China
The tenth Shangri-La Dialogue
Author: Sheryn Lee, ANU On 4-5 June, Singapore was once again awash with security and defence buzz amid the 10 th annual International Institute of Strategic Studies’ Shangri-La Dialogue. While in previous years attention has centred on the keynote address of the US Secretary of Defence, this year’s event was dominated by a first time attendant: the Chinese Defence Minister, General Liang Guanglie. The Chinese General’s appearance heralded the strategic importance of the dialogue as a forum for the world’s leading nations. It also recognised the reality that discussions of regional defence issues and multilateral security initiatives necessitate Beijing’s participation. It seemed fitting that a dialogue that begun with the US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates’ rejection of the notion that the US is in relative decline should end with General Liang proselytising on why the region should be assured that China’s expanding military capabilities are benign. In spite of their almost boilerplate attempts to reassure, the sum effect of these statements was to throw into relief the blunt concerns of regional defence ministers regarding the negative tangent of security developments in maritime Asia. South Korean Defence Minister Kim Kwan Jin stated that Seoul would not continue to show restraint in the face of North Korean aggression, while Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov claimed that the Kuril Islands were not a ‘territorial dispute’ with Japan. By turns, the Vietnamese Defence Minister confirmed the acquisition of six Kilo-class submarines, and the UK Defence Minister Liam Fox outlined ‘greater plans’ for the Five Power Defence Arrangements, with the UK and Australia to conclude a bilateral defence agreement by 2012. In contrast to China’s talk of a desire for a ‘peaceful external environment’ for its ‘peaceful development’, and the pressure it is receiving to become a ‘responsible stakeholder,’ it has done little to moderate its push for overt militarised influence. Its increased presence in the region is having a destabilising effect, not only in the case of the South China Sea, but also in regards to dealing with Pyongyang’s intransigence. Similarly, despite Secretary Gates’ rhetoric, American power in the region cannot keep up the same tempo over the long term. Fiscal constraints and continuing extra-regional demands, in particular in the Middle East, have already begun to take their toll on Washington’s military edge, as China’s modernisation of the PLA rapidly continues. These challenges are largely ignored in the official narratives from formalised settings such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), which have tended to emphasise the possibilities for cooperative responses to regional threats. Even at the Shangri-La Dialogue there was an overwhelming focus on humanitarian aid and disaster relief. There is no question that collaborative efforts in these areas are significant, but the very real elephant of traditional security challenges is being downplayed, even as it threatens to trample regional stability. The question that is seldom asked publicly is: how can the region deal with the shifting power dynamics? Many nations are taking the answer into their own hands by turning towards military modernisation programs of their own, not only to counter China’s efforts but also to prepare for a future in which Washington may not be able to play the role of ‘offshore balancer’. As such, one of the key points that arose at Shangri-La was the desire to build a security architecture robust enough to reduce the likelihood of miscalculation and misunderstanding, and deal with such challenges as negotiating multilateral binding limits on military modernisation, or committing parties to an ‘Incidents at Sea’ agreement. At this point in time, the region lacks the institutions necessary to make such actions credible. While establishing new mechanisms like the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+) and expanding existing ones like the EAS could potentially lead to a security architecture that produces tangible results, neither approach has yet borne fruit with regards to core strategic challenges. The challenge for policymakers is to respond to this demand for an architecture commensurate with the problems of competition and robust enough to bring both the US and China together to deal honestly with their military competition while providing security for smaller regional states. Increasingly, the political and strategic barriers to this challenge appear insurmountable. The region is confronting a contradiction at the heart of multilateral discussion: while talk helps, it only does so if it is frank. Empty talk reflects insincerity, which actually exacerbates distrust amongst participants and accelerates competition. With the failure of security dialogue to achieve the level of trust required for collectiveaction, regional parties are encouraged to take a self-help approach to security by themselves or with traditional partners. As a consequence, there is a risk that the region will descend into bickering and confrontation between highly armed blocs. Rather than contributing to a balance of power, such a scenario raises the risk that certain major extra-regional players, such as the United States, may decide to cut their involvement suddenly in response to domestic and economic pressures. The potential for regional strategic instability would be significant, with conflict triggers abounding from the DMZ to the Paracel Islands. As the region faces the possibility of a conflict spiral exacerbated by distrust, the need to overcome reticence and speak bluntly about regional strategic and economic realities is paramount. Unfortunately, the opportunity for honesty passed Washington and Beijing by at Shangri-La. Sheryn Lee is a research assistant and Robert O’Neill Scholar at the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, the Australian National University. Assessing the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue East Asia Forum dialogue ADMM+8: An acronym to watch
Author: Sheryn Lee, ANU
On 4-5 June, Singapore was once again awash with security and defence buzz amid the 10th annual International Institute of Strategic Studies’ Shangri-La Dialogue.
