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China

How does the public perceive the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan?

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People walk past a Taiwanese flag amid COVID-19 in Taipei, Taiwan, 10 August 2020 (Photo: Reuters/Ann Wang).

Authors: Yao-Yuan Yeh, University of St Thomas, Charles KS Wu, Purdue University, Austin Wang, UNLV, and Fang-Yu Chen, Michigan State University

Observers of Taiwan’s foreign relations are well aware of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) perennial efforts to isolate Taiwan from the international community. Under the ‘One China’ policy, establishing diplomatic ties with Taiwan is tantamount to breaking up with the PRC.

 

 

Since President Tsai Ing-wen came into office, China has poached a number of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners. Taiwan is now left with just 15 national partners, including the Holy See, after seven states switched recognition to the PRC since 2016. Erosion of international recognition, while underway for a long time, still gradually weakens Taiwan’s assertions to sovereignty.

Despite the constant effort exerted by the Taiwanese government to voice concern and challenge the trend, how Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation is perceived by its own public is rarely brought up. Studying this offers insights for policy observers and policymakers on the future of cross-Strait relations. How citizens in Taiwan respond to China’s use of international pressure may also be of interest to citizens elsewhere, especially in Hong Kong, dealing with similar issues.

Ethnic identity in Taiwan is complicated due to the island’s unique history. After losing the civil war in 1949, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) retreated from mainland China to Taiwan, along with two million mainlanders under the banner of the Republic of China. During its rule, the Kuomintang suppressed indigenous Taiwanese identity in order to cultivate a Chinese one. This was to support its aim of eventually unifying with mainland China.

According to surveys conducted by the Election Study Center at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University, in 1992, at the beginning of democratisation, 46.4 per cent of respondents considered themselves ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese’. 25.5 per cent considered themselves soley ‘Chinese’ and 17.6 per cent thought of themselves as only ‘Taiwanese’.

A poll by the same institute in 2020 reflects a sharp change in identification in Taiwan. Over 67 per cent of respondents considered themselves only ‘Taiwanese’. Only 27.5 per cent and 2.4 per cent of the respondents regarded themselves as ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese’ and only ‘Chinese’, respectively.

Identity appears to have a strong relationship with how Taiwanese people perceive and evaluate Taiwan’s diplomatic challenges.

Those who consider themselves to be ‘both Chinese and Taiwanese’ or only ‘Chinese’ see the ‘Republic of China’ as crucial to their ethnic identity — the name reinforces and legitimates the existence of a Chinese identity in Taiwan. But those who consider themselves to be only ‘Taiwanese’ appear less likely to care as much about the Republic of China losing diplomatic partners, as they tend to consider ‘Republic of China’ to be out of touch with their identity.

To study the link between identity and public attitudes toward diplomatic relations, the authors designed a survey with the Pollcracy Lab at National Chengchi University. Between 6 and 8 January 2020, 1060 respondents answered the following two questions on Taiwan’s international isolation: ‘If our diplomatic partners kept declining, would it cause negative impacts on Taiwan?’ After reading recent news on other nations severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan, are you still confident with Taiwan’s diplomacy?’

32 per cent responded that losing partners represents a ‘serious negative impact’ for Taiwan, while 41 per cent and 27 per cent chose ‘somewhat negative’ and ‘no impact’, respectively. For the second question, 4.8 per cent of respondents felt more confident about Taiwan’s diplomacy, while 50 per cent and 45 per cent of the subjects expressed the same and less confidence on the matter, respectively. Overall most citizens considered losing diplomatic partners to be problematic.

The survey also asked citizens about their identity. 57 per cent of the respondents identified as solely ‘Taiwanese’, and 41 per cent considered themselves ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese’. 1.2 per cent of subjects thought of themselves as ‘Chinese’ only.

Among those identifying as only ‘Taiwanese’, 17 per cent worried that losing partners would carry a serious negative impact for Taiwan. The level of concern among those with dual identity and a ‘Chinese’-only identity was much higher, at 51 per cent and…

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Trends and Future Prospects of Bilateral Direct Investment between China and Germany

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China and Germany experienced a decline in direct investment in 2023 due to global economic uncertainty and policy changes. Despite this, China remains an attractive destination for German FDI. Key industries like automotive and advanced manufacturing continue to draw investors, although FDI outflows from Germany to China decreased by 30% in the first three quarters of 2023. Despite this, the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21% in the same period according to MOFCOM. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data and MOFCOM’s actual use of foreign capital provide different perspectives on the investment trends between the two countries.


Direct investment between China and Germany declined in 2023, due to a range of factors from global economic uncertainty to policy changes. However, China remains an important destination for German foreign direct investment (FDI), and key industries in both countries continue to excite investors. We look at the latest direct investment data between Germany and China to analyze the latest trends and discuss key factors that could shape future business and commercial ties.

