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China

Xi Jinping’s pledge: Will China be carbon neutral by 2060?

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People's Republic of China President Xi Jinping speaks during the 75th annual U.N. General Assembly, which is being held mostly virtually due to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic in the Manhattan borough of New York City, New York, 22 September 2020 (Photo: United Nations/Reuters).

Author: Fergus Green, Utrecht University

In a speech to the UN General Assembly in late September 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared his country’s aim ‘to have CO2 emissions peak before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060’.

As the first time the government has adopted a domestic long-term goal for emissions, the announcement took even seasoned China-watchers by surprise.

China’s emissions comprise more than a quarter of the global total, so its plans are of unparalleled importance to global climate change mitigation efforts. According to one prominent estimate, China achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 could lower global warming projections by 0.2–0.3 degrees Celsius.

Yet, this would still not be consistent with the global trajectory needed to restrict global average temperature increases to within 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels — the more ambitious of the Paris Agreement’s numerous objectives. According to analysis by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), meeting that objective would require net zero emissions globally around 2050 and cuts of 45 per cent relative to 2010 levels by 2030. More recent scientific analysis urges an even faster timetable to reduce the risk of catastrophic outcomes. China’s 2060 carbon neutrality target would be 10 years too slow at the least.

‘Carbon neutrality’ implies net zero carbon dioxide emissions, but it is not clear what long-term trajectory China has in mind for its other greenhouse gas sources and sinks. The goal also doesn’t cover China’s financing of coal power plants and polluting infrastructure in other countries — but that’s another story.

All of this assumes China’s goal will be implemented, raising an important question of credibility. It certainly requires an enormous transformation. At a minimum, it would mean all but completely phasing out fossil fuel energy in power generation, transport, buildings and industry. Considerable changes in land use will also be needed to suck more CO2 out of the atmosphere.

According to one study, China could feasibly decarbonise its power sector by 2050 using existing non-fossil electricity generation technologies, and it could decarbonise much of transport, buildings and industry through widespread electrification and the deployment of other available technologies. Decarbonising the remaining sources of emissions would, according to the study, require technological breakthroughs, for example in hydrogen energy. This could occur if the government undertook a concerted energy innovation program over the relevant timeframe.

Achieving net-zero carbon emissions by 2060 would bring local economic and social benefits to China. According to modelling by Cambridge Econometrics, investing in clean energy and its related infrastructure would significantly increase Chinese GDP relative to a baseline scenario. It would also have numerous domestic ‘co-benefits’ such as dramatically lowering local air pollution — a scourge that causes millions of premature deaths in China every year.

Achieving this material and socio-economic transformation would require major changes in governance, planning, policy, investment and organisational practice at multiple levels. Here lies the greatest challenge, for China’s political economy is dominated by vested interests and riddled with perverse incentives for unsustainable production. State-owned enterprises in the fossil fuel and energy-intensive industries, as well as industry-focused bureaucracies and many provincial and city officials, still have a short-term interest in building fossil fuel power plants, steel mills, cement factories and other highly polluting infrastructure. Central officials often acquiesce or otherwise fail to rein them in.

There has been a dramatic increase in new coal-fired power station development in the last few years as central government planning controls have loosened. A study by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CRECA) analysed priority projects in China’s main energy-consuming and producing provinces. It showed that the equivalent of hundreds of billions of dollars in post-COVID-19 stimulus is being planned for fossil fuel and energy-intensive industrial projects, exceeding planned spending on low-carbon energy threefold.

It is trends like these that make analysts understandably cautious about the significance of the 2060 target. As CRECA’s Lauri Myllyvirta notes, 2060 is a long way away and the government’s medium-term target gives it space to increase…

Read the rest of this article on East Asia Forum

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Trends and Future Prospects of Bilateral Direct Investment between China and Germany

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China and Germany experienced a decline in direct investment in 2023 due to global economic uncertainty and policy changes. Despite this, China remains an attractive destination for German FDI. Key industries like automotive and advanced manufacturing continue to draw investors, although FDI outflows from Germany to China decreased by 30% in the first three quarters of 2023. Despite this, the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21% in the same period according to MOFCOM. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data and MOFCOM’s actual use of foreign capital provide different perspectives on the investment trends between the two countries.


Direct investment between China and Germany declined in 2023, due to a range of factors from global economic uncertainty to policy changes. However, China remains an important destination for German foreign direct investment (FDI), and key industries in both countries continue to excite investors. We look at the latest direct investment data between Germany and China to analyze the latest trends and discuss key factors that could shape future business and commercial ties.

