenous Indonesians — the perils of failed social integration confront all Indonesians. In addition, Chinese Indonesians are not, and should not be, a substantive issue in Sino-Indonesian relations. This is underlined in China’s muted and belated response to Indonesian’s anti-Chinese riots in 1998, and the relative lack of its mention during Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s recent visit to Indonesia in April. After all, the existence of ethnic kin across international borders has aroused little suspicion of disloyalty toward, say, Malay Indonesians, despite the long and continuing history of tension between Indonesia and Malaysia. Most importantly, Chinese Indonesians’ greatest contribution to the Indonesian nation-building project might have lain in their unwitting role as Indonesia’s internal Other. Constructing a common national identity would have been much more challenging without an Other. Indonesia’s external Other clearly exists beyond the national borders. Chinese Indonesians’ role as the internal Other is, nevertheless, evident in their ascribed standing as the perennially ‘foreign’ group against whom ‘real’ indigenous Indonesians could coalesce and be contrasted. Starting the conversation Indonesia has moved on from the Suharto-era preoccupation with Communism and ethnic Chinese links to Communist China, and Chinese Indonesians continue to converge with the Indonesian mainstream. Furthermore, the issue of economic inequality in Indonesia is evolving from one that carries a stigma for Chinese Indonesians to one that all Indonesians must face, as more and more indigenous Indonesians steadily enter the middle classes. Indigenous and Chinese Indonesians have much more in common than they realize. It is now time to restart the conversation. Ray Hervandi is Project Assistant at the East-West Center in Washington and works on Southeast Asian affairs. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the East-West Center. The piece first appeared here , in the East-West Center’s Asia Pacific Bulletin , on May 10, 2011. Indonesia, the region and the world The taming of ethnic conflict in Indonesia Post-Mubarak Egypt: Is Indonesia the right model?
Author: Ray Hervandi, East-West Center
Indonesia’s initiation of democratic reforms in May 1998 did not portend well for Chinese Indonesians.
Constituting less than 5 percent of Indonesia’s 240 million people and concentrated in urban areas, Chinese Indonesians were, at that point, still reeling from the anti-Chinese riots that had occurred just before Suharto’s fall. Scarred by years of repression and forced assimilation under Suharto, many Chinese Indonesians were uncertain — once again — about what the ‘new’ Indonesia had in store for them.
Yet, the transition to an open Indonesia has also resulted in greater space to be Chinese Indonesian. Laws and regulations discriminating against Chinese Indonesians have been repealed. Chinese culture has grown visible in Indonesia. Mandarin Chinese, rarely the language of this minority in the past, evolved into a novel emblem of Chinese Indonesians’ public identity.
Notwithstanding the considerably expanded toleration post-Suharto Indonesia has shown Chinese Indonesians, their delicate integration into Indonesian society is a work in progress. Failure to foster full integration would condemn Chinese Indonesians to a continued precarious existence in Indonesia and leave them vulnerable to violence at the next treacherous point in Indonesian politics. This undermines Indonesia’s ideals that celebrate all its citizens.
Moreover, Chinese Indonesians’ journey of integration would remain incomplete, unless Indonesians — Chinese Indonesians included — restart a civil conversation that examines how this minority fits in Indonesia’s ongoing state- and nation-building project. In the process, this conversation will have to reconsider Chinese Indonesians’ locus in the nation.
Once Chinese, Now Indonesian
In the social structure of the Dutch East Indies, sojourners, and later migrants, from China occupied the middleman position that served as a buffer between the few Dutch colonials and the many indigenous peoples of the East Indies. However, political adherence of East Indies Chinese was arrayed along a wide spectrum: from devotion to Chinese nationalism in its Nationalist or Communist variants, to encouraging the preservation of the colonial status quo, to unambiguous support for the Indonesian nationalists.
Indonesia’s botched coup of 1965 and the ensuing anti-Communist purges left Indonesian Chinese in an increasingly untenable position. Alleged links between China, Indonesian Communists, and ethnic Chinese communities behind the failed coup emphasized the paranoia that Indonesian Chinese are unchangingly committed to China and thus disloyal to Indonesia. The Suharto-era obsession with the so-called ‘triangular threats’ laid the foundation for anti-Chinese discrimination because, as an Indonesian expression has it, ‘once Chinese, always Chinese’.
