China
Vietnam ropes in stakeholders to China territorial dispute
Author: P. K. Ghosh, Observer Research Foundation
Vietnam’s recent granting of seven oil blocks in the South China Sea for exploration by India is part of a plan to internationalise Hanoi’s territorial dispute with China. Hanoi hopes to create more stakeholders who can withstand hegemonistic Chinese ambitions in the area.
It is well known that the Indian government has made heavy investments in energy exploration in the South China Sea. Awarded through the global bidding process, India earlier had three blocks in the Vietnamese region in which about US$360 million was invested through the state-run ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL).
OVL has been prospecting for oil in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone in blocks 127 and 128 (Phu Kanh Basin) in territories under dispute. It withdrew from block 127 which proved unviable and dry, while block 128 was bogged down by layers of hard rock and unfavourable geological conditions which made it difficult to penetrate.
Despite these issues, India decided not to withdraw from block 128 for geo-strategic reasons, including a request from the Vietnamese to stay on for another two years. In the meantime Indian operations of extracting natural gas in block 6.1 since 2003 in the region, which is not under dispute, continues from where it got two billion cubic metres of gas in 2011–12 for its 45 per cent participating interest.
While the Chinese had not objected to Vietnam allotting the lucrative block 6.1 to India in Nam Con Son Basin, it objected to India taking up exploration in blocks 127 and 128. Chinese objections have included demarches, pressure on companies not to sell equipment to India and the alleged harassment of an Indian warship, INS Airavat, which had transited through the disputed portion of the South China Sea.
Following talks between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong during the Vietnamese leader’s recent high-profile visit to India, eight agreements were signed. There was also an MoU signed, in which the seven oil blocks in the South China Sea were offered to India — including three on an exclusive basis — as well as joint prospecting in some Central Asian countries with which both Hanoi and New Delhi have good political ties.
The blocks have been offered on a nomination basis whereby India’s OVL would not have to go through a bidding round of offering the best production sharing contracts. Instead a direct proposal for production sharing would be negotiated under Vietnam’s petroleum laws.
Aside from India, Hanoi is also targeting Russia and Japan to counter pressure from China as their presence would serve as a deterrent. (Hanoi recently roped in Russia to invest in oil and gas blocks.)
Hanoi’s move could make China uneasy as Chinese foreign policy, especially towards the South China Sea and the East China Sea, has undergone a major shift in the last few years. This change in course has ensured that Deng Xiaoping’s ‘24-character strategy’, which acted as a guideline for foreign and security policy, and China’s phase of ‘biding time’, has evolved into a more forceful assertion of sovereignty claims.
The new Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping — which is keen to establish its authority in the national politics and thus shy away from being called ‘weak or too generous’ — has upped the ante and signalled an uncompromising stand by regarding the South China Sea as a matter of ‘core interests’.
It is not difficult to imagine that the Chinese will be uncomfortable with the current scenario. China is against any ‘outside power’ being involved in the South China Sea, though its own forces are regularly operating in the Indian Ocean region. Vietnam on its part well knows that it makes strategic sense to internationalise the scenario and put into place as many international stakeholders as possible.
The only countries that can probably withstand the pressures from and against China are being wooed by Vietnam. They in turn may like to prop up Vietnam as a bulwark against the increasingly hegemonistic attitude of the Chinese. The United States, Russia and India are the countries that fit well into the Vietnamese game plan.
Dr P. K. Ghosh is a Senior Fellow at the Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation and a former Co-Chair of the CSCAP International Study Group on Maritime Security.
This article was first published here as RSIS Commentary No. 228/2013.
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Vietnam ropes in stakeholders to China territorial dispute
Business
China and the UK Resume Economic and Financial Discussions After Six-Year Break
China and Britain resumed economic talks after six years, aiming to improve relations. Chancellor Reeves seeks cooperation but raises concerns over Russia’s support and Hong Kong’s civil liberties.
Resumption of Talks
Taipei, Taiwan (AP) — China and the United Kingdom have reignited economic discussions after a six-year pause, spurred by British Treasury Chief Rachel Reeves’ recent visit to Beijing. The Labour government aims to mend strained relations with China, the world’s second-largest economy. Reeves met with Chinese leaders and underscored the necessity for a "stable, pragmatic" partnership, emphasizing collaboration on mutual interests while maintaining transparency in disagreements.