While in previous years attention has centred on the keynote address of the US Secretary of Defence, this year’s event was dominated by a first time attendant: the Chinese Defence Minister, General Liang Guanglie. The Chinese General’s appearance heralded the strategic importance of the dialogue as a forum for the world’s leading nations. It also recognised the reality that discussions of regional defence issues and multilateral security initiatives necessitate Beijing’s participation.
It seemed fitting that a dialogue that begun with the US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates’ rejection of the notion that the US is in relative decline should end with General Liang proselytising on why the region should be assured that China’s expanding military capabilities are benign. In spite of their almost boilerplate attempts to reassure, the sum effect of these statements was to throw into relief the blunt concerns of regional defence ministers regarding the negative tangent of security developments in maritime Asia. South Korean Defence Minister Kim Kwan Jin stated that Seoul would not continue to show restraint in the face of North Korean aggression, while Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov claimed that the Kuril Islands were not a ‘territorial dispute’ with Japan. By turns, the Vietnamese Defence Minister confirmed the acquisition of six Kilo-class submarines, and the UK Defence Minister Liam Fox outlined ‘greater plans’ for the Five Power Defence Arrangements, with the UK and Australia to conclude a bilateral defence agreement by 2012.
In contrast to China’s talk of a desire for a ‘peaceful external environment’ for its ‘peaceful development’, and the pressure it is receiving to become a ‘responsible stakeholder,’ it has done little to moderate its push for overt militarised influence. Its increased presence in the region is having a destabilising effect, not only in the case of the South China Sea, but also in regards to dealing with Pyongyang’s intransigence. Similarly, despite Secretary Gates’ rhetoric, American power in the region cannot keep up the same tempo over the long term. Fiscal constraints and continuing extra-regional demands, in particular in the Middle East, have already begun to take their toll on Washington’s military edge, as China’s modernisation of the PLA rapidly continues.
These challenges are largely ignored in the official narratives from formalised settings such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), which have tended to emphasise the possibilities for cooperative responses to regional threats. Even at the Shangri-La Dialogue there was an overwhelming focus on humanitarian aid and disaster relief. There is no question that collaborative efforts in these areas are significant, but the very real elephant of traditional security challenges is being downplayed, even as it threatens to trample regional stability. The question that is seldom asked publicly is: how can the region deal with the shifting power dynamics?
Many nations are taking the answer into their own hands by turning towards military modernisation programs of their own, not only to counter China’s efforts but also to prepare for a future in which Washington may not be able to play the role of ‘offshore balancer’. As such, one of the key points that arose at Shangri-La was the desire to build a security architecture robust enough to reduce the likelihood of miscalculation and misunderstanding, and deal with such challenges as negotiating multilateral binding limits on military modernisation, or committing parties to an ‘Incidents at Sea’ agreement.
At this point in time, the region lacks the institutions necessary to make such actions credible. While establishing new mechanisms like the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+) and expanding existing ones like the EAS could potentially lead to a security architecture that produces tangible results, neither approach has yet borne fruit with regards to core strategic challenges. The challenge for policymakers is to respond to this demand for an architecture commensurate with the problems of competition and robust enough to bring both the US and China together to deal honestly with their military competition while providing security for smaller regional states.
Increasingly, the political and strategic barriers to this challenge appear insurmountable. The region is confronting a contradiction at the heart of multilateral discussion: while talk helps, it only does so if it is frank. Empty talk reflects insincerity, which actually exacerbates distrust amongst participants and accelerates competition. With the failure of security dialogue to achieve the level of trust required for collectiveaction, regional parties are encouraged to take a self-help approach to security by themselves or with traditional partners. As a consequence, there is a risk that the region will descend into bickering and confrontation between highly armed blocs. Rather than contributing to a balance of power, such a scenario raises the risk that certain major extra-regional players, such as the United States, may decide to cut their involvement suddenly in response to domestic and economic pressures. The potential for regional strategic instability would be significant, with conflict triggers abounding from the DMZ to the Paracel Islands.
As the region faces the possibility of a conflict spiral exacerbated by distrust, the need to overcome reticence and speak bluntly about regional strategic and economic realities is paramount. Unfortunately, the opportunity for honesty passed Washington and Beijing by at Shangri-La.
Sheryn Lee is a research assistant and Robert O’Neill Scholar at the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, the Australian National University.
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The tenth Shangri-La Dialogue
China
New Publication: A Guide for Foreign Investors on Navigating China’s New Company Law
The sixth revision of China’s Company Law is the most extensive amendment in history, impacting foreign invested enterprises with stricter rules on capital injection and corporate governance. Most FIEs must align with the New Company Law by July 1, 2024, with a deadline of December 31, 2024 for adjustments. Contact Dezan Shira & Associates for assistance.
The sixth revision of China’s Company Law represents the most extensive amendment in its history. From stricter capital injection rules to enhanced corporate governance, the changes introduced in the New Company Law have far-reaching implications for businesses, including foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) operating in or entering the China market.
Since January 1, 2020, the Company Law has governed both wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) and joint ventures (JVs), following the enactment of the Foreign Investment Law (FIL). Most FIEs must align with the provisions of the New Company Law from July 1, 2024, while those established before January 1, 2020 have bit more time for adjustments due to the five-year grace period provided by the FIL. The final deadline for their alignment is December 31, 2024.