But a funny thing happened on the way to Reformasi. While the ethnic Chinese had always been under the process of acculturation in the East Indies and later Indonesia, Suharto’s policy of forced assimilation — for better or worse — decisively sped up the process that transformed Indonesian Chinese into Chinese Indonesians. Generations of young ethnic Chinese in Indonesia grew up with no real or imagined bonds with China. They spoke Indonesian or the local regional language. They embraced one of the five officially sanctioned religions of Indonesia, most likely Christianity or Buddhism. (Reform-era Indonesia eventually recognised the sixth official religion, Confucianism, in 2000.) From Olympian badminton player Susi Susanti to singer Agnes Monica, they shared in Indonesia’s national life. They came to identify Indonesia as their homeland and themselves as Indonesians.
Reconstructing the Chinese Indonesian’s image
Indigenous and Chinese Indonesians are not that different. Their dysfunctions are Indonesian, their challenges parallel, and their histories tightly intertwined. Consider, for example, the charge that Chinese Indonesians encourage corruption in Indonesia. In an echo of the old colonial structure, the Suharto years were infamous for the corrupt Ali-Baba partnership, which describes a nexus between the crooked indigenous official, Ali, and his greedy Chinese businessman, Baba. The ill effects of these inequitable partnerships were, however, blamed rarely on Ali, who brought political cover to the partnership, but always on Baba, who faced the heat.
Or take the accusation that Chinese Indonesians arrogantly refuse to integrate into local society. In fact, palpable animosity and anti-Chinese prejudice are what leads many Chinese Indonesians to keep to themselves. As illustrated in the cases of the Javanese in Aceh, the Madurese in Central Borneo, or the Buginese on Tarakan — all cases of severe social conflict between newly arrived and local indigenous Indonesians — the perils of failed social integration confront all Indonesians.
In addition, Chinese Indonesians are not, and should not be, a substantive issue in Sino-Indonesian relations. This is underlined in China’s muted and belated response to Indonesian’s anti-Chinese riots in 1998, and the relative lack of its mention during Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s recent visit to Indonesia in April. After all, the existence of ethnic kin across international borders has aroused little suspicion of disloyalty toward, say, Malay Indonesians, despite the long and continuing history of tension between Indonesia and Malaysia.
Most importantly, Chinese Indonesians’ greatest contribution to the Indonesian nation-building project might have lain in their unwitting role as Indonesia’s internal Other. Constructing a common national identity would have been much more challenging without an Other. Indonesia’s external Other clearly exists beyond the national borders. Chinese Indonesians’ role as the internal Other is, nevertheless, evident in their ascribed standing as the perennially ‘foreign’ group against whom ‘real’ indigenous Indonesians could coalesce and be contrasted.
Starting the conversation
Indonesia has moved on from the Suharto-era preoccupation with Communism and ethnic Chinese links to Communist China, and Chinese Indonesians continue to converge with the Indonesian mainstream. Furthermore, the issue of economic inequality in Indonesia is evolving from one that carries a stigma for Chinese Indonesians to one that all Indonesians must face, as more and more indigenous Indonesians steadily enter the middle classes. Indigenous and Chinese Indonesians have much more in common than they realize. It is now time to restart the conversation.
Ray Hervandi is Project Assistant at the East-West Center in Washington and works on Southeast Asian affairs. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the East-West Center.
The piece first appeared here, in the East-West Center’s Asia Pacific Bulletin, on May 10, 2011.
- Indonesia, the region and the world
- The taming of ethnic conflict in Indonesia
- Post-Mubarak Egypt: Is Indonesia the right model?
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Reimagining Chinese Indonesians in democratic Indonesia
China
Q1 2024 Brief on Transfer Pricing in Asia
Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 on transfer pricing, consolidating various guidelines. The Directorate General of Taxes focuses on compliance, expanded arm’s length principle, and substance checks. Singapore’s Budget 2024 addresses economic challenges, operational costs, and sustainability, implementing global tax reforms like the Income Inclusion Rule and Domestic Top-up Tax.
Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) has released Regulation No. 172 of 2023 (“PMK-172”), which prevails as a unified transfer pricing guideline. PMK-172 consolidates various transfer pricing matters that were previously covered under separate regulations, including the application of the arm’s length principle, transfer pricing documentation requirements, transfer pricing adjustments, Mutual Agreement Procedure (“MAP”), and Advance Pricing Agreements (“APA”).
The Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes (DGT) has continued to focus on compliance with the ex-ante principle, the expanded scope of transactions subject to the arm’s length principle, and the reinforcement of substance checks as part of the preliminary stage, indicating the DGT’s expectation of meticulous and well-supported transfer pricing analyses conducted by taxpayers.