Economic Collaboration
During her talks, Reeves sought to address key issues such as reducing economic support to Russia and advocating for basic rights in Hong Kong. Both nations signed agreements expected to infuse £600 million ($732 million) into the U.K. economy over the next five years. These agreements target crucial sectors including finance, with Reeves emphasizing that this renewed engagement may generate up to £1 billion for the U.K.
National Security Concerns
While seeking better ties, there are mounting concerns regarding national security and human rights abuses in China. Critics from the opposition have questioned the balance between economic opportunities and safeguarding Britain’s interests. Reeves acknowledged the importance of national security but highlighted the need for pragmatic relations with global partners, stating that ignoring China is not a viable option for the U.K.’s economic future.
Source : China and the UK restart economic and financial talks after a 6-year hiatus
China
Indonesia Needs to Take a Critical Stance on China’s Global Order Vision
During his visit to China, Indonesian President Prabowo secured $10 billion in investments and issued a Joint Statement, raising concerns about Indonesia’s neutrality amid China’s global vision and territorial claims.
Indonesian President’s Visit to China
During his visit to China from November 8 to 10, 2024, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto secured a remarkable US$10 billion in investments and issued the Joint Statement on Advancing the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. This document has raised eyebrows as it suggests alignment with China’s global vision, potentially undermining Indonesia’s traditionally impartial stance among major powers. Notably, it includes discussions on joint development in areas with overlapping territorial claims, despite Indonesia being a non-claimant in the contentious South China Sea.
Strengthening Bilateral Relations
President Prabowo considers China a significant partner, reflecting on centuries of bilateral collaboration. This visit highlights Indonesia’s commitment to enhancing cooperation across various sectors, including technology and green energy. China also pledged support for Prabowo’s free meal program, which is part of Indonesia’s larger Food Supplementation and School Feeding initiative, reinforcing the ties between the two nations.
Implications of the Joint Statement
The Joint Statement emphasized shared aspirations for the future but also raised concerns about Indonesia’s strategic positioning. By commending China’s narrative, particularly the concept of a "community with a shared future," Indonesia may inadvertently compromise its neutrality amid major power rivalries. Given the complexities surrounding this language, it is crucial for Indonesia to approach such statements carefully to uphold its independent foreign policy.
Source : Indonesia must be critical of China’s global order vision
China
Cross-Border Data Transfers: New Draft Guidelines Clarify Certification for Personal Information Protection
China’s draft measures for personal information protection in cross-border data transfers clarify certification procedures, eligibility, and requirements. Released by the Cyberspace Administration, they aim to enhance data governance and privacy, ensuring compliance and safeguarding personal information in international exchanges.
China’s new draft measures provide clarity on the certification process for personal information protection in cross-border data transfers (CBDT). Aimed at enhancing data governance, safeguarding privacy, and ensuring regulatory compliance, the draft measures outline eligibility criteria for applying the certification mechanism, specify the requirements, and detail the certification procedures.
On January 3, 2025, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) issued a draft document titled Measures for the Certification of Personal Information Protection for Cross-Border Data Transfers (hereinafter, draft measures) for public consultation. The draft measures, comprising 20 detailed articles, outline a comprehensive framework for certifying the security and compliance of personal data transfers beyond China’s borders.
With the feedback deadline set for February 3, 2025, the draft measures represent a crucial step in China’s broader strategy to strengthen data governance, ensure cybersecurity, and address global concerns over the safety of cross-border information flows.
Article 3 of the draft measures defines “PI protection certification” in cross-border data transfers as the formal evaluation process carried out by bodies authorized by the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR).
These certification bodies are responsible for assessing the compliance of personal information processors with the requirements of secure cross-border data transfers. The certification ensures that processors—whether domestic or foreign—adhere to the stringent criteria set out in the regulations, thereby protecting individuals’ personal information while enabling international data exchanges. Certified entities must demonstrate their capacity to manage cross-border data transfers in compliance with the standards laid out by the CAC and SAMR.
The certification process not only verifies compliance but also serves as an assurance to the public and regulatory authorities that the certified processors meet the required data protection measures.
Moreover, the scope of “cross-border data transfers” encompasses several scenarios where personal information moves across national boundaries. These include:
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.
- China and the UK Resume Economic and Financial Discussions After Six-Year Break
- Indonesia Needs to Take a Critical Stance on China’s Global Order Vision
- Cross-Border Data Transfers: New Draft Guidelines Clarify Certification for Personal Information Protection
- China’s economy took centre stage in Xi’s new year address, spinning slow growth as a ‘remarkable’ achievement
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