In this publication, we guide foreign investors through the implications of the New Company Law for existing and new FIEs and relevant stakeholders. We begin with an overview of the revision’s background and objectives, followed by a summary of key changes. Our in-depth analysis, from a foreign stakeholder perspective, illuminates the practical implications. Lastly, we explore tax impacts alongside the revisions, demonstrating how the New Company Law may shape future business transactions and arrangements.
If you or your company require assistance with Company Law adjustments in China, please do not hesitate to contact Dezan Shira & Associates. For more information, feel free to reach us via email at china@dezshira.com.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
Lingang New Area in Shanghai Opens First Cross-Border Data Service Center to Streamline Data Export Process
The Lingang New Area in Shanghai has launched China’s first Cross-Border Data Service Center to facilitate data export for companies in Shanghai. The center will help with applications, data catalogs, and management, aiming to provide legal and safe cross-border data transfer mechanisms.
The Lingang New Area in Shanghai’s Pilot Free Trade Zone has launched a new cross-border data service center to provide administrative and consulting services to companies in Shanghai that need to export data out of China. The service center will help facilitate data export by accepting applications from companies for data export projects and is tasked with formulating and implementing data catalogs to facilitate data export in the area. The Shanghai cross-border data service center will provide services to companies across the whole city.
The Lingang New Area in the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone has launched China’s first Cross-Border Data Service Center (the “service center”). The service center, which is jointly operated by the Cybersecurity Administration of China (CAC) and the local government, aims to further facilitate legal, safe, and convenient cross-border data transfer (CBDT) mechanisms for companies.
The service center will not only serve companies in the Lingang New Area but is also open to companies across Shanghai, and will act as an administrative service center specializing in CBDT.
In January 2024, the local government showcased a set of trial measures for the “classified and hierarchical” management of CBDT in the Lingang New Area. The measures, which have not yet been released to the public, seek to facilitate CBDT from the area by dividing data for cross-border transfer into three different risk categories: core, important, and general data.
The local government also pledged to release two data catalogs: a “general data” catalog, which will include types of data that can be transferred freely out of the Lingang New Area, and an “important data” catalog, which will be subject to restrictions. According to Zong Liang, an evaluation expert at the service center, the first draft of the general data catalog has been completed and is being submitted to the relevant superior departments for review.
In March 2024, the CAC released the final version of a set of regulations significantly facilitating CBDT for companies in the country. The new regulations increase the limits on the volume of PI that a company can handle before it is required to undergo additional compliance procedures, provide exemptions from the compliance procedures, and clarify the handling of important data.
Also in March, China released a new set of technical standards stipulating the rules for classifying three different types of data – core, important, and general data. Importantly, the standards provide guidelines for regulators and companies to identify what is considered “important” data. This means they will act as a reference for companies and regulators when assessing the types of data that can be exported, including FTZs such as the Lingang New Area.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
A Concise Guide to the Verification Letter of Invitation Requirement in the China Visa Process
The application procedures for business visas to China have been simplified, with most foreigners now able to apply for an M/F visa using only an invitation letter from a Chinese company. Some countries are eligible for visa-free entry. However, a Verification Letter of Invitation may still be needed in certain cases. Consult the local Chinese embassy for confirmation.
In light of recent developments, the application procedures for business visas to China have undergone substantial simplification. Most foreigners can now apply for an M/F visa using only the invitation letter issued by a Chinese company. Additionally, citizens of certain countries are eligible to enter China without a visa and stay for up to 144 hours or even 15 days.
However, it’s important to note that some applicants may still need to apply for a “Verification Letter of Invitation (邀请核实单)” when applying for an M/F visa to China. In this article, we will introduce what a Verification Letter of Invitation is, who needs to apply for it, and the potential risks.
It’s important to note that in most cases, the invitation letter provided by the inviting unit (whether a public entity or a company) is sufficient for M/F visa applications. The Verification Letter for Invitation is only required when the Chinese embassies or consulates in certain countries specifically ask for the document.
Meanwhile, it is also essential to note that obtaining a Verification Letter for Invitation does not guarantee visa approval. The final decision on granting a visa rests with the Chinese embassy abroad, based on the specific circumstances of the applicant.
Based on current information, foreign applicants in Sri Lanka and most Middle East countries – such as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, and so on – need to submit a Verification Letter for Invitation when they apply for a visa to China.
That said, a Verification Letter for Invitation might not be required in a few Middle East countries, such as Saudi Arabia. Therefore, we suggest that foreign applicants consult with their the local Chinese embassy or consulate to confirm in advance.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
- New Publication: A Guide for Foreign Investors on Navigating China’s New Company Law
- Lingang New Area in Shanghai Opens First Cross-Border Data Service Center to Streamline Data Export Process
- A Concise Guide to the Verification Letter of Invitation Requirement in the China Visa Process
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