Connect with us
//pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/js/adsbygoogle.js (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});

Trade

Is Australia too dumb and too China-dependent?

Published

on

Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne meets her Chinese counterpart Wang Yi at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing, China, 8 November 2018 (Photo: Reuters/Thomas Peter).

Author: Adam Triggs, ANU

Having been labelled ‘dumb’, ‘getting dumber’ and ‘too dependent on China’, it’s been a rough few weeks for Australia’s exports. Luckily, these criticisms are largely misguided. They misunderstand how and why markets produce certain outcomes in an open economy. The remedies proposed are solutions in search of a problem.

Take the ‘dumb and getting dumber’ criticism first. This comes from the Harvard Kennedy School’s Atlas of Economic Complexity. The Atlas ranks Australia 93rd out of 133 countries in the complexity of its exports. And Australia is getting worse on that measure, falling 36 rungs down the ladder since 1995.

Being the eighth-richest economy in the world (in per capita terms), Australia is obviously ‘rich and dumb’ according to commentators panicked by a perceived lack of complexity and innovation in an otherwise wealthy economy.

But the Atlas measures the diversity and complexity of a country’s exports, not its economy. Coal and iron ore — Australia’s two largest exports — account for about a third of its total exports, but the entire mining sector accounts for less than one-tenth of its economy. Australia’s exports might be concentrated, but its economy is much more diverse.

And a few things are conspicuously absent from the Atlas. Most notably, it doesn’t include education, which happens to be Australia’s third-largest export (education is omitted from the Atlas because education is not reported consistently by countries).

But the most substantial problem with the ‘dumb and getting dumber’ criticism is that it misunderstands how trade and markets work in shaping a country’s trade profile. This is a misunderstanding that fuels another common criticism of Australia’s exports: that they are too dependent on China.

It’s true that Australia exports a lot to China — about 38 per cent of its exports. This is far more than to Japan, Australia’s second-largest export destination at around 16 per cent. At roughly AU$144 billion (US$99 billion) a year, exports to China contribute 8 per cent of Australia’s GDP.

Is this a problem? Some fear that these benefits could be at risk if China were to weaponise its trade with Australia as part of a geopolitical dispute, or if the Chinese economy were to suffer a crisis. Luckily, neither is a realistic threat.

As Shiro Armstrong and Peter Drysdale have noted, China has zero strategic interest in weaponising trade against Australia. Yes, Australia is dependent on China, but China is also dependent on Australia. Australia supplies 61 per cent of China’s iron ore, 53 per cent of its coal and 23 per cent of its thermal coal. Australia’s shares in each are increasing.

Others warn that an impending financial or economic crisis in China puts Australian trade at risk. But historically the opposite has been true. Economic shocks in China have often brought increased demand for Australian exports as Chinese authorities seek to stimulate their economy. China is more than capable of managing shocks. In fact, most analyses suggest that Chinese authorities have too much control over their economy, not too little.

At its root, the concern that Australia’s exports are too concentrated — both in what it sells and who its sells it to — reflects a misunderstanding of how and why markets deliver these outcomes in an open economy.

The reason is straightforward. Trade is about specialisation. As with all countries, Australia has limited resources — limited capital, labour, energy and materials — with which to produce things to sell to other countries. Because Australia is a clever country, it produces things that it is good at making and that receive the most money on international markets. This process of specialisation maximises returns and the prosperity of the Australian people. It is a process that is delivered by markets, not governments, and is made possible by free trade.

Some argue that Australia should cut trade with China out of fear that this trade might one day be cut in a geopolitical dispute. This is a bit like becoming so worried your car might be dented in the supermarket car park that you get in first and dent it before anyone else does. It seems strange to bring forward the thing you fear.

Australia trades with China and not with Iceland, for example, because that’s where the money is. Australians could ship coal and iron ore to Iceland, but the shipping costs would be high — and Icelanders probably don’t want Australian coal and iron ore anyway.

Others believe

Source link

Continue Reading

Trade

Fixing fragmentation in the settlement of international trade disputes

Published

on

Fragmentation in global trade due to the lack of development in multilateral trade rules at the WTO has led to an increase in FTAs. The Appellate Body impasse has further exacerbated fragmentation, requiring a multilateral approach for reform.

