China
Russia–Japan territorial disputes, divisive as ever
Author: Tsuneo Akaha, MIIS The Russia–Japan territorial dispute over the southern Kurils/Northern Territories is heating up again. Although the Cold War has long ended, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to Kunashiri Island on 1 November 2010 prompted Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan to call it ‘an unforgivable outrage.’ Japan claims that the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri (Kunashir in Russian), and Etorofu (Iturup) are not part of the territories it surrendered in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. The peace accord, Japan claims, did not specify to whom the renounced territories would belong, and the Soviet Union (now Russia) could not and cannot base their sovereignty claims to the islands on a treaty the USSR refused to sign. Moscow and Tokyo agreed in their joint declaration of 1956, which restored their diplomatic relations, that the Soviet Union would return the disputed islands to Japan upon conclusion of a bilateral peace treaty. Both countries ratified the joint declaration. In 1991, the Japanese were encouraged when General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev acknowledged that there was a territorial dispute between the two countries. They even became hopeful when the first Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, agreed in 1993 that the 1956 joint declaration was still valid. Since then, Japan has continued to insist that all of the disputed islands are inherent territory of Japan and Russia’s control of the islands is illegal. Moscow’s position is essentially that Japan has no claim to the territories because it surrendered the entire Kuril chain in the San Francisco peace treaty. The victorious Soviet Union, therefore, acquired the islands as well as the southern half of Sakhalin Island (the northern half was already Soviet territory before the Second World War) as justly deserved spoils of war — as agreed in the Yalta Conference among the allied leaders. In recent years, the Russian leadership has intensified their appeal to patriotism and used the islands issue to this end. On 7 July 2010, the Russian Duma passed legislation establishing 2 September as the day to commemorate the end of the Great Patriotic War; that date in 1945 being the day when Japan signed the instrument of surrender. On 28 September, President Medvedev and Chinese President Hu Jintao issued a joint statement commemorating the 65 th anniversary of the war and pledged further strengthening of the Sino–Russian strategic alliance. This was followed by the Russian president’s visit to Kunashiri Island, as noted above, and similar visits to the disputed territories by Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, other key ministers and high-ranking officials. Ironically, the Russian leaders’ visits to the disputed islands demonstrate Moscow’s commitment to develop the long-neglected economy of the Russian Far East, including the southern Kurils; an effort in which Russia regards Japan as an important partner. Japan also sees mutual benefits in closer economic ties with Russia, particularly in the energy field. Although the eventual outcome of the territorial dispute is anybody’s guess, there is no question that the level of trust between Moscow and Tokyo must improve substantially if a mutually acceptable solution is to be reached. Several essential elements of trust-building efforts can be outlined. First, it is essential to improve and expand the relationship between the two governments so as to withstand the ups and downs of diplomatic tensions. The two countries need a more comprehensive engagement, particularly in the economic and social spheres, at both national and subnational levels, especially involving communities in the Russian Far East and northern and western regions of Japan. Second, Moscow and Tokyo should advance cooperation over transnational and global challenges; for example, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, climate change, public health (like HIV/AIDS and infectious diseases), alternative energy development, space exploration and new materials development. Third, both sides should encourage creative and innovative ideas that go beyond long-held perspectives which have proven ineffective. For one, Russia might consider returning the Habomais and Shikotan to Japan upon conclusion of a peace treaty, where the two sides commit to negotiating the status of the remaining islands. While the negotiations continued, Japan should offer assistance and encourage private investment in the development of the entire Northern Territories. Both Russians and Japanese might live side-by-side, with disputes between them to be settled in an arbitration board or a court of their choice. Finally, for any compromise to withstand inevitable criticisms at home, the political leaders in Moscow and Tokyo must build their credibility not on their ability to fan nationalism among their citizens but on their ability to ensure sustainable economic development and social stability. Professor Tsuneo Akaha is Professor of International Policy Studies and Director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the Monetary Institute of International Studies, California. China and its territorial disputes: One approach does not fit all China and its territorial disputes: One approach does not fit all Japan must acknowledge ‘territorial issue’ over islands
Author: Tsuneo Akaha, MIIS
The Russia–Japan territorial dispute over the southern Kurils/Northern Territories is heating up again. Although the Cold War has long ended, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to Kunashiri Island on 1 November 2010 prompted Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan to call it ‘an unforgivable outrage.’
