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China

The right angle of the Quadrilateral

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Sailors aboard the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) stand by as the ship goes alongside the Indian navy fleet oiler INS Shakti (A57) during the Malabar naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, 13 April 2012 (Photo: Reuters/Abaca Press).

Author: Mason Richey, HUFS

The leaders of the United States, Japan, Australia and India met virtually on 12 March in their strategic mini-lateral grouping known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad. This was an inaugural leader-level summit for the grouping, following its upgrade to a stand-alone ministerial-level meeting in 2020.

Contrary to expectations that the Quad might continue as an Indo-Pacific ‘talk shop’, the Joint Statement after the summit envisions deliverables over the short- to medium-term. Two initiatives are notable. First, the Quad has devised a division of labour for developing, financing, manufacturing and distributing one billion COVID-19 vaccine doses for Southeast Asia. Second, the Quad is establishing resilient rare-earth metal supply chains. Less concretely, it envisions working groups on climate and emerging technology. Presumably the Quad will also continue Malabar combined naval exercises, which Australia joined in 2020 for the first time in 13 years.

Sensible though these collaborations are, the Quad is nevertheless weakened by two problems. The first is conceptual and strategic incoherence vis-a-vis China. The second is a lack of deep security cooperation among the Quad’s non-US members. Interestingly, improving the latter could help mitigate the former.

The obvious problem is that the Quad’s grand design — strengthening the ‘rules-based order’ of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) — is underdetermined with respect to matching means to ends. The crux of the difficulty is that the Quad’s nebulous, gauzy strategic mission obscures what general consensus believes is the actual objective of the grouping for the United States — countering China. Whether Japanese, Australian, and Indian leaders share that assessment is irrelevant to this perception of the role of the Quad. The perception matters and is baked into the Quad cake. The ostensible ambition to counter or contain China in the Indo-Pacific is outstripped by the Quad’s inability to do so, a state of affairs rooted in both China’s regional economic weight and its growing military capabilities. The Quad also does not acknowledge anti-China strategic objectives despite consensus belief to the contrary. More pointedly, China itself views the Quad as a direct challenge to its regional ambitions.

The Joint Statement’s headline initiatives — COVID-19 vaccine production and distribution, and rare-earth metal supply chain diversification — both signal pushback against elements of Chinese global and regional power (such as Beijing’s vaccine diplomacy and geo-economic use of raw materials). The Quad’s reference to ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ values and maritime security, with four-party Malabar naval exercises lurking in the background, confronts maritime revisionism and underlines the point that the Quad is seemingly directed toward China, despite the rhetoric of the Joint Statement and official denial.

China has never hidden distrust of the Quad. The dialogue’s first iteration sputtered out in 2007 after China pressured the four parties prior to meetings and naval exercises, convincing Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd to withdraw. Quad 2.0 was revived in 2017 under the Trump administration as a clear demarcation in a great power competition between Washington and Beijing. China views the Biden administration as continuing this Trumpian anti-China spirit.

Doubtless there is bad faith in Beijing. There is likely no reasonable step the Quad could take to allay Beijing’s professed anxiety about encirclement. But that is, nonetheless, the crux of the problem of the Quad’s incoherence. Either the Quad is directed against China but lacks the means to accomplish its objectives, or the Biden administration has convinced itself that the Quad really is not about China, yet will not get credit for it.

Beijing is convinced of the former, but the Quad’s origins were far from anti-China. It originally sprung out of the Tsunami Core Group formed by the United States, Japan, Australia and India to coordinate humanitarian assistance and disaster relief following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. This origin story leads to two observations relevant for the present.

First, the Quad is most likely to succeed as a mini-lateral group addressing functional security domains — human, cyber, environmental, counterterrorism — rather than diffuse strategic concerns, which are better served by regional alliances. The Quad’s COVID-19 vaccine initiative is a model in this regard. Focusing…

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Trends and Future Prospects of Bilateral Direct Investment between China and Germany

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China and Germany experienced a decline in direct investment in 2023 due to global economic uncertainty and policy changes. Despite this, China remains an attractive destination for German FDI. Key industries like automotive and advanced manufacturing continue to draw investors, although FDI outflows from Germany to China decreased by 30% in the first three quarters of 2023. Despite this, the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21% in the same period according to MOFCOM. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data and MOFCOM’s actual use of foreign capital provide different perspectives on the investment trends between the two countries.


Direct investment between China and Germany declined in 2023, due to a range of factors from global economic uncertainty to policy changes. However, China remains an important destination for German foreign direct investment (FDI), and key industries in both countries continue to excite investors. We look at the latest direct investment data between Germany and China to analyze the latest trends and discuss key factors that could shape future business and commercial ties.