In conclusion, PMK-172 reflects the Indonesian government’s commitment to addressing some of the most controversial transfer pricing issues and promoting clarity and certainty. While it brings new opportunities, it also presents challenges. Taxpayers are strongly advised to evaluate the implications of these new guidelines on their businesses in Indonesia to navigate this transformative regulatory landscape successfully.
In a significant move to bolster economic resilience and sustainability, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Mr. Lawrence Wong, unveiled the ambitious Singapore Budget 2024 on February 16, 2024. Amidst global economic fluctuations and a pressing climate crisis, the Budget strategically addresses the dual challenges of rising operational costs and the imperative for sustainable development, marking a pivotal step towards fortifying Singapore’s position as a competitive and green economy.
In anticipation of global tax reforms, Singapore’s proactive steps to implement the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) and Domestic Top-up Tax (DTT) under the BEPS 2.0 framework demonstrate a forward-looking approach to ensure tax compliance and fairness. These measures reaffirm Singapore’s commitment to international tax standards while safeguarding its economic interests.
Transfer pricing highlights from the Singapore Budget 2024 include:
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
New Report from Dezan Shira & Associates: China Takes the Lead in Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024
China has been the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 years, producing one-third of global manufacturing output. In the Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024, China ranks highest among eight emerging countries in the region. Challenges for these countries include global demand disparities affecting industrial output and export orders.
Known as the “World’s Factory”, China has held the title of the world’s largest manufacturer for 14 consecutive years, starting from 2010. Its factories churn out approximately one-third of the global manufacturing output, a testament to its industrial might and capacity.
China’s dominant role as the world’s sole manufacturing power is reaffirmed in Dezan Shira & Associates’ Emerging Asia Manufacturing Index 2024 report (“EAMI 2024”), in which China secures the top spot among eight emerging countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The other seven economies are India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Bangladesh.
The EAMI 2024 aims to assess the potential of these eight economies, navigate the risks, and pinpoint specific factors affecting the manufacturing landscape.
In this article, we delve into the key findings of the EAMI 2024 report and navigate China’s advantages and disadvantages in the manufacturing sector, placing them within the Asia-Pacific comparative context.
Emerging Asia countries face various challenges, especially in the current phase of increased volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA). One notable challenge is the impact of global demand disparities on the manufacturing sector, affecting industrial output and export orders.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
Is journalist Vicky Xu preparing to return to China?
Chinese social media influencers have recently claimed that prominent Chinese-born Australian journalist Vicky Xu had posted a message saying she planned to return to China.
There is no evidence for this. The source did not provide evidence to support the claim, and Xu herself later confirmed to AFCL that she has no such plans.
Currently working as an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, or ASPI, Xu has previously written for both the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, or ABC, and The New York Times.
A Chinese language netizen on X initially claimed on March 31 that the changing geopolitical relations between Sydney and Beijing had caused Xu to become an expendable asset and that she had posted a message expressing a strong desire to return to China. An illegible, blurred photo of the supposed message accompanied the post.
This claim was retweeted by a widely followed influencer on the popular Chinese social media site Weibo one day later, who additionally commented that Xu was a “traitor” who had been abandoned by Australian media.
Following the publication of an ASPI article in 2021 which exposed forced labor conditions in Xinjiang co-authored by Xu, the journalist was labeled “morally bankrupt” and “anti-China” by the Chinese state owned media outlet Global Times and subjected to an influx of threatening messages and digital abuse, eventually forcing her to temporarily close several of her social media accounts.
AFCL found that neither Xu’s active X nor LinkedIn account has any mention of her supposed return to China, and received the following response from Xu herself about the rumor:
“I can confirm that I don’t have plans to go back to China. I think if I do go back I’ll most definitely be detained or imprisoned – so the only career I’ll be having is probably going to be prison labor or something like that, which wouldn’t be ideal.”
Neither a keyword search nor reverse image search on the photo attached to the original X post turned up any text from Xu supporting the netizens’ claims.
Translated by Shen Ke. Edited by Shen Ke and Malcolm Foster.
Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) was established to counter disinformation in today’s complex media environment. We publish fact-checks, media-watches and in-depth reports that aim to sharpen and deepen our readers’ understanding of current affairs and public issues. If you like our content, you can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram and X.
Read the rest of this article here >>> Is journalist Vicky Xu preparing to return to China?
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