China
WeChat ban a catch-22 for Chinese Australians
Author: Haiqing Yu, RMIT University
Chinese social media network WeChat is facing global scrutiny and possible bans due to its handling of user data privacy, its censorship and surveillance practices and the widespread misinformation and propaganda campaigns it hosts supposedly on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party. Yet members of the Chinese diaspora in Australia continue to use WeChat as their main social media platform, despite the availability of alternative social media networks that claim to protect privacy and freedom of expression.
Global scrutiny of Chinese digital platforms such as TikTok and WeChat has been front-page news since July 2020. These globally successful Chinese platforms are caught in the crossfire of geopolitical tensions between China and India, and China and the United States. They have been subjected to scrutiny over ‘security’, ‘surveillance’ and ‘influence’.
In July, India banned TikTok and WeChat along with 57 other Chinese apps amid military tensions along the India–China border, citing a threat to ‘sovereignty and integrity’. In August, US President Donald Trump weighed in on the debate by signing two executive orders banning any US transactions with WeChat operator Tencent and TikTok operator ByteDance citing ‘security concerns’. This came as ByteDance was pressured to ‘sell’ its US TikTok operations to a US company. Microsoft, followed by Oracle, entered into discussions about taking over the popular app.
In Australia, the same apps are also under increasing scrutiny from the Australian government and face the threat of being banned. At the end of July 2020, TikTok and other global social media companies fronted a Senate inquiry into foreign interference conducted on social media misinformation.
WeChat has been at the centre of controversy over surveillance and censorship on Chinese digital platforms for a long time. Public scrutiny intensified in Australia in the context of the potential WeChat ban in the United States. The Australian media has given extensive coverage to claims that a private WeChat group was inappropriately engaged by a staffer of New South Wales Legislative Council parliamentarian Shaoquett Moselmane. Two Chinese scholars in the same chat group had their Australian visas cancelled.
The potential ban in the United States has divided opinions into three camps. Those opposing the ban say they rely on WeChat to communicate with family and friends. The more neutral position supports the right of users to choose their own platform but dislikes WeChat’s censorship practices. Supporters of the ban believe WeChat infringes on freedom of expression.
Some members of the Chinese Australian community have created parallel chat groups on WhatsApp, Letstalk, Line or Telegram in case of a local WeChat ban. But they continue to be drawn back to WeChat as their main social media platform. Why do members of the Chinese diaspora choose to self-censor when they have many other options available? The answer may lie in platform affordances available in WeChat as well as techno-material features of the app that produce ‘habits’, engender ‘necessity’ and provide users with a sense of ‘vitality’.
People are attracted to the platform for its design. WeChat is the international version of Weixin, which has targeted the Chinese market since 2011. It has been continuously optimising, improving and adding features as its global market expands. It is now an influential platform, open to third-party developers and content creators for free. This openness in platform design has ensured its agility as an innovative super-platform. People are attracted to the platform for its all-in-one functionality. The super-app concept is now an industry standard and copied among digital start-ups elsewhere.
New Chinese migrants take their social media habits to their host countries, even when they use ‘Western’ or non-Chinese social media platforms alongside Chinese ones. Research has shown that the formation of a social media habit is an intentional and emotional process driven by conscious decision making as well as unconscious affective attachment.
WeChat is the only platform that allows members of the Chinese diaspora to connect with family and friends in China, where familiar ‘Western’ platforms are banned. Chinese Australians are caught in a catch-22. They feel it necessary to continue using WeChat even if they sympathise with accusations of the platform’s monopolistic practices and unfair competition in the global market.
While it is…
China
Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister, will visit Australia to discuss trade and technology.
China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, will visit New Zealand and Australia from March 17 to March 21, 2024, following invitations from both countries. The visit will include discussions on various bilateral and regional issues, including trade relations and scientific cooperation.
UPDATE (March 15, 2024): China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, is set to embark on a key diplomatic mission to New Zealand and Australia from March 17 to March 21, 2024. This visit comes following invitations from New Zealand’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Peters, and Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne. A pivotal aspect of Wang Yi’s agenda will be his attendance at the seventh round of China-Australia Diplomatic and Strategic Dialogue (hereinafter, “the Dialogue”), scheduled during his stay in Australia. The Dialogue is anticipated to tackle various bilateral and regional issues.
As reported by SCMP on February 29, 2024, Australia has extended an official invitation to China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, marking a significant development in the ongoing dialogue between the two nations.
Against this backdrop, the invitation reflects a concerted effort to address a range of contentious issues that have strained diplomatic ties in recent years.
The upcoming discussions between China and Australia will center around critical issues that have the potential to shape the trajectory of their bilateral relations. The negotiation dynamics between these two countries are marked by a nuanced interplay of interests, priorities, and strategic imperatives.
Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is actively advocating for the lifting of sanctions on Australian wine and lobsters, which have strained trade relations between the two countries. Seeking sanctions relief underscores Australia’s efforts to alleviate economic pressures and facilitate bilateral trade and investment.
Concurrently, China is pressing Australia to commit to a new Science and Technology Agreement, aiming to foster collaborative efforts in areas of mutual interest. Despite challenges posed by the broader geopolitical context, China’s emphasis on scientific and technological cooperation reflects its acknowledgment of the benefits of engagement and partnership in addressing global challenges and promoting sustainable development.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
China props up state-owned developer Vanke as property crisis deepens
China has asked 12 banks to provide financing to the beleaguered state-owned real estate firm, Vanke Group, just days after the housing and urban-rural development ministry vowed to let insolvent property developers go bankrupt.