Direct investment between China and Germany has undergone profound changes over the past decade. An increasingly complex investment environment for companies in both countries has led to falling two-way FDI figures in the first three quarters of 2023, in stark contrast to positive trends seen in 2022.

At the same time, industries with high growth potential, such as automotive and advanced manufacturing, continue to attract German companies to China, and high levels of reinvested earnings suggest established firms are doubling down on their commitments in the Chinese market. In Germany, the potential for electric vehicle (EV) sales is buoying otherwise low investment among Chinese companies.

According to data from Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, total FDI outflows from Germany to China fell in the first three quarters of 2023, declining by 30 percent to a total of EUR 7.98 billion.

This is a marked reversal of trends from 2022, when FDI flows from Germany to China reached a record EUR 11.4 billion, up 14.7 percent year-on-year.

However, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21 percent year-on-year in the first eight months of 2023. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data, which follows standards set by the IMF, the OECD, and the European Central Bank (ECB), includes a broader scope of transactions within its direct investment data, including, broadly, direct investment positions, direct investment income flows, and direct investment financial flows.

Meanwhile, the actual use of foreign capital recorded by MOFCOM includes contracted foreign capital that has been concluded, including the registered and working capital paid by foreign investors, as well as the transaction consideration paid for the transferred equity of domestic investors.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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China’s coast guard on Saturday fired a water cannon at a Philippine supply boat in disputed waters in the South China Sea, causing “significant damages to the vessel” and injuring its crew, the Philippine coast guard said.

Manila was attempting to resupply troops stationed on a ship at the Second Thomas Shoal, known locally as Ayungin Shoal, when the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia “harassed, blocked, deployed water cannons, and executed dangerous maneuvers against the routine RoRe (rotation and resupply) mission,” said the Philippine National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea.

The West Philippine Sea is the part of the South China Sea that Manila claims as its jurisdiction.

The Chinese coast guard also set up “a floating barrier” to block access to shoal where Manila ran aground an old warship, BRP Sierra Madre, to serve as a military outpost.

The Philippine task force condemned China’s “unprovoked aggression, coercion, and dangerous maneuvers.”

Philippines’ RoRe missions have been regularly blocked by China’s coast guard, but this is the first time a barrier was set up near the shoal. 

The Philippine coast guard nevertheless claimed that the mission on Saturday was accomplished.

Potential consequences

The Second Thomas Shoal lies within the country’s exclusive economic zone where Manila holds sovereign rights. 

China, however, claims historic rights over most of the South China Sea, including the Spratly archipelago, which the shoal forms a part of.

A Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson on Saturday said the Philippine supply vessel “intruded” into the waters near the shoal, called Ren’ai Jiao in Chinese, “without permission from the Chinese government.”

“China coast guard took necessary measures at sea in accordance with law to safeguard China’s rights, firmly obstructed the Philippines’ vessels, and foiled the Philippines’ attempt,” the ministry said.

“If the Philippines insists on going its own way, China will continue to adopt resolute measures,” the spokesperson said, warning that Manila “should be prepared to bear all potential consequences.”

Chinese Maritime Militia vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, March 5, 2024. (Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson wrote on social media platform X that her country “stands with the Philippines” against China’s maneuvers.

Beijing’s “interference with the Philippines’ freedom of navigation violates international law and threatens a free and open Indo-Pacific,” she wrote.

Australian Ambassador to the Philippines Hae Kyong Yu also said that Canberra shares the Philippines’ “serious concerns about dangerous conduct by China’s vessels adjacent to Second Thomas Shoal.” 

“This is part of a pattern of deeply concerning behavior,” Yu wrote on X.

Edited by Jim Snyder.

Read the rest of this article here >>> Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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Foreigners in China: 2024 Living and Working Guidelines

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China’s Ministry of Commerce released updated guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China in 2024. The guidelines cover accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols. It also outlines responsibilities regarding social security premiums and individual income tax obligations. prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required upon arrival.


The updated 2024 guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China, released by the country’s Ministry of Commerce, outline essential procedures and considerations covering accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols.

On January 25, 2024, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) released the latest version of the Guidelines for Foreign Businessmen to Live and Work in China (hereinafter referred to as the “guidelines”).

The document is divided into four main sections, labeled as:

Furthermore, the guidelines elucidate the regulatory framework governing foreign businessperson’s responsibilities concerning social security premiums and individual income tax obligations.

This article provides a comprehensive overview of the guidelines, delving into their significance and implications for foreign businesspersons in China.

Upon arrival in China, prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required.

If staying in a hotel, registration can be facilitated by the hotel staff upon presentation of a valid passport or international travel documents.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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