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China

China’s geostrategic engagement in a new Afghanistan

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Taliban officials visit Mes Aynak copper mine with China's Jiangxi Copper and Metallurgical Corp of China (MCC) representatives, including Head of MCC Chinese Company in Afghanistan Sefatullah Rahimi, in Mes Aynak, Logar province, Afghanistan 13 September 2021 (Photo: Reuters).

Author: BM Jain, Indian Journal of Asian Affairs

China is determined to establish a geostrategic foothold in the new Taliban-led Afghanistan. A decade ago, China forayed into Afghanistan’s strategic space by inking deals with the Afghan government in the mining, power and oilfields sectors — although Afghanistan’s chaotic political environment prevented any real progress. China then played a key role in facilitating peace talks with the Taliban from 2014. With the Taliban back in power, China can once again advance its interests.

The new Taliban regime has termed China its ‘most important partner’ and a ‘dependable friend’ for aid, investments and infrastructure projects. These depictions are significant because the Taliban does not expect to receive foreign aid from other sources, such as the World Bank or the IMF, to stave off an economic catastrophe. Part of what attracts the Taliban to China is its massive financial resources, evidenced by its US$1 trillion investment in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

More importantly, the Taliban is being treated as a pariah by the international community at large. As such, it looks to China as a pillar of financial and diplomatic support at the United Nations. Notably, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s address to the 2021 G20 foreign ministers’ meeting called for the lifting of unilateral sanctions against Afghanistan.

What drives China to solidify its ties with the Taliban government? Geopolitically, China is in a much better position today to play the role of a game-changer, with the decline of US power and its chaotic exit from Afghanistan. China is now emboldened to fill the power vacuum to serve its myriad strategic interests.

Beijing’s fundamental concern is about radicalisation spilling over into China. It is seriously engaged in negotiating with the interim Taliban government for a blanket guarantee that it will not export extremist forces to support Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang. Regardless of the magnitude of the threat, Beijing’s main concern is adopting all possible preventive measures to ensure internal security and stability.

China’s eyes are also cast on Afghanistan’s rare-earth metals, which are estimated at between US$1–3 trillion in value. These metals are used in rechargeable batteries for electric cars, computers, televisions, fibre optics and lasers. China’s direct investment in Afghanistan has spiked by nearly 12 per cent in 2020, apart from its investments in Afghanistan’s Mes Aynak copper mine project in 2008 and the Amu Darya oil exploration in 2011.

China also needs the Taliban’s full support for the successful completion of its BRI — and the Taliban is rolling out the red carpet. Taliban spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid reportedly clarified that his government is willing to join the BRI’s China–Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Another Chinese objective is to scupper even the minimal strategic presence of India under the new government. To this end China is engaging Pakistan, which has no qualms about joining hands with its ‘all-weather friend’.

Overall, China seeks to play a proactive role diplomatically and politically to help bring stability and peaceful conditions to Afghanistan. This would help it advance its projects and play an influential role in articulating and contouring governance structures in Afghanistan.

The question is, how?

China will employ mixed tools of diplomacy characterised by patience, caution and long-term strategic planning to exercise its leverage. Still, no definite timeline for this can be predicted in the complex web of international politics.

So far as India’s role in a new Afghanistan is concerned, its strategic gurus appear to be clueless. There is no blueprint or integrated roadmap to deal with the China–Pakistan challenge to India’s strategic investments in Afghanistan. India is now sidelined on the emerging future of Afghanistan, affecting its free access to Central Asia through the Afghan corridor and obstructing its operations in Iran’s Chabahar port adjacent to the Afghan border. While India was not invited to the 2016 multiparty talks hosted by Moscow, China emerged as a key player to reshape Afghanistan’s future course.

Other stakeholders, including Iran and Russia, are equally interested in playing a role in determining Afghanistan’s strategic landscape. China will need to play its cards with caution and restraint to manage and sustain its friendly ties with both Moscow and Tehran without undermining its key interests.

It is in China’s…

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Trends and Future Prospects of Bilateral Direct Investment between China and Germany

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China and Germany experienced a decline in direct investment in 2023 due to global economic uncertainty and policy changes. Despite this, China remains an attractive destination for German FDI. Key industries like automotive and advanced manufacturing continue to draw investors, although FDI outflows from Germany to China decreased by 30% in the first three quarters of 2023. Despite this, the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21% in the same period according to MOFCOM. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data and MOFCOM’s actual use of foreign capital provide different perspectives on the investment trends between the two countries.


Direct investment between China and Germany declined in 2023, due to a range of factors from global economic uncertainty to policy changes. However, China remains an important destination for German foreign direct investment (FDI), and key industries in both countries continue to excite investors. We look at the latest direct investment data between Germany and China to analyze the latest trends and discuss key factors that could shape future business and commercial ties.