The Chinese government’s support bucks its recent trend of letting indebted developers take their own downward course, which has compounded a spiraling crisis in the sector, once a major economic growth driver.
Privately-held Evergrande Group and Country Garden Holdings were left to their own devices as their debts soared, leaving their creditors and homebuyers high and dry in trying to recover investments. The Hong Kong High Court issued a liquidation order for Evergrande in January. A similar fate looms for Country Garden which received a liquidation petition from one of its creditors in Hong Kong. Both companies are listed in Hong Kong.
In contrast, rescue efforts for Vanke, part-owned by the Shenzhen government, are being coordinated by the State Council, China’s cabinet amid Chinese President Xi Jinping’s policy of advancing state enterprises and a retreat of the private sector.
The State Council has requested financial institutions to make swift progress and called on creditors to consider private debt maturity extension, according to a Reuters report on Monday, citing unnamed sources.
Separately, the state-owned Cailian Press reported that the 12 institutions are expected to raise as much as 80 billion yuan (US$11.1 billion) for Vanke. But the report cited sources saying that the attitude maintained by each bank was conservative.
Shaky ground
Nonetheless, Vanke is likely to stay on shaky ground among investors after rating agency Moody’s lowered its credit rating to “junk.”
“The rating actions reflect Moody’s expectation that China Vanke’s credit metrics, financial flexibility and liquidity buffer will weaken over the next 12-18 months because of its declining contracted sales and the rising uncertainties over its access to funding amid the prolonged property market downturn in China,” said Kaven Tsang, a Moody’s senior vice president in a statement this week.
The rating agency said it has placed all the ratings on review for downgrade, as it saw the company’s ability to recover sales, improve funding access, and maintain an adequate liquidity buffer to be worrying.
The government’s bid to save Vanke has aroused discussion online. Some netizens questioned the discrepancy between saving Vanke and abandoning Evergrande, while others worried that saving Vanke would reduce national resources at a time when the economy is growing at its slowest pace since 1990. There are also many posts rationalizing the government’s efforts to support Vanke.
The blogger “Wuxinxinshuofang” believes that propping up Vanke is to ensure that the “hunt” for foreign capital won’t be disrupted by a Vanke-triggered real estate crisis.
“The collapse of Vanke will bring about the debt crisis and liquidity crisis of all real estate companies. Efforts so far to prop up the market have only begun to show effects. Vanke can fail next year, but not this,” the blogger wrote.
Zombie developers to zombie banks?
Frank Xie, a professor at the University of South Carolina Aiken Business School, attributed Beijing’s support to Vanke’s state-owned background.
“The Chinese Communist Party cannot let Vanke fail, because the CCP [Communist Party of China] treats its own people and outsiders differently,” Xie pointed out.
The failure of any state-owned assets would be “tantamount to the bankruptcy of national capital, questioning the Communist Party’s ability to run enterprises.”
Xie said that Chinese banks have accumulated a large backlog of mortgage loans involving real estate, and even assisting Vanke will only delay the explosion.
“As for other private companies facing the same problems as Evergrande, the CCP cannot save them, nor does it want to save them,” he added.
Beijing has also established a “white list” of approved property projects by distressed developers that banks and financial institutions should support in a stop-gap measure. Those deemed beyond rescue should go bankrupt.
Chen Songxing, director of the New Economic Policy Research Center at National Donghua University in Taiwan, said that the Chinese official statement of “bankruptcy should be bankrupt” is merely to show the outside world Beijing is unable to save real estate developers.
Chen said the amount of rescue for Vanke this time was insufficient to solve the problem, given how intertwined the real estate and banking industries are. He warned this was only a delay tactic which could lead to a bigger crisis.
“China’s current financial situation actually does not have the ability to save the real estate industry, as this is just transferring the debts of real estate developers and local governments to banks.
“If you continue to save these zombie real estate developers this year, it is very likely that banks will also become zombies in the future. It is very detrimental to China’s economic development,” Chen said.
Edited by Taejun Kang and Mike Firn.
Read the rest of this article here >>> China props up state-owned developer Vanke as property crisis deepens
China
China to update M&A Regulations in 2024: Changes to Filing Thresholds
China’s State Council has implemented revised Provisions on Declaration Standards for Business Operator Concentration, effective from January 22, 2024. Originally proposed by SAMR in June 2022, the 2024 Provisions have raised turnover criteria, benefiting big tech firms and multinational companies involved in M&A activities.
China’s State Council has released the revised Provisions of the State Council on Declaration Standards Regarding the Concentration of Business Operators, which took effect from January 22, 2024.
The 2024 Provisions were initially proposed by the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) in June 2022. The comparatively slow legislation process indicates the Provisions had been subjected to heated discussion within the government organs.
Notably, the 2024 Provisions dropped some specific standards proposed in the 2022 draft that required any deal involving a company with annual China revenues over RMB 100 billion to be subject to review by the authorities. According to analysts, this roll-back was designed to favor the big tech firms originally, but will concurrently benefit all multinational companies (MNCs).
This article delves into the significant revisions to China’s M&A declaration thresholds and their implications, providing crucial insights for businesses and stakeholders involved in merger activities.
The 2024 Provisions have significantly raised the turnover criteria for the declaration threshold for concentration of undertakings.
The term “concentration of undertakings” refers to any of the following circumstances:
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.