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China

Biden needs balance and engagement in Asia with China

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A TV screen shows news of US President Joe Biden after his inauguration, in Hong Kong, China, 21 January 2021 (Photo: Reuters/Tyrone Siu).

Author: Editorial Board, ANU

Responsible adults are back in the White House. President Joe Biden sent a clear message in his inauguration that his priority is to heal a divided United States of America. He went on to immediately sign a series of executive orders including one that has the United States rejoin the Paris climate agreement.

So begins the hard yards of repairing America’s international standing and undoing the damage from four years of Donald Trump’s America First agenda. The United States didn’t just vacate global leadership for four years but was itself a source of uncertainty and instability. The domestic sources of America First persist with inequality and division magnified by failure to manage the response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Whether Mr Biden and his administration can reclaim global leadership while attending to America’s great domestic fractures is still a question.

The biggest challenge on the international stage will be managing the China relationship. The United States has never faced a big power rival like China that already has a larger economy by some measures and is deeply integrated into the global economy.

China policy under President Trump — to be tough on China, frame it as a strategic rival and start to decouple the economies — had a large measure of bipartisan support. Secretary of State-designate Antony Blinken emphasised continuity on China policy in his senate confirmation hearings. But there will be differences. Where a Biden administration will differ most is on how it engages allies and partners in its strategy.

The Biden administration is starting to reveal its thinking on China and Asia policy. Kurt Campbell, Mr Biden’s ‘Asia tsar’ and the architect of President Obama’s Asia pivot (later rebranded the Asia rebalance), has outlined a strategy of working with allies to curb China’s assertive behaviour and restore balance and legitimacy to the Asian order. This is a welcome departure from the Trump administration that undermined alliances.

Mr Campbell’s strategy reveals two important gaps that are difficult to address yet. How will the United States engage China directly, and how will the coalition of allies and partners work with both the United States and China?

Any engagement between China and the United States involves spillovers for the rest of the world. Mr Trump’s transactional, bilateral, divide and conquer approach to foreign policy led to the phase one trade deal with China that eschewed multilateral trade rules and norms. The deal involved significant negative spillovers for the rest of the world as it diverted Chinese trade away from others like Australia towards US goods and gave special access to US companies in China that unilateral US sanctions had cut out for competitors from other countries.

The United States will need to find a way to engage China to pursue its global interests — from climate change to global economic governance — that avoids damage to the rest of the world. The global community needs to push China and the United States towards settlements in multilateral settings.

Mr Campbell suggests using an alliance of democracies or coalitions of the willing to counter Chinese assertiveness and curb Chinese behaviour. He will find many willing partners. But if those coalitions do not include engagement with China on win-win or positive sum issues like trade and investment, the willing partners will be fewer.

Few countries will have much appetite for being forced into a choice between China and the United States, a strategy that Mr Trump’s secretary of state Mike Pompeo pursued overtly. China is much too important to many countries around the world for their economic and political security. It will become more important as a source of recovery from the pandemic and to East Asia in particular after the conclusion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement.

Mr Biden’s advisors are already finding the balance a challenge, letting it be known they are unhappy with the European Union for concluding an investment deal with China before the Biden administration was in place. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan tweeted: ‘The Biden-Harris administration would welcome early consultations with our European partners on our common concerns about China’s economic practices’.

Asia tsar Campbell went further in his Foreign Affairs article suggesting that Europe is out of step with the Indo-Pacific approach because ‘distant European leaders are inevitably less concerned about China’s…

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Trends and Future Prospects of Bilateral Direct Investment between China and Germany

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China and Germany experienced a decline in direct investment in 2023 due to global economic uncertainty and policy changes. Despite this, China remains an attractive destination for German FDI. Key industries like automotive and advanced manufacturing continue to draw investors, although FDI outflows from Germany to China decreased by 30% in the first three quarters of 2023. Despite this, the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21% in the same period according to MOFCOM. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data and MOFCOM’s actual use of foreign capital provide different perspectives on the investment trends between the two countries.


Direct investment between China and Germany declined in 2023, due to a range of factors from global economic uncertainty to policy changes. However, China remains an important destination for German foreign direct investment (FDI), and key industries in both countries continue to excite investors. We look at the latest direct investment data between Germany and China to analyze the latest trends and discuss key factors that could shape future business and commercial ties.

Direct investment between China and Germany has undergone profound changes over the past decade. An increasingly complex investment environment for companies in both countries has led to falling two-way FDI figures in the first three quarters of 2023, in stark contrast to positive trends seen in 2022.