Direct investment between China and Germany has undergone profound changes over the past decade. An increasingly complex investment environment for companies in both countries has led to falling two-way FDI figures in the first three quarters of 2023, in stark contrast to positive trends seen in 2022.

At the same time, industries with high growth potential, such as automotive and advanced manufacturing, continue to attract German companies to China, and high levels of reinvested earnings suggest established firms are doubling down on their commitments in the Chinese market. In Germany, the potential for electric vehicle (EV) sales is buoying otherwise low investment among Chinese companies.

According to data from Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, total FDI outflows from Germany to China fell in the first three quarters of 2023, declining by 30 percent to a total of EUR 7.98 billion.

This is a marked reversal of trends from 2022, when FDI flows from Germany to China reached a record EUR 11.4 billion, up 14.7 percent year-on-year.

However, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21 percent year-on-year in the first eight months of 2023. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data, which follows standards set by the IMF, the OECD, and the European Central Bank (ECB), includes a broader scope of transactions within its direct investment data, including, broadly, direct investment positions, direct investment income flows, and direct investment financial flows.

Meanwhile, the actual use of foreign capital recorded by MOFCOM includes contracted foreign capital that has been concluded, including the registered and working capital paid by foreign investors, as well as the transaction consideration paid for the transferred equity of domestic investors.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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China’s coast guard on Saturday fired a water cannon at a Philippine supply boat in disputed waters in the South China Sea, causing “significant damages to the vessel” and injuring its crew, the Philippine coast guard said.

Manila was attempting to resupply troops stationed on a ship at the Second Thomas Shoal, known locally as Ayungin Shoal, when the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia “harassed, blocked, deployed water cannons, and executed dangerous maneuvers against the routine RoRe (rotation and resupply) mission,” said the Philippine National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea.

The West Philippine Sea is the part of the South China Sea that Manila claims as its jurisdiction.

The Chinese coast guard also set up “a floating barrier” to block access to shoal where Manila ran aground an old warship, BRP Sierra Madre, to serve as a military outpost.

The Philippine task force condemned China’s “unprovoked aggression, coercion, and dangerous maneuvers.”

Philippines’ RoRe missions have been regularly blocked by China’s coast guard, but this is the first time a barrier was set up near the shoal. 

The Philippine coast guard nevertheless claimed that the mission on Saturday was accomplished.

Potential consequences

The Second Thomas Shoal lies within the country’s exclusive economic zone where Manila holds sovereign rights. 

China, however, claims historic rights over most of the South China Sea, including the Spratly archipelago, which the shoal forms a part of.

A Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson on Saturday said the Philippine supply vessel “intruded” into the waters near the shoal, called Ren’ai Jiao in Chinese, “without permission from the Chinese government.”

“China coast guard took necessary measures at sea in accordance with law to safeguard China’s rights, firmly obstructed the Philippines’ vessels, and foiled the Philippines’ attempt,” the ministry said.

“If the Philippines insists on going its own way, China will continue to adopt resolute measures,” the spokesperson said, warning that Manila “should be prepared to bear all potential consequences.”

Chinese Maritime Militia vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, March 5, 2024. (Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson wrote on social media platform X that her country “stands with the Philippines” against China’s maneuvers.

Beijing’s “interference with the Philippines’ freedom of navigation violates international law and threatens a free and open Indo-Pacific,” she wrote.

Australian Ambassador to the Philippines Hae Kyong Yu also said that Canberra shares the Philippines’ “serious concerns about dangerous conduct by China’s vessels adjacent to Second Thomas Shoal.” 

“This is part of a pattern of deeply concerning behavior,” Yu wrote on X.

Edited by Jim Snyder.

Read the rest of this article here >>> Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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Foreigners in China: 2024 Living and Working Guidelines

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China’s Ministry of Commerce released updated guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China in 2024. The guidelines cover accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols. It also outlines responsibilities regarding social security premiums and individual income tax obligations. prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required upon arrival.


The updated 2024 guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China, released by the country’s Ministry of Commerce, outline essential procedures and considerations covering accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols.

On January 25, 2024, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) released the latest version of the Guidelines for Foreign Businessmen to Live and Work in China (hereinafter referred to as the “guidelines”).

The document is divided into four main sections, labeled as:

Furthermore, the guidelines elucidate the regulatory framework governing foreign businessperson’s responsibilities concerning social security premiums and individual income tax obligations.

This article provides a comprehensive overview of the guidelines, delving into their significance and implications for foreign businesspersons in China.

Upon arrival in China, prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required.

If staying in a hotel, registration can be facilitated by the hotel staff upon presentation of a valid passport or international travel documents.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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