Connect with us
//pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/js/adsbygoogle.js (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});

China

The CPTPP isn’t just a trade deal for Taiwan, it’s a survival plan

Published

on

Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu speaks to the international press and correspondents at the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Joseph Wu touches upon issues around China, US, armed sales, CPTPP, Japan, possible war from China, population, epidemic and other international issues such as crimes and food safety (Photo: Daniel Tsang/Reuters)

Author: Shihoko Goto, Wilson Center

When Taiwan made its bid to join the CPTPP in September, a week after China officially declared its interest in joining, there was speculation about the implications of the timing. Taipei could not afford to wait to request entry once Beijing got in the game. Yet the CPTPP is at the heart of mapping out Taiwan’s long-term survival, not just a means to remain competitive in global markets.

Taipei is facing formidable military pressure from Beijing. In a television interview in October, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen stressed that threats from Beijing were growing daily. In response the United States has galvanised like-minded countries within and beyond the Indo-Pacific to prepare to come to Taiwan’s defence should the need arise.

Yet the schism grows between the United States (and its partners and allies) preparedness to come to the physical defence of Taiwan and their readiness to support Taiwan’s ability to continue remaining economically competitive.

For now, Taiwan’s economy is not simply doing well — it is flourishing. Its unique position in the global supply chain has become all too clear during the COVID-19 pandemic. Taiwan’s GDP expanded in 2020 when the majority of economies worldwide shrunk drastically. Demand for its technology exports continues to be robust. Taiwanese industries play a pivotal role in supplying international markets with high-capacity semiconductors. Domestic investment remains strong, and the wooing of Taiwanese chipmakers by overseas manufacturers continues to intensify.

Nevertheless, the economic environment that Taiwan may find itself in the long term is as fraught with risks as its security landscape — but without the same sort of concerted regional support. Taipei finds itself amid a newly emerging regional trade architecture from which it is increasingly at risk of being marginalised. Taiwan’s bid to join the CPTPP not only highlights the risk of marginalisation that it faces as the Indo-Pacific becomes the centre of multilateral and bilateral trade deals, but it also underscores the need for a greater US economic presence in the region. The lack of a collective economic security vision, unlike a roadmap for regional military security, makes Taiwan’s future prospects more vulnerable.

In theory Taipei has a fighting chance of joining the CPTPP, given that it is on equal footing with Beijing. Both are seeking membership at the same time and will have to meet the same requirements for entry. Taiwan should have the upper hand, since it has met more of the criteria for accession and is also prepared to make the necessary concessions to be considered. And unlike the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement, of which China is a founding member, current CPTPP members including Japan, Australia and New Zealand have stepped up efforts to vocalise support for Taiwan.

Still, whether the 11 existing CPTPP members have the political will to risk a significant fallout with China for allowing Taiwan to join is debatable. The members need to consider aligning the security risks they have verbally committed to taking in Taiwan’s defence with the risks they should be prepared to take in defence of Taiwan’s economic survival.

The Biden administration has overcome its reluctance to enter new trade deals and has resumed negotiations with Taipei. The rapidly shifting landscape since the bilateral Trade and Investment Framework was signed in 1994 requires more than an end to the longstanding conflict over agricultural import restrictions or lowering tariffs more broadly. What Taiwan needs most is a demonstration of firm US and regional long-term commitment to support the government and its economy as much as its military defence.

Taiwan has thrived to date as a global player despite having only signed a limited amount of trade deals with select countries, including economic cooperation agreements with New Zealand and Singapore. But as the Indo-Pacific becomes the epicentre of integrated deals that will make trade far more efficient, cost-effective, and harmonised, Taiwan is in danger of becoming less attractive for investors precisely because it is not part of the trade networks.

For Taiwan to remain a flourishing and prosperous democracy, it needs not only strong defensive support from its partners, but also their backing to remain an integral part of the global economy. What’s more, its efforts to join the CPTPP must be acknowledged as a political manoeuvre as much as economic policy. By joining the CPTPP, the…

Read the rest of this article on East Asia Forum

Continue Reading

China

Trends and Future Prospects of Bilateral Direct Investment between China and Germany

Published

on

China and Germany experienced a decline in direct investment in 2023 due to global economic uncertainty and policy changes. Despite this, China remains an attractive destination for German FDI. Key industries like automotive and advanced manufacturing continue to draw investors, although FDI outflows from Germany to China decreased by 30% in the first three quarters of 2023. Despite this, the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21% in the same period according to MOFCOM. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data and MOFCOM’s actual use of foreign capital provide different perspectives on the investment trends between the two countries.


Direct investment between China and Germany declined in 2023, due to a range of factors from global economic uncertainty to policy changes. However, China remains an important destination for German foreign direct investment (FDI), and key industries in both countries continue to excite investors. We look at the latest direct investment data between Germany and China to analyze the latest trends and discuss key factors that could shape future business and commercial ties.