At the same time, industries with high growth potential, such as automotive and advanced manufacturing, continue to attract German companies to China, and high levels of reinvested earnings suggest established firms are doubling down on their commitments in the Chinese market. In Germany, the potential for electric vehicle (EV) sales is buoying otherwise low investment among Chinese companies.

According to data from Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, total FDI outflows from Germany to China fell in the first three quarters of 2023, declining by 30 percent to a total of EUR 7.98 billion.

This is a marked reversal of trends from 2022, when FDI flows from Germany to China reached a record EUR 11.4 billion, up 14.7 percent year-on-year.

However, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21 percent year-on-year in the first eight months of 2023. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data, which follows standards set by the IMF, the OECD, and the European Central Bank (ECB), includes a broader scope of transactions within its direct investment data, including, broadly, direct investment positions, direct investment income flows, and direct investment financial flows.

Meanwhile, the actual use of foreign capital recorded by MOFCOM includes contracted foreign capital that has been concluded, including the registered and working capital paid by foreign investors, as well as the transaction consideration paid for the transferred equity of domestic investors.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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China’s coast guard on Saturday fired a water cannon at a Philippine supply boat in disputed waters in the South China Sea, causing “significant damages to the vessel” and injuring its crew, the Philippine coast guard said.

Manila was attempting to resupply troops stationed on a ship at the Second Thomas Shoal, known locally as Ayungin Shoal, when the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia “harassed, blocked, deployed water cannons, and executed dangerous maneuvers against the routine RoRe (rotation and resupply) mission,” said the Philippine National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea.

The West Philippine Sea is the part of the South China Sea that Manila claims as its jurisdiction.

The Chinese coast guard also set up “a floating barrier” to block access to shoal where Manila ran aground an old warship, BRP Sierra Madre, to serve as a military outpost.

The Philippine task force condemned China’s “unprovoked aggression, coercion, and dangerous maneuvers.”

Philippines’ RoRe missions have been regularly blocked by China’s coast guard, but this is the first time a barrier was set up near the shoal. 

The Philippine coast guard nevertheless claimed that the mission on Saturday was accomplished.

Potential consequences

The Second Thomas Shoal lies within the country’s exclusive economic zone where Manila holds sovereign rights. 

China, however, claims historic rights over most of the South China Sea, including the Spratly archipelago, which the shoal forms a part of.

A Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson on Saturday said the Philippine supply vessel “intruded” into the waters near the shoal, called Ren’ai Jiao in Chinese, “without permission from the Chinese government.”

“China coast guard took necessary measures at sea in accordance with law to safeguard China’s rights, firmly obstructed the Philippines’ vessels, and foiled the Philippines’ attempt,” the ministry said.

“If the Philippines insists on going its own way, China will continue to adopt resolute measures,” the spokesperson said, warning that Manila “should be prepared to bear all potential consequences.”

Chinese Maritime Militia vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, March 5, 2024. (Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson wrote on social media platform X that her country “stands with the Philippines” against China’s maneuvers.

Beijing’s “interference with the Philippines’ freedom of navigation violates international law and threatens a free and open Indo-Pacific,” she wrote.

Australian Ambassador to the Philippines Hae Kyong Yu also said that Canberra shares the Philippines’ “serious concerns about dangerous conduct by China’s vessels adjacent to Second Thomas Shoal.” 

“This is part of a pattern of deeply concerning behavior,” Yu wrote on X.

Edited by Jim Snyder.

Read the rest of this article here >>> Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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Foreigners in China: 2024 Living and Working Guidelines

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China’s Ministry of Commerce released updated guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China in 2024. The guidelines cover accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols. It also outlines responsibilities regarding social security premiums and individual income tax obligations. prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required upon arrival.


The updated 2024 guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China, released by the country’s Ministry of Commerce, outline essential procedures and considerations covering accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols.

On January 25, 2024, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) released the latest version of the Guidelines for Foreign Businessmen to Live and Work in China (hereinafter referred to as the “guidelines”).

The document is divided into four main sections, labeled as:

Furthermore, the guidelines elucidate the regulatory framework governing foreign businessperson’s responsibilities concerning social security premiums and individual income tax obligations.

This article provides a comprehensive overview of the guidelines, delving into their significance and implications for foreign businesspersons in China.

Upon arrival in China, prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required.

If staying in a hotel, registration can be facilitated by the hotel staff upon presentation of a valid passport or international travel documents.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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