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China

The rise of populism in Australia’s China policy

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An Australian flag is pictured at its embassy in Beijing, China 24 January, 2019 (Photo: Reuters/Jason Lee).

Author: Greg McCarthy, UWA

The growing tensions between Australia and China are often attributed to external factors. But Australia’s policy towards China is also an expression of the Liberal–National coalition government’s domestic politics. It is the connection between domestic and foreign affairs that provides the political ballast for the government’s China policy. In both, ‘national sovereignty’ is invoked to enhance and defend the power of the government while closing off debates over liberal democratic rights.

 

A clear instance of the growing power of the state over civil society under the rubric of defending national sovereignty from Chinese interference is the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018. A section deemed the ‘China clause’ compels individuals suspected of acting on the behalf of foreign governments for political or government influence to provide information to Australian authorities.

The government expected that the legislation would require the 13 Confucius institutes in Australia to register but they all declined, arguing they did not meet the legislation’s specifications. Unexpectedly, former prime minister Tony Abbott was asked to register as an ‘agent of foreign influence’ because he was a speaker at a US-connected conservative political conference, prompting civil libertarians to argue that the legislation would be fitting for a ‘totalitarian regime’.

No such voices were raised when the homes and offices of New South Wales parliamentarian Shaoquett Moselmane of the Australian Labor Party and his part-time staffer John Zhang were raided by the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). The raids were depicted as ‘the most serious ASIO counter foreign interference operation since the Cold War’. Prime Minister Scott Morrison, in populist language, said, ‘We won’t cop anyone coming and seeking to interfere in our political system … We are a resilient people. We will stand up to it. And we will take action as what you’ve seen today demonstrates’.

Another example of the ‘China threat’ being used to enhance the federal government’s power is the stoush over the Victorian state government’s generic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) agreement with China. Federal Minister for Home Affairs Peter Dutton described the BRI as ‘a propaganda initiative from China’ that brings an ‘enormous amount of foreign interference’. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned that if the Victorian BRI agreement ever ventured into telecommunications, the United States would ‘simply disconnect’ from Australia.

To assert power over Victoria’s BRI agreement, the government presented in September the Australia’s Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Bill 2020 to the federal parliament, despite its adverse effects on civil rights, federalism and university autonomy.

The Bill was referred to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee for consultation. Following multiple submissions, the Committee held hearings on the legislation in October. Questioning in one session focused in on Beijing’s ‘predatory’ activities at both the state and local government levels and in universities. When George Williams, constitutional law expert and deputy vice-chancellor at the University of New South Wales, appeared before the Committee he argued the Bill was ‘not fit to be enacted’. Williams noted that the Bill gave extraordinary power to the minister of foreign affairs without procedural fairness.

The overreach of the Bill is exacerbated by the lack of clarity on key terms, leaving substantial discretion to the foreign minister. As Williams’ remarks, ‘foreign relations is not defined at all’ and ‘foreign policy’ is so ill-defined as to ‘include the concept “any things outside of Australia”.’ The legislation also requires Australian universities to seek government approval to cooperate with foreign universities that do not pass an ‘institutional autonomy’ test, but doesn’t specify what institutional autonomy means.

When university representatives appeared before the Committee, they also raised the issue of what institutional autonomy meant. The questioning made clear that the term is targeted at Chinese universities — the session’s chair, Senator Eric Abetz, pointedly asked the CEO of Universities Australia, Catriona Jackson, ‘If it’s so difficult, can you tell me whether the Chinese universities are institutionally autonomous from the Chinese Communist Party?’

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Trends and Future Prospects of Bilateral Direct Investment between China and Germany

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China and Germany experienced a decline in direct investment in 2023 due to global economic uncertainty and policy changes. Despite this, China remains an attractive destination for German FDI. Key industries like automotive and advanced manufacturing continue to draw investors, although FDI outflows from Germany to China decreased by 30% in the first three quarters of 2023. Despite this, the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21% in the same period according to MOFCOM. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data and MOFCOM’s actual use of foreign capital provide different perspectives on the investment trends between the two countries.


Direct investment between China and Germany declined in 2023, due to a range of factors from global economic uncertainty to policy changes. However, China remains an important destination for German foreign direct investment (FDI), and key industries in both countries continue to excite investors. We look at the latest direct investment data between Germany and China to analyze the latest trends and discuss key factors that could shape future business and commercial ties.

Direct investment between China and Germany has undergone profound changes over the past decade. An increasingly complex investment environment for companies in both countries has led to falling two-way FDI figures in the first three quarters of 2023, in stark contrast to positive trends seen in 2022.

