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What the US ‘EAGLE Act’ means for Southeast Asia

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Liu Zhen, Vice President of Beijing Kuaishou Technology Co. speaks at the 2021 ASEAN-China Digital Economy Development and Cooperation Forum held in Wuhan city, Hubei, China, July 16 2021 (Photo: Oriental Image).

Author: Karl Chee Leong Lee, Anbound Malaysia

Two months after its introduction to the US House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee, the ‘Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement (EAGLE) Act’ has passed the mark for it to be introduced in the House for a vote at a later stage. Southeast Asia should sit up and take note.

Despite failing to secure bipartisan compromise for this bill, both Democrats and Republicans agreed that Washington has to deal with China from the position of strength. This is true whether through the Democrats’ restrained approach or the Republicans’ hard-line slant on Indo-Pacific security, human rights and global governance.

The inclusion of ASEAN within Section 205 of the proposed Act speaks to the importance of Southeast Asia to the Foreign Affairs Committee. Altogether, there are 17 provisions within the Statement of Policy on Cooperation with ASEAN, with most of them pointing to the reaffirmation of Washington’s support for ASEAN. Still, two specific provisions warrant particular attention from ASEAN in its future engagement with the United States.

The fourth provision hints at the Foreign Affairs Committee’s desire to see ASEAN foster integration with like-minded powers that are aligned with Washington, either as security allies or partners. It calls for ASEAN to unite with Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and the European Union in the three domains of cooperation — namely, political, economic and security. As China is the most important trade partner for ASEAN and the foremost rival for the United States and its allies, it is clear the provision is made with thoughts of containing Beijing in mind.

Such a provision, should it be ratified, poses an unprecedented challenge to ASEAN’s long-held centrality principle. The centrality principle is predicated upon the Southeast Asian bloc being the driver of regional architecture — the processes for economic and security cooperation within the region and beyond.

The fourth provision of Section 205 will provide Washington with the legal pretext to lobby and pressure ASEAN to support the US-led Quad’s Indo-Pacific strategy that counters China. Thus, ASEAN should pay special attention to the progress of this omnibus bill and, if possible, engage with the Congressional political establishment. This may ensure the provision will not place the Southeast Asian bloc at a disadvantage in fostering equidistant relations with great powers.

The eighteenth provision further outlines Washington’s commitment to allocate resources to ASEAN as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy that supports the bloc’s crucial role in the region. While this provision is welcome for ASEAN, it directly contradicts with the fourth provision that downplays the Southeast Asian bloc’s centrality. What is more worthwhile to note is the US pledge to continue allocating resources to the Southeast Asian bloc — an opportunity that ought to be utilised effectively to realise a powerful and functional ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific.

There are also sections within the proposed EAGLE Act that warrant special attention for individual Southeast Asian countries. Section 223, or the Statement of Policy on Maritime Freedom of Operations in International Waterways and Airspace of the Indo-Pacific and Artificial Land Features in the South China Sea, is a clear example of this. Its twelfth provision calls for the development of multilateral mechanisms to ‘prevent destabilising behaviours and deter risky and dangerous activities by certain parties’, obviously referring to China’s activities in the South China Sea.

The catch is that the House Foreign Affairs Committee is banking on these multilateral mechanisms achieving a ‘common operating picture’ with Southeast Asian countries in the long term. Should such a military establishment be formed, it is bound to test Southeast Asia’s capability in maintaining its strategic balance with Washington and Beijing.

Finally, Section 604 enables the United States to execute its strategic competition with China in the area of infrastructure development. Known as the Promoting Responsible Development Alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), this Section authorises the Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID and other agency chiefs to provide alternatives to development projects that may otherwise become part of China’s BRI.

This targeted approach will bring new development alternatives to most Southeast Asian countries, which are in need of new and sustainable infrastructure…

Read the rest of this article on East Asia Forum

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Trends and Future Prospects of Bilateral Direct Investment between China and Germany

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China and Germany experienced a decline in direct investment in 2023 due to global economic uncertainty and policy changes. Despite this, China remains an attractive destination for German FDI. Key industries like automotive and advanced manufacturing continue to draw investors, although FDI outflows from Germany to China decreased by 30% in the first three quarters of 2023. Despite this, the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21% in the same period according to MOFCOM. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data and MOFCOM’s actual use of foreign capital provide different perspectives on the investment trends between the two countries.


Direct investment between China and Germany declined in 2023, due to a range of factors from global economic uncertainty to policy changes. However, China remains an important destination for German foreign direct investment (FDI), and key industries in both countries continue to excite investors. We look at the latest direct investment data between Germany and China to analyze the latest trends and discuss key factors that could shape future business and commercial ties.