Direct investment between China and Germany has undergone profound changes over the past decade. An increasingly complex investment environment for companies in both countries has led to falling two-way FDI figures in the first three quarters of 2023, in stark contrast to positive trends seen in 2022.

At the same time, industries with high growth potential, such as automotive and advanced manufacturing, continue to attract German companies to China, and high levels of reinvested earnings suggest established firms are doubling down on their commitments in the Chinese market. In Germany, the potential for electric vehicle (EV) sales is buoying otherwise low investment among Chinese companies.

According to data from Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, total FDI outflows from Germany to China fell in the first three quarters of 2023, declining by 30 percent to a total of EUR 7.98 billion.

This is a marked reversal of trends from 2022, when FDI flows from Germany to China reached a record EUR 11.4 billion, up 14.7 percent year-on-year.

However, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21 percent year-on-year in the first eight months of 2023. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data, which follows standards set by the IMF, the OECD, and the European Central Bank (ECB), includes a broader scope of transactions within its direct investment data, including, broadly, direct investment positions, direct investment income flows, and direct investment financial flows.

Meanwhile, the actual use of foreign capital recorded by MOFCOM includes contracted foreign capital that has been concluded, including the registered and working capital paid by foreign investors, as well as the transaction consideration paid for the transferred equity of domestic investors.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

Continue Reading

China

Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

Published

on

China’s coast guard on Saturday fired a water cannon at a Philippine supply boat in disputed waters in the South China Sea, causing “significant damages to the vessel” and injuring its crew, the Philippine coast guard said.

Manila was attempting to resupply troops stationed on a ship at the Second Thomas Shoal, known locally as Ayungin Shoal, when the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia “harassed, blocked, deployed water cannons, and executed dangerous maneuvers against the routine RoRe (rotation and resupply) mission,” said the Philippine National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea.

The West Philippine Sea is the part of the South China Sea that Manila claims as its jurisdiction.

The Chinese coast guard also set up “a floating barrier” to block access to shoal where Manila ran aground an old warship, BRP Sierra Madre, to serve as a military outpost.

The Philippine task force condemned China’s “unprovoked aggression, coercion, and dangerous maneuvers.”

Philippines’ RoRe missions have been regularly blocked by China’s coast guard, but this is the first time a barrier was set up near the shoal. 

The Philippine coast guard nevertheless claimed that the mission on Saturday was accomplished.

Potential consequences

The Second Thomas Shoal lies within the country’s exclusive economic zone where Manila holds sovereign rights. 

China, however, claims historic rights over most of the South China Sea, including the Spratly archipelago, which the shoal forms a part of.

A Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson on Saturday said the Philippine supply vessel “intruded” into the waters near the shoal, called Ren’ai Jiao in Chinese, “without permission from the Chinese government.”

“China coast guard took necessary measures at sea in accordance with law to safeguard China’s rights, firmly obstructed the Philippines’ vessels, and foiled the Philippines’ attempt,” the ministry said.

“If the Philippines insists on going its own way, China will continue to adopt resolute measures,” the spokesperson said, warning that Manila “should be prepared to bear all potential consequences.”

Chinese Maritime Militia vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, March 5, 2024. (Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson wrote on social media platform X that her country “stands with the Philippines” against China’s maneuvers.

Beijing’s “interference with the Philippines’ freedom of navigation violates international law and threatens a free and open Indo-Pacific,” she wrote.

Australian Ambassador to the Philippines Hae Kyong Yu also said that Canberra shares the Philippines’ “serious concerns about dangerous conduct by China’s vessels adjacent to Second Thomas Shoal.” 

“This is part of a pattern of deeply concerning behavior,” Yu wrote on X.

Edited by Jim Snyder.

Read the rest of this article here >>> Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

Continue Reading

China

Foreigners in China: 2024 Living and Working Guidelines

Published

on

China’s Ministry of Commerce released updated guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China in 2024. The guidelines cover accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols. It also outlines responsibilities regarding social security premiums and individual income tax obligations. prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required upon arrival.


The updated 2024 guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China, released by the country’s Ministry of Commerce, outline essential procedures and considerations covering accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols.

On January 25, 2024, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) released the latest version of the Guidelines for Foreign Businessmen to Live and Work in China (hereinafter referred to as the “guidelines”).

The document is divided into four main sections, labeled as:

Furthermore, the guidelines elucidate the regulatory framework governing foreign businessperson’s responsibilities concerning social security premiums and individual income tax obligations.

This article provides a comprehensive overview of the guidelines, delving into their significance and implications for foreign businesspersons in China.

Upon arrival in China, prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required.

If staying in a hotel, registration can be facilitated by the hotel staff upon presentation of a valid passport or international travel documents.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

Continue Reading