Japan claims that the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri (Kunashir in Russian), and Etorofu (Iturup) are not part of the territories it surrendered in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. The peace accord, Japan claims, did not specify to whom the renounced territories would belong, and the Soviet Union (now Russia) could not and cannot base their sovereignty claims to the islands on a treaty the USSR refused to sign.
Moscow and Tokyo agreed in their joint declaration of 1956, which restored their diplomatic relations, that the Soviet Union would return the disputed islands to Japan upon conclusion of a bilateral peace treaty. Both countries ratified the joint declaration. In 1991, the Japanese were encouraged when General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev acknowledged that there was a territorial dispute between the two countries. They even became hopeful when the first Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, agreed in 1993 that the 1956 joint declaration was still valid. Since then, Japan has continued to insist that all of the disputed islands are inherent territory of Japan and Russia’s control of the islands is illegal.
Moscow’s position is essentially that Japan has no claim to the territories because it surrendered the entire Kuril chain in the San Francisco peace treaty. The victorious Soviet Union, therefore, acquired the islands as well as the southern half of Sakhalin Island (the northern half was already Soviet territory before the Second World War) as justly deserved spoils of war — as agreed in the Yalta Conference among the allied leaders.
In recent years, the Russian leadership has intensified their appeal to patriotism and used the islands issue to this end. On 7 July 2010, the Russian Duma passed legislation establishing 2 September as the day to commemorate the end of the Great Patriotic War; that date in 1945 being the day when Japan signed the instrument of surrender. On 28 September, President Medvedev and Chinese President Hu Jintao issued a joint statement commemorating the 65th anniversary of the war and pledged further strengthening of the Sino–Russian strategic alliance. This was followed by the Russian president’s visit to Kunashiri Island, as noted above, and similar visits to the disputed territories by Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, other key ministers and high-ranking officials.
Ironically, the Russian leaders’ visits to the disputed islands demonstrate Moscow’s commitment to develop the long-neglected economy of the Russian Far East, including the southern Kurils; an effort in which Russia regards Japan as an important partner. Japan also sees mutual benefits in closer economic ties with Russia, particularly in the energy field.
Although the eventual outcome of the territorial dispute is anybody’s guess, there is no question that the level of trust between Moscow and Tokyo must improve substantially if a mutually acceptable solution is to be reached. Several essential elements of trust-building efforts can be outlined.
First, it is essential to improve and expand the relationship between the two governments so as to withstand the ups and downs of diplomatic tensions. The two countries need a more comprehensive engagement, particularly in the economic and social spheres, at both national and subnational levels, especially involving communities in the Russian Far East and northern and western regions of Japan.
Second, Moscow and Tokyo should advance cooperation over transnational and global challenges; for example, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, climate change, public health (like HIV/AIDS and infectious diseases), alternative energy development, space exploration and new materials development.
Third, both sides should encourage creative and innovative ideas that go beyond long-held perspectives which have proven ineffective. For one, Russia might consider returning the Habomais and Shikotan to Japan upon conclusion of a peace treaty, where the two sides commit to negotiating the status of the remaining islands. While the negotiations continued, Japan should offer assistance and encourage private investment in the development of the entire Northern Territories. Both Russians and Japanese might live side-by-side, with disputes between them to be settled in an arbitration board or a court of their choice.
Finally, for any compromise to withstand inevitable criticisms at home, the political leaders in Moscow and Tokyo must build their credibility not on their ability to fan nationalism among their citizens but on their ability to ensure sustainable economic development and social stability.
Professor Tsuneo Akaha is Professor of International Policy Studies and Director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the Monetary Institute of International Studies, California.
- China and its territorial disputes: One approach does not fit all
- China and its territorial disputes: One approach does not fit all
- Japan must acknowledge ‘territorial issue’ over islands
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Russia–Japan territorial disputes, divisive as ever
Business
China and the UK Resume Economic and Financial Discussions After Six-Year Break
China and Britain resumed economic talks after six years, aiming to improve relations. Chancellor Reeves seeks cooperation but raises concerns over Russia’s support and Hong Kong’s civil liberties.
Resumption of Talks
Taipei, Taiwan (AP) — China and the United Kingdom have reignited economic discussions after a six-year pause, spurred by British Treasury Chief Rachel Reeves’ recent visit to Beijing. The Labour government aims to mend strained relations with China, the world’s second-largest economy. Reeves met with Chinese leaders and underscored the necessity for a "stable, pragmatic" partnership, emphasizing collaboration on mutual interests while maintaining transparency in disagreements.
