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China

WeChat’s wires are crossed in Australian politics

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A shopper looks at her phone in front of a sales sign displayed in a window of a retail store at a shopping centre in central Sydney, Australia 18 April 2017. (Photo: REUTERS/Steven Saphore via Reuters Connect).

Author: Fan Yang, Deakin University

Weixin was launched in January 2011 by Chinese tech giant Tencent. It is now the primary digital platform for Mandarin speakers, with almost 1.3 billion monthly active accounts as of April 2022.

WeChat is not Weixin. Weixin and WeChat are two interoperable platforms within Weixin’s ecosystem — both of which are subject to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) governance ‘at home’ and ‘abroad’. Weixin user accounts are linked to Chinese mobile phone numbers and are subject to the ‘Standards of Weixin Account Usage’.

WeChat user accounts are associated with non-Chinese mobile phone numbers and are governed by WeChat’s ‘Acceptable Use Policy’. Users with different memberships can communicate with each other with the exception that publications by official overseas WeChat accounts (not affiliated with Chinese businesses) cannot be viewed by Weixin users.

The difference between the two user policies suggests that WeChat users are not completely restricted by the CCP. But the ambiguity in the language of the policies offers Tencent and the Chinese government the flexibility to extend their control from Weixin accounts to WeChat accounts, regardless of users’ geolocation.

The WeChat terms of service claim that the use of WeChat official accounts, e-commerce and mini-programs are supervised by Weixin rather than WeChat. Location-specific terms apply to the governance of WeChat in jurisdictions such as the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, the European Union and Singapore.

WeChat’s governance is layered, with Chinese Weixin users based in mainland China facing the strictest restrictions while non-Chinese WeChat users outside China enjoy the broadest range of autonomy, protected by nation-specific privacy laws. These differentiated governance models and nation-specific terms of service intend to expand WeChat’s reach beyond China. But they also indicate that WeChat is becoming increasingly complicated.

WeChat’s hybrid regulatory framework and transnationality make it difficult to understand the platform’s governance. How users are regulated and which governance frameworks they follow depend on what features they use and their mobile phone numbers, nationality and geolocation. Privacy, surveillance and cybersecurity issues surrounding WeChat in Australia and beyond have triggered a politically charged debate about keeping or banning the platform.

As an ‘all-in-one’ platform, WeChat is designed to monopolise one’s lifestyle, reflecting the platform’s commercial and political goals of aggregating users’ data. WeChat provides a platform for daily communication, content production and publication, e-commerce and financial transactions.

For many Chinese–Australians, their engagement with WeChat is two-fold. WeChat enables them to maintain relationships with people in mainland China, where Western platforms are blocked, while also forming a community for Chinese small businesses marginalised from English-speaking mainstream society.

WeChat became politically significant in Australia in 2016 when the media revealed that misleading political campaigns in Mandarin were being organised by conservative party supporters across WeChat group chats. Increasing migrant civic engagement on WeChat since 2019 has seen former Liberal and Labor party leaders Scott Morrison and Bill Shorten and former Liberal candidate of Hong Kongese ancestry Gladys Liu join the platform.

Ahead of the 2022 Australian federal election, WeChat was used by major politicians, including Anthony Albanese, Scott Morrison, Josh Frydenberg, Paul Fletcher and Clare O’Neill, as well as Teal candidates such as Li Fuxin and Kylea Tink. Australian politicians engaged with Chinese migrant voters through political advertisements, attacks, campaigns and policy updates on WeChat.

Research into WeChat and elections shows that politicians use WeChat for political gain. As communication remains largely one-way, politicians can use the platform to mobilise votes ahead of federal elections. Australian politicians also interact with WeChat cautiously and critically, citing concerns around cybersecurity, surveillance, censorship and Beijing’s influence on Australian politics.

Following Trump’s bid to ban TikTok and WeChat in 2020, Australia’s then prime minister Scott Morrison launched a security investigation, signalling the possibility of banning the two platforms. Ahead of the 2022 Australian federal election, discussions around a ‘WeChat ban’ were politicised by the…

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Trends and Future Prospects of Bilateral Direct Investment between China and Germany

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China and Germany experienced a decline in direct investment in 2023 due to global economic uncertainty and policy changes. Despite this, China remains an attractive destination for German FDI. Key industries like automotive and advanced manufacturing continue to draw investors, although FDI outflows from Germany to China decreased by 30% in the first three quarters of 2023. Despite this, the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21% in the same period according to MOFCOM. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data and MOFCOM’s actual use of foreign capital provide different perspectives on the investment trends between the two countries.


Direct investment between China and Germany declined in 2023, due to a range of factors from global economic uncertainty to policy changes. However, China remains an important destination for German foreign direct investment (FDI), and key industries in both countries continue to excite investors. We look at the latest direct investment data between Germany and China to analyze the latest trends and discuss key factors that could shape future business and commercial ties.

