China
China’s charm offensive in Bangladesh
Author: Asif Muztaba Hassan, Dhaka
China’s combative foreign conduct has many believing that the country has departed from former leader Deng Xiaoping’s philosophy ‘to leave brightness, embrace obscurity, and keep a low profile’ (tao guang yang hui) and is ready to assert it authority internationally. But China’s quiet charm offensive with Bangladesh lends a different character to its diplomacy.
China’s assertive behaviour, especially in the South China Sea, may run contrary to Deng’s philosophy. But as China faces increasing risks and challenges to its interests, it appears as if tao guang yang hui informs Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call for ‘fighting spirit’ in party officials — encouraging them to be bold, test limits, observe and wait for opportunities.
Lu Shaye, China’s Ambassador to France, best embodied this fighting spirit in June 2021 when he claimed ‘in the eyes of the Westerners, our diplomacy is on the offensive and aggressive, but the truth is, it is them who are on the offensive and aggressive. What we are doing is merely justified defence to protect our rights and interests’.
China’s tactics appear reactionary rather than a pre-emptive tool for coercive diplomacy. Neither Xi nor the Chinese Communist Party officials completely reveal the ‘shiny side of the blade’ but successfully communicate their message that China will not back down from a fight. But while the confrontational rhetoric dominates global headlines, Beijing’s quiet and nascent charm offensive often goes unnoticed. China has sought to cultivate and deepen commercial ties with many global players, including Bangladesh.
China’s economic and defence diplomacy surrounds Bangladesh. In addition to being Dhaka’s largest investor, China also agreed to allow duty-free access to 97 per cent of Bangladeshi products in late 2020. In contrast, the United States has consistently denied duty-free access to Bangladesh’s products, despite Bangladeshi diplomats tooth-and-nail lobbying.
Free-trade access largely influences Bangladeshi diplomacy. Many experts even termed Beijing’s charm offensive in Dhaka as the first step towards its coercive diplomacy. Yet China finds itself struggling, and at times failing, to court Bangladesh.
The United States has exported US$110 million worth of arms to Bangladesh since 2010, which is meagre compared to US$2.59 billion Bangladesh spent on Chinese military equipment. Yet in the face of a heated Sino-Indian relationship in 2020, the United States decided to pursue a proactive approach to court Bangladesh by proposing a military modernisation plan, starting with Apache helicopters and missiles. Deeper security cooperation is of ‘mutual interest, with full respect for Bangladesh’s sovereignty and independence of action’, wrote Laura Stone, then deputy assistant secretary with the US Department of State.
Beijing cannot achieve its desired foreign policy goals without respecting Bangladesh’s sovereignty and conduct of its international politics. The Chinese Ambassador to Dhaka, Li Jiming, was reprimanded by Bangladesh Foreign Minister AK Abdul Momen when Li warned of ‘damaging’ bilateral relations if Bangladesh chooses to ‘join’ the Quad.
Bangladesh’s foreign policy strength lies in its deep support for neighbour India and increasing engagement with the United States and Japan. From helping Bangladesh achieve liberation to shared counterterrorism efforts — India’s sphere of influence has been longstanding and strong. Beijing understands that it can only go so far with Dhaka and has resorted to building alternative alliances — like the International Forum on COVID-19 Vaccine Cooperation — and waiting for the ‘opportune moment’.
When India halted COVID-19 vaccine exports earlier this year to meet domestic demand, China swooped in, offering 100 thousand jabs as a gift to Bangladesh. Since March 2021, Bangladesh has received 9 million Sinopharm doses from China, with an additional 1.1 million doses as a gift. On 17 August, Bangladesh signed a deal to locally produce 5 million Sinopharm jabs each month.
To counter China’s growing vaccine diplomacy, Washington decided to send both Pfizer and Moderna vaccines to Dhaka. Bangladesh has received roughly 5.5 million vaccine doses from the United States as a gift, with 6 million more promised to be delivered by December 2021 under the COVAX initiative. Japan also sent over 3 million AstraZeneca doses in phases to Bangladesh.
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs termed Bangladesh as the ‘
China
New Publication: A Guide for Foreign Investors on Navigating China’s New Company Law
The sixth revision of China’s Company Law is the most extensive amendment in history, impacting foreign invested enterprises with stricter rules on capital injection and corporate governance. Most FIEs must align with the New Company Law by July 1, 2024, with a deadline of December 31, 2024 for adjustments. Contact Dezan Shira & Associates for assistance.
The sixth revision of China’s Company Law represents the most extensive amendment in its history. From stricter capital injection rules to enhanced corporate governance, the changes introduced in the New Company Law have far-reaching implications for businesses, including foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) operating in or entering the China market.
Since January 1, 2020, the Company Law has governed both wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) and joint ventures (JVs), following the enactment of the Foreign Investment Law (FIL). Most FIEs must align with the provisions of the New Company Law from July 1, 2024, while those established before January 1, 2020 have bit more time for adjustments due to the five-year grace period provided by the FIL. The final deadline for their alignment is December 31, 2024.