Direct investment between China and Germany has undergone profound changes over the past decade. An increasingly complex investment environment for companies in both countries has led to falling two-way FDI figures in the first three quarters of 2023, in stark contrast to positive trends seen in 2022.

At the same time, industries with high growth potential, such as automotive and advanced manufacturing, continue to attract German companies to China, and high levels of reinvested earnings suggest established firms are doubling down on their commitments in the Chinese market. In Germany, the potential for electric vehicle (EV) sales is buoying otherwise low investment among Chinese companies.

According to data from Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, total FDI outflows from Germany to China fell in the first three quarters of 2023, declining by 30 percent to a total of EUR 7.98 billion.

This is a marked reversal of trends from 2022, when FDI flows from Germany to China reached a record EUR 11.4 billion, up 14.7 percent year-on-year.

However, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21 percent year-on-year in the first eight months of 2023. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data, which follows standards set by the IMF, the OECD, and the European Central Bank (ECB), includes a broader scope of transactions within its direct investment data, including, broadly, direct investment positions, direct investment income flows, and direct investment financial flows.

Meanwhile, the actual use of foreign capital recorded by MOFCOM includes contracted foreign capital that has been concluded, including the registered and working capital paid by foreign investors, as well as the transaction consideration paid for the transferred equity of domestic investors.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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China’s coast guard on Saturday fired a water cannon at a Philippine supply boat in disputed waters in the South China Sea, causing “significant damages to the vessel” and injuring its crew, the Philippine coast guard said.

Manila was attempting to resupply troops stationed on a ship at the Second Thomas Shoal, known locally as Ayungin Shoal, when the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia “harassed, blocked, deployed water cannons, and executed dangerous maneuvers against the routine RoRe (rotation and resupply) mission,” said the Philippine National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea.

The West Philippine Sea is the part of the South China Sea that Manila claims as its jurisdiction.

The Chinese coast guard also set up “a floating barrier” to block access to shoal where Manila ran aground an old warship, BRP Sierra Madre, to serve as a military outpost.

The Philippine task force condemned China’s “unprovoked aggression, coercion, and dangerous maneuvers.”

Philippines’ RoRe missions have been regularly blocked by China’s coast guard, but this is the first time a barrier was set up near the shoal. 

The Philippine coast guard nevertheless claimed that the mission on Saturday was accomplished.

Potential consequences

The Second Thomas Shoal lies within the country’s exclusive economic zone where Manila holds sovereign rights. 

China, however, claims historic rights over most of the South China Sea, including the Spratly archipelago, which the shoal forms a part of.

A Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson on Saturday said the Philippine supply vessel “intruded” into the waters near the shoal, called Ren’ai Jiao in Chinese, “without permission from the Chinese government.”

“China coast guard took necessary measures at sea in accordance with law to safeguard China’s rights, firmly obstructed the Philippines’ vessels, and foiled the Philippines’ attempt,” the ministry said.

“If the Philippines insists on going its own way, China will continue to adopt resolute measures,” the spokesperson said, warning that Manila “should be prepared to bear all potential consequences.”

Chinese Maritime Militia vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, March 5, 2024. (Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson wrote on social media platform X that her country “stands with the Philippines” against China’s maneuvers.

Beijing’s “interference with the Philippines’ freedom of navigation violates international law and threatens a free and open Indo-Pacific,” she wrote.

Australian Ambassador to the Philippines Hae Kyong Yu also said that Canberra shares the Philippines’ “serious concerns about dangerous conduct by China’s vessels adjacent to Second Thomas Shoal.” 

“This is part of a pattern of deeply concerning behavior,” Yu wrote on X.

Edited by Jim Snyder.

Read the rest of this article here >>> Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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Foreigners in China: 2024 Living and Working Guidelines

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China’s Ministry of Commerce released updated guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China in 2024. The guidelines cover accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols. It also outlines responsibilities regarding social security premiums and individual income tax obligations. prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required upon arrival.


The updated 2024 guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China, released by the country’s Ministry of Commerce, outline essential procedures and considerations covering accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols.

On January 25, 2024, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) released the latest version of the Guidelines for Foreign Businessmen to Live and Work in China (hereinafter referred to as the “guidelines”).

The document is divided into four main sections, labeled as:

Furthermore, the guidelines elucidate the regulatory framework governing foreign businessperson’s responsibilities concerning social security premiums and individual income tax obligations.

This article provides a comprehensive overview of the guidelines, delving into their significance and implications for foreign businesspersons in China.

Upon arrival in China, prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required.

If staying in a hotel, registration can be facilitated by the hotel staff upon presentation of a valid passport or international travel documents.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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