Direct investment between China and Germany has undergone profound changes over the past decade. An increasingly complex investment environment for companies in both countries has led to falling two-way FDI figures in the first three quarters of 2023, in stark contrast to positive trends seen in 2022.

At the same time, industries with high growth potential, such as automotive and advanced manufacturing, continue to attract German companies to China, and high levels of reinvested earnings suggest established firms are doubling down on their commitments in the Chinese market. In Germany, the potential for electric vehicle (EV) sales is buoying otherwise low investment among Chinese companies.

According to data from Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, total FDI outflows from Germany to China fell in the first three quarters of 2023, declining by 30 percent to a total of EUR 7.98 billion.

This is a marked reversal of trends from 2022, when FDI flows from Germany to China reached a record EUR 11.4 billion, up 14.7 percent year-on-year.

However, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21 percent year-on-year in the first eight months of 2023. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data, which follows standards set by the IMF, the OECD, and the European Central Bank (ECB), includes a broader scope of transactions within its direct investment data, including, broadly, direct investment positions, direct investment income flows, and direct investment financial flows.

Meanwhile, the actual use of foreign capital recorded by MOFCOM includes contracted foreign capital that has been concluded, including the registered and working capital paid by foreign investors, as well as the transaction consideration paid for the transferred equity of domestic investors.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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China’s coast guard on Saturday fired a water cannon at a Philippine supply boat in disputed waters in the South China Sea, causing “significant damages to the vessel” and injuring its crew, the Philippine coast guard said.

Manila was attempting to resupply troops stationed on a ship at the Second Thomas Shoal, known locally as Ayungin Shoal, when the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia “harassed, blocked, deployed water cannons, and executed dangerous maneuvers against the routine RoRe (rotation and resupply) mission,” said the Philippine National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea.

The West Philippine Sea is the part of the South China Sea that Manila claims as its jurisdiction.

The Chinese coast guard also set up “a floating barrier” to block access to shoal where Manila ran aground an old warship, BRP Sierra Madre, to serve as a military outpost.

The Philippine task force condemned China’s “unprovoked aggression, coercion, and dangerous maneuvers.”

Philippines’ RoRe missions have been regularly blocked by China’s coast guard, but this is the first time a barrier was set up near the shoal. 

The Philippine coast guard nevertheless claimed that the mission on Saturday was accomplished.

Potential consequences

The Second Thomas Shoal lies within the country’s exclusive economic zone where Manila holds sovereign rights. 

China, however, claims historic rights over most of the South China Sea, including the Spratly archipelago, which the shoal forms a part of.

A Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson on Saturday said the Philippine supply vessel “intruded” into the waters near the shoal, called Ren’ai Jiao in Chinese, “without permission from the Chinese government.”

“China coast guard took necessary measures at sea in accordance with law to safeguard China’s rights, firmly obstructed the Philippines’ vessels, and foiled the Philippines’ attempt,” the ministry said.

“If the Philippines insists on going its own way, China will continue to adopt resolute measures,” the spokesperson said, warning that Manila “should be prepared to bear all potential consequences.”

Chinese Maritime Militia vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, March 5, 2024. (Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson wrote on social media platform X that her country “stands with the Philippines” against China’s maneuvers.

Beijing’s “interference with the Philippines’ freedom of navigation violates international law and threatens a free and open Indo-Pacific,” she wrote.

Australian Ambassador to the Philippines Hae Kyong Yu also said that Canberra shares the Philippines’ “serious concerns about dangerous conduct by China’s vessels adjacent to Second Thomas Shoal.” 

“This is part of a pattern of deeply concerning behavior,” Yu wrote on X.

Edited by Jim Snyder.

Read the rest of this article here >>> Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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Foreigners in China: 2024 Living and Working Guidelines

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China’s Ministry of Commerce released updated guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China in 2024. The guidelines cover accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols. It also outlines responsibilities regarding social security premiums and individual income tax obligations. prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required upon arrival.


The updated 2024 guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China, released by the country’s Ministry of Commerce, outline essential procedures and considerations covering accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols.

On January 25, 2024, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) released the latest version of the Guidelines for Foreign Businessmen to Live and Work in China (hereinafter referred to as the “guidelines”).

The document is divided into four main sections, labeled as:

Furthermore, the guidelines elucidate the regulatory framework governing foreign businessperson’s responsibilities concerning social security premiums and individual income tax obligations.

This article provides a comprehensive overview of the guidelines, delving into their significance and implications for foreign businesspersons in China.

Upon arrival in China, prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required.

If staying in a hotel, registration can be facilitated by the hotel staff upon presentation of a valid passport or international travel documents.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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