Direct investment between China and Germany has undergone profound changes over the past decade. An increasingly complex investment environment for companies in both countries has led to falling two-way FDI figures in the first three quarters of 2023, in stark contrast to positive trends seen in 2022.

At the same time, industries with high growth potential, such as automotive and advanced manufacturing, continue to attract German companies to China, and high levels of reinvested earnings suggest established firms are doubling down on their commitments in the Chinese market. In Germany, the potential for electric vehicle (EV) sales is buoying otherwise low investment among Chinese companies.

According to data from Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, total FDI outflows from Germany to China fell in the first three quarters of 2023, declining by 30 percent to a total of EUR 7.98 billion.

This is a marked reversal of trends from 2022, when FDI flows from Germany to China reached a record EUR 11.4 billion, up 14.7 percent year-on-year.

However, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21 percent year-on-year in the first eight months of 2023. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data, which follows standards set by the IMF, the OECD, and the European Central Bank (ECB), includes a broader scope of transactions within its direct investment data, including, broadly, direct investment positions, direct investment income flows, and direct investment financial flows.

Meanwhile, the actual use of foreign capital recorded by MOFCOM includes contracted foreign capital that has been concluded, including the registered and working capital paid by foreign investors, as well as the transaction consideration paid for the transferred equity of domestic investors.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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China’s coast guard on Saturday fired a water cannon at a Philippine supply boat in disputed waters in the South China Sea, causing “significant damages to the vessel” and injuring its crew, the Philippine coast guard said.

Manila was attempting to resupply troops stationed on a ship at the Second Thomas Shoal, known locally as Ayungin Shoal, when the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia “harassed, blocked, deployed water cannons, and executed dangerous maneuvers against the routine RoRe (rotation and resupply) mission,” said the Philippine National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea.

The West Philippine Sea is the part of the South China Sea that Manila claims as its jurisdiction.

The Chinese coast guard also set up “a floating barrier” to block access to shoal where Manila ran aground an old warship, BRP Sierra Madre, to serve as a military outpost.

The Philippine task force condemned China’s “unprovoked aggression, coercion, and dangerous maneuvers.”

Philippines’ RoRe missions have been regularly blocked by China’s coast guard, but this is the first time a barrier was set up near the shoal. 

The Philippine coast guard nevertheless claimed that the mission on Saturday was accomplished.

Potential consequences

The Second Thomas Shoal lies within the country’s exclusive economic zone where Manila holds sovereign rights. 

China, however, claims historic rights over most of the South China Sea, including the Spratly archipelago, which the shoal forms a part of.

A Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson on Saturday said the Philippine supply vessel “intruded” into the waters near the shoal, called Ren’ai Jiao in Chinese, “without permission from the Chinese government.”

“China coast guard took necessary measures at sea in accordance with law to safeguard China’s rights, firmly obstructed the Philippines’ vessels, and foiled the Philippines’ attempt,” the ministry said.

“If the Philippines insists on going its own way, China will continue to adopt resolute measures,” the spokesperson said, warning that Manila “should be prepared to bear all potential consequences.”

Chinese Maritime Militia vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, March 5, 2024. (Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson wrote on social media platform X that her country “stands with the Philippines” against China’s maneuvers.

Beijing’s “interference with the Philippines’ freedom of navigation violates international law and threatens a free and open Indo-Pacific,” she wrote.

Australian Ambassador to the Philippines Hae Kyong Yu also said that Canberra shares the Philippines’ “serious concerns about dangerous conduct by China’s vessels adjacent to Second Thomas Shoal.” 

“This is part of a pattern of deeply concerning behavior,” Yu wrote on X.

Edited by Jim Snyder.

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Foreigners in China: 2024 Living and Working Guidelines

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China’s Ministry of Commerce released updated guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China in 2024. The guidelines cover accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols. It also outlines responsibilities regarding social security premiums and individual income tax obligations. prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required upon arrival.


The updated 2024 guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China, released by the country’s Ministry of Commerce, outline essential procedures and considerations covering accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols.

On January 25, 2024, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) released the latest version of the Guidelines for Foreign Businessmen to Live and Work in China (hereinafter referred to as the “guidelines”).

The document is divided into four main sections, labeled as:

Furthermore, the guidelines elucidate the regulatory framework governing foreign businessperson’s responsibilities concerning social security premiums and individual income tax obligations.

This article provides a comprehensive overview of the guidelines, delving into their significance and implications for foreign businesspersons in China.

Upon arrival in China, prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required.

If staying in a hotel, registration can be facilitated by the hotel staff upon presentation of a valid passport or international travel documents.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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