Economic Collaboration
During her talks, Reeves sought to address key issues such as reducing economic support to Russia and advocating for basic rights in Hong Kong. Both nations signed agreements expected to infuse £600 million ($732 million) into the U.K. economy over the next five years. These agreements target crucial sectors including finance, with Reeves emphasizing that this renewed engagement may generate up to £1 billion for the U.K.
National Security Concerns
While seeking better ties, there are mounting concerns regarding national security and human rights abuses in China. Critics from the opposition have questioned the balance between economic opportunities and safeguarding Britain’s interests. Reeves acknowledged the importance of national security but highlighted the need for pragmatic relations with global partners, stating that ignoring China is not a viable option for the U.K.’s economic future.
Source : China and the UK restart economic and financial talks after a 6-year hiatus
China
Indonesia Needs to Take a Critical Stance on China’s Global Order Vision
During his visit to China, Indonesian President Prabowo secured $10 billion in investments and issued a Joint Statement, raising concerns about Indonesia’s neutrality amid China’s global vision and territorial claims.
Indonesian President’s Visit to China
During his visit to China from November 8 to 10, 2024, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto secured a remarkable US$10 billion in investments and issued the Joint Statement on Advancing the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. This document has raised eyebrows as it suggests alignment with China’s global vision, potentially undermining Indonesia’s traditionally impartial stance among major powers. Notably, it includes discussions on joint development in areas with overlapping territorial claims, despite Indonesia being a non-claimant in the contentious South China Sea.
Strengthening Bilateral Relations
President Prabowo considers China a significant partner, reflecting on centuries of bilateral collaboration. This visit highlights Indonesia’s commitment to enhancing cooperation across various sectors, including technology and green energy. China also pledged support for Prabowo’s free meal program, which is part of Indonesia’s larger Food Supplementation and School Feeding initiative, reinforcing the ties between the two nations.
Implications of the Joint Statement
The Joint Statement emphasized shared aspirations for the future but also raised concerns about Indonesia’s strategic positioning. By commending China’s narrative, particularly the concept of a "community with a shared future," Indonesia may inadvertently compromise its neutrality amid major power rivalries. Given the complexities surrounding this language, it is crucial for Indonesia to approach such statements carefully to uphold its independent foreign policy.
Source : Indonesia must be critical of China’s global order vision
China
Cross-Border Data Transfers: New Draft Guidelines Clarify Certification for Personal Information Protection
China’s draft measures for personal information protection in cross-border data transfers clarify certification procedures, eligibility, and requirements. Released by the Cyberspace Administration, they aim to enhance data governance and privacy, ensuring compliance and safeguarding personal information in international exchanges.
China’s new draft measures provide clarity on the certification process for personal information protection in cross-border data transfers (CBDT). Aimed at enhancing data governance, safeguarding privacy, and ensuring regulatory compliance, the draft measures outline eligibility criteria for applying the certification mechanism, specify the requirements, and detail the certification procedures.
On January 3, 2025, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) issued a draft document titled Measures for the Certification of Personal Information Protection for Cross-Border Data Transfers (hereinafter, draft measures) for public consultation. The draft measures, comprising 20 detailed articles, outline a comprehensive framework for certifying the security and compliance of personal data transfers beyond China’s borders.
With the feedback deadline set for February 3, 2025, the draft measures represent a crucial step in China’s broader strategy to strengthen data governance, ensure cybersecurity, and address global concerns over the safety of cross-border information flows.
Article 3 of the draft measures defines “PI protection certification” in cross-border data transfers as the formal evaluation process carried out by bodies authorized by the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR).
These certification bodies are responsible for assessing the compliance of personal information processors with the requirements of secure cross-border data transfers. The certification ensures that processors—whether domestic or foreign—adhere to the stringent criteria set out in the regulations, thereby protecting individuals’ personal information while enabling international data exchanges. Certified entities must demonstrate their capacity to manage cross-border data transfers in compliance with the standards laid out by the CAC and SAMR.
The certification process not only verifies compliance but also serves as an assurance to the public and regulatory authorities that the certified processors meet the required data protection measures.
Moreover, the scope of “cross-border data transfers” encompasses several scenarios where personal information moves across national boundaries. These include:
This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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