At the same time, industries with high growth potential, such as automotive and advanced manufacturing, continue to attract German companies to China, and high levels of reinvested earnings suggest established firms are doubling down on their commitments in the Chinese market. In Germany, the potential for electric vehicle (EV) sales is buoying otherwise low investment among Chinese companies.

According to data from Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, total FDI outflows from Germany to China fell in the first three quarters of 2023, declining by 30 percent to a total of EUR 7.98 billion.

This is a marked reversal of trends from 2022, when FDI flows from Germany to China reached a record EUR 11.4 billion, up 14.7 percent year-on-year.

However, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21 percent year-on-year in the first eight months of 2023. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data, which follows standards set by the IMF, the OECD, and the European Central Bank (ECB), includes a broader scope of transactions within its direct investment data, including, broadly, direct investment positions, direct investment income flows, and direct investment financial flows.

Meanwhile, the actual use of foreign capital recorded by MOFCOM includes contracted foreign capital that has been concluded, including the registered and working capital paid by foreign investors, as well as the transaction consideration paid for the transferred equity of domestic investors.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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China’s coast guard on Saturday fired a water cannon at a Philippine supply boat in disputed waters in the South China Sea, causing “significant damages to the vessel” and injuring its crew, the Philippine coast guard said.

Manila was attempting to resupply troops stationed on a ship at the Second Thomas Shoal, known locally as Ayungin Shoal, when the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia “harassed, blocked, deployed water cannons, and executed dangerous maneuvers against the routine RoRe (rotation and resupply) mission,” said the Philippine National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea.

The West Philippine Sea is the part of the South China Sea that Manila claims as its jurisdiction.

The Chinese coast guard also set up “a floating barrier” to block access to shoal where Manila ran aground an old warship, BRP Sierra Madre, to serve as a military outpost.

The Philippine task force condemned China’s “unprovoked aggression, coercion, and dangerous maneuvers.”

Philippines’ RoRe missions have been regularly blocked by China’s coast guard, but this is the first time a barrier was set up near the shoal. 

The Philippine coast guard nevertheless claimed that the mission on Saturday was accomplished.

Potential consequences

The Second Thomas Shoal lies within the country’s exclusive economic zone where Manila holds sovereign rights. 

China, however, claims historic rights over most of the South China Sea, including the Spratly archipelago, which the shoal forms a part of.

A Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson on Saturday said the Philippine supply vessel “intruded” into the waters near the shoal, called Ren’ai Jiao in Chinese, “without permission from the Chinese government.”

“China coast guard took necessary measures at sea in accordance with law to safeguard China’s rights, firmly obstructed the Philippines’ vessels, and foiled the Philippines’ attempt,” the ministry said.

“If the Philippines insists on going its own way, China will continue to adopt resolute measures,” the spokesperson said, warning that Manila “should be prepared to bear all potential consequences.”

Chinese Maritime Militia vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, March 5, 2024. (Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson wrote on social media platform X that her country “stands with the Philippines” against China’s maneuvers.

Beijing’s “interference with the Philippines’ freedom of navigation violates international law and threatens a free and open Indo-Pacific,” she wrote.

Australian Ambassador to the Philippines Hae Kyong Yu also said that Canberra shares the Philippines’ “serious concerns about dangerous conduct by China’s vessels adjacent to Second Thomas Shoal.” 

“This is part of a pattern of deeply concerning behavior,” Yu wrote on X.

Edited by Jim Snyder.

Read the rest of this article here >>> Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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Foreigners in China: 2024 Living and Working Guidelines

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China’s Ministry of Commerce released updated guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China in 2024. The guidelines cover accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols. It also outlines responsibilities regarding social security premiums and individual income tax obligations. prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required upon arrival.


The updated 2024 guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China, released by the country’s Ministry of Commerce, outline essential procedures and considerations covering accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols.

On January 25, 2024, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) released the latest version of the Guidelines for Foreign Businessmen to Live and Work in China (hereinafter referred to as the “guidelines”).

The document is divided into four main sections, labeled as:

Furthermore, the guidelines elucidate the regulatory framework governing foreign businessperson’s responsibilities concerning social security premiums and individual income tax obligations.

This article provides a comprehensive overview of the guidelines, delving into their significance and implications for foreign businesspersons in China.

Upon arrival in China, prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required.

If staying in a hotel, registration can be facilitated by the hotel staff upon presentation of a valid passport or international travel documents.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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