Fragmentation in Global Trade

Fragmentation in global trade is not new. With the slow development of multilateral trade rules at the World Trade Organization (WTO), governments have turned to free trade agreements (FTAs). As of 2023, almost 600 bilateral and regional trade agreements have been notified to the WTO, leading to growing fragmentation in trade rules, business activities, and international relations. But until recently, trade dispute settlements have predominantly remained within the WTO.

Challenges with WTO Dispute Settlement

The demise of the Appellate Body increased fragmentation in both the interpretation and enforcement of trade law. A small number of WTO Members created the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) as a temporary solution, but in its current form, it cannot properly address fragmentation. Since its creation in 2020, the MPIA has only attracted 26 parties, and its rulings have not been consistent with previous decisions made by the Appellate Body, rendering WTO case law increasingly fragmented.

The Path Forward for Global Trade

Maintaining the integrity and predictability of the global trading system while reducing fragmentation requires restoring the WTO’s authority. At the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference in 2022, governments agreed to re-establish a functional dispute settlement system by 2024. Reaching a consensus will be difficult, and negotiations will take time. A critical mass-based, open plurilateral approach provides a viable alternative way to reform the appellate mechanism, as WTO Members are committed to reforming the dispute settlement system.

Source : Fixing fragmentation in the settlement of international trade disputes

Continue Reading

Trade

WTO ministerial trading in low expectations and high stakes

Published

on

The WTO’s 13th Ministerial Conference is set to focus on e-commerce transparency, investment facilitation, and admitting new members. However, progress may be hindered by disputes, especially regarding fisheries subsidies.

The World Trade Organisation’s 13th Ministerial Conference

The World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) 13th Ministerial Conference is set to take place in Abu Dhabi on 26–29 February, with expectations of deals on electronic commerce transparency, investment facilitation for development, and the admission of Timor Leste and the Comoros as WTO members. Despite these positive developments, the expectations are relatively modest compared to promises made at the 12th Ministerial Conference, which included addressing fisheries subsidies and restoring a fully functioning dispute settlement mechanism by 2024.

Challenges in Dispute Settlement and Agricultural Trade Reform

However, challenges remain, especially in the deadlock of dispute settlement since December 2019 due to a US veto on the appointment of Appellate Body judges. Progress in restoring the dispute settlement mechanism has stalled, and discord continues regarding India’s grain stockholding policy as a potential illegal subsidy. Restoring a fully functioning dispute settlement mechanism hinges on addressing US concerns about perceived bias against trade remedies in relation to China’s state subsidies.

Geopolitical Tensions and the Future of Trade Relations

The likelihood of reaching agreements amid geopolitical tensions between Western democracies and China appears slim, with issues surrounding subsidies and global supply chains causing rifts in trade relations. As nations focus on self-reliance within the global value chain, opportunities for trading face obstacles. Advocacy for open markets and addressing protectionist sentiments remains crucial for fostering resilience to external shocks and promoting economic growth.

Source : WTO ministerial trading in low expectations and high stakes

Continue Reading

Trade

Getting Vietnam’s economic growth back on track

Published

on

Vietnam’s economy grew 8% in 2022 but slowed in 2023 due to falling exports and delays in public investments. The economy’s future depends on structural reforms and reducing dependency on foreign investment.

Vietnam’s Economic Roller Coaster

After emerging from COVID-19 with an 8 per cent annual growth rate, Vietnam’s economy took a downturn in the first half of 2023. The drop was attributed to falling exports due to monetary tightening in developed countries and a slow post-pandemic recovery in China.

Trade Performance and Monetary Policy

Exports were down 12 per cent on-year, with the industrial production index showing negative growth early in 2023 but ended with an increase of approximately 1 per cent for the year. Monetary policy was loosened throughout the year, with bank credit growing by 13.5 per cent overall and 1.7 per cent in the last 20 days of 2023.

Challenges and Prospects

Vietnam’s economy suffered from delayed public investments, electricity shortages, and a declining domestic private sector in the last two years. Looking ahead to 2024, economic growth is expected to be in the range of 5.5–6 per cent, but the country faces uncertainties due to geopolitical tensions and global economic conditions.

Source : Getting Vietnam’s economic growth back on track

Continue Reading