In this publication, we guide foreign investors through the implications of the New Company Law for existing and new FIEs and relevant stakeholders. We begin with an overview of the revision’s background and objectives, followed by a summary of key changes. Our in-depth analysis, from a foreign stakeholder perspective, illuminates the practical implications. Lastly, we explore tax impacts alongside the revisions, demonstrating how the New Company Law may shape future business transactions and arrangements.
If you or your company require assistance with Company Law adjustments in China, please do not hesitate to contact Dezan Shira & Associates. For more information, feel free to reach us via email at china@dezshira.com.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
Lingang New Area in Shanghai Opens First Cross-Border Data Service Center to Streamline Data Export Process
The Lingang New Area in Shanghai has launched China’s first Cross-Border Data Service Center to facilitate data export for companies in Shanghai. The center will help with applications, data catalogs, and management, aiming to provide legal and safe cross-border data transfer mechanisms.
The Lingang New Area in Shanghai’s Pilot Free Trade Zone has launched a new cross-border data service center to provide administrative and consulting services to companies in Shanghai that need to export data out of China. The service center will help facilitate data export by accepting applications from companies for data export projects and is tasked with formulating and implementing data catalogs to facilitate data export in the area. The Shanghai cross-border data service center will provide services to companies across the whole city.
The Lingang New Area in the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone has launched China’s first Cross-Border Data Service Center (the “service center”). The service center, which is jointly operated by the Cybersecurity Administration of China (CAC) and the local government, aims to further facilitate legal, safe, and convenient cross-border data transfer (CBDT) mechanisms for companies.
The service center will not only serve companies in the Lingang New Area but is also open to companies across Shanghai, and will act as an administrative service center specializing in CBDT.
In January 2024, the local government showcased a set of trial measures for the “classified and hierarchical” management of CBDT in the Lingang New Area. The measures, which have not yet been released to the public, seek to facilitate CBDT from the area by dividing data for cross-border transfer into three different risk categories: core, important, and general data.
The local government also pledged to release two data catalogs: a “general data” catalog, which will include types of data that can be transferred freely out of the Lingang New Area, and an “important data” catalog, which will be subject to restrictions. According to Zong Liang, an evaluation expert at the service center, the first draft of the general data catalog has been completed and is being submitted to the relevant superior departments for review.
In March 2024, the CAC released the final version of a set of regulations significantly facilitating CBDT for companies in the country. The new regulations increase the limits on the volume of PI that a company can handle before it is required to undergo additional compliance procedures, provide exemptions from the compliance procedures, and clarify the handling of important data.
Also in March, China released a new set of technical standards stipulating the rules for classifying three different types of data – core, important, and general data. Importantly, the standards provide guidelines for regulators and companies to identify what is considered “important” data. This means they will act as a reference for companies and regulators when assessing the types of data that can be exported, including FTZs such as the Lingang New Area.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
A Concise Guide to the Verification Letter of Invitation Requirement in the China Visa Process
The application procedures for business visas to China have been simplified, with most foreigners now able to apply for an M/F visa using only an invitation letter from a Chinese company. Some countries are eligible for visa-free entry. However, a Verification Letter of Invitation may still be needed in certain cases. Consult the local Chinese embassy for confirmation.
In light of recent developments, the application procedures for business visas to China have undergone substantial simplification. Most foreigners can now apply for an M/F visa using only the invitation letter issued by a Chinese company. Additionally, citizens of certain countries are eligible to enter China without a visa and stay for up to 144 hours or even 15 days.
However, it’s important to note that some applicants may still need to apply for a “Verification Letter of Invitation (邀请核实单)” when applying for an M/F visa to China. In this article, we will introduce what a Verification Letter of Invitation is, who needs to apply for it, and the potential risks.
It’s important to note that in most cases, the invitation letter provided by the inviting unit (whether a public entity or a company) is sufficient for M/F visa applications. The Verification Letter for Invitation is only required when the Chinese embassies or consulates in certain countries specifically ask for the document.
Meanwhile, it is also essential to note that obtaining a Verification Letter for Invitation does not guarantee visa approval. The final decision on granting a visa rests with the Chinese embassy abroad, based on the specific circumstances of the applicant.
Based on current information, foreign applicants in Sri Lanka and most Middle East countries – such as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, and so on – need to submit a Verification Letter for Invitation when they apply for a visa to China.
That said, a Verification Letter for Invitation might not be required in a few Middle East countries, such as Saudi Arabia. Therefore, we suggest that foreign applicants consult with their the local Chinese embassy or consulate to confirm in advance.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
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- Lingang New Area in Shanghai Opens First Cross-Border Data Service Center to Streamline Data Export Process
- A Concise Guide to the Verification Letter of Invitation Requirement in the China Visa Process
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