Direct investment between China and Germany has undergone profound changes over the past decade. An increasingly complex investment environment for companies in both countries has led to falling two-way FDI figures in the first three quarters of 2023, in stark contrast to positive trends seen in 2022.

At the same time, industries with high growth potential, such as automotive and advanced manufacturing, continue to attract German companies to China, and high levels of reinvested earnings suggest established firms are doubling down on their commitments in the Chinese market. In Germany, the potential for electric vehicle (EV) sales is buoying otherwise low investment among Chinese companies.

According to data from Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, total FDI outflows from Germany to China fell in the first three quarters of 2023, declining by 30 percent to a total of EUR 7.98 billion.

This is a marked reversal of trends from 2022, when FDI flows from Germany to China reached a record EUR 11.4 billion, up 14.7 percent year-on-year.

However, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21 percent year-on-year in the first eight months of 2023. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data, which follows standards set by the IMF, the OECD, and the European Central Bank (ECB), includes a broader scope of transactions within its direct investment data, including, broadly, direct investment positions, direct investment income flows, and direct investment financial flows.

Meanwhile, the actual use of foreign capital recorded by MOFCOM includes contracted foreign capital that has been concluded, including the registered and working capital paid by foreign investors, as well as the transaction consideration paid for the transferred equity of domestic investors.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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China’s coast guard on Saturday fired a water cannon at a Philippine supply boat in disputed waters in the South China Sea, causing “significant damages to the vessel” and injuring its crew, the Philippine coast guard said.

Manila was attempting to resupply troops stationed on a ship at the Second Thomas Shoal, known locally as Ayungin Shoal, when the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia “harassed, blocked, deployed water cannons, and executed dangerous maneuvers against the routine RoRe (rotation and resupply) mission,” said the Philippine National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea.

The West Philippine Sea is the part of the South China Sea that Manila claims as its jurisdiction.

The Chinese coast guard also set up “a floating barrier” to block access to shoal where Manila ran aground an old warship, BRP Sierra Madre, to serve as a military outpost.

The Philippine task force condemned China’s “unprovoked aggression, coercion, and dangerous maneuvers.”

Philippines’ RoRe missions have been regularly blocked by China’s coast guard, but this is the first time a barrier was set up near the shoal. 

The Philippine coast guard nevertheless claimed that the mission on Saturday was accomplished.

Potential consequences

The Second Thomas Shoal lies within the country’s exclusive economic zone where Manila holds sovereign rights. 

China, however, claims historic rights over most of the South China Sea, including the Spratly archipelago, which the shoal forms a part of.

A Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson on Saturday said the Philippine supply vessel “intruded” into the waters near the shoal, called Ren’ai Jiao in Chinese, “without permission from the Chinese government.”

“China coast guard took necessary measures at sea in accordance with law to safeguard China’s rights, firmly obstructed the Philippines’ vessels, and foiled the Philippines’ attempt,” the ministry said.

“If the Philippines insists on going its own way, China will continue to adopt resolute measures,” the spokesperson said, warning that Manila “should be prepared to bear all potential consequences.”

Chinese Maritime Militia vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, March 5, 2024. (Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson wrote on social media platform X that her country “stands with the Philippines” against China’s maneuvers.

Beijing’s “interference with the Philippines’ freedom of navigation violates international law and threatens a free and open Indo-Pacific,” she wrote.

Australian Ambassador to the Philippines Hae Kyong Yu also said that Canberra shares the Philippines’ “serious concerns about dangerous conduct by China’s vessels adjacent to Second Thomas Shoal.” 

“This is part of a pattern of deeply concerning behavior,” Yu wrote on X.

Edited by Jim Snyder.

Read the rest of this article here >>> Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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Foreigners in China: 2024 Living and Working Guidelines

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China’s Ministry of Commerce released updated guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China in 2024. The guidelines cover accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols. It also outlines responsibilities regarding social security premiums and individual income tax obligations. prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required upon arrival.


The updated 2024 guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China, released by the country’s Ministry of Commerce, outline essential procedures and considerations covering accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols.

On January 25, 2024, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) released the latest version of the Guidelines for Foreign Businessmen to Live and Work in China (hereinafter referred to as the “guidelines”).

The document is divided into four main sections, labeled as:

Furthermore, the guidelines elucidate the regulatory framework governing foreign businessperson’s responsibilities concerning social security premiums and individual income tax obligations.

This article provides a comprehensive overview of the guidelines, delving into their significance and implications for foreign businesspersons in China.

Upon arrival in China, prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required.

If staying in a hotel, registration can be facilitated by the hotel staff upon presentation of a valid passport or international travel documents.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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