China
COVID-19 is a human security crisis
Author: Akiko Fukushima, Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research
COVID-19 cases are growing at an accelerated pace, infecting 2 million people around the world. With this staggering number of victims, the pandemic is now being compared to a war. We do not yet have an effective vaccine or proven treatment, and the development of a vaccine may take a year or longer. The world is currently left with non-pharmaceutical interventions to slow and mitigate the transmission of the virus, including bans on public events, school and university closures, and even local and national lockdowns.
The COVID-19 pandemic is not only a health crisis, it is a human security crisis — depriving our freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live with dignity. The pandemic demands a human security approach of comprehensive, across-the-board human protection and empowerment.
When the concept of human security was introduced in policy discussions in the 1990s, the approach was criticised for broadening security threats beyond war. In 2020, we are learning that an epidemic, which has killed close to 120,000 around the world as of 14 April, undermines our security and safety.
In responding, a medical solution alone is not enough. Measures should also address knock-on effects in health, economics, politics, society and culture.
On the economic front, stock markets have plummeted as the global outbreak intensifies. The pandemic has caused an economic contraction more serious than the global financial crisis in 2008. The global value chain has been hard hit. The economic effect is not elsewhere but everywhere. The closures and lockdowns have affected both goods and services industries. The entire world population is suffering from fear and want.
The pandemic also impacts politics, both domestic and international. Some seek to gain from the pandemic, leading to further competition and confrontation among nation states. For example, former US diplomat Kurt M Campbell and Brookings program lead Rush Doshi have remarked that China — after failing to take immediate steps during the initial outbreak — is now claiming success in battling the virus and is spearheading the provision of medical assistance to other nations, including Italy, Serbia and Iran. The COVID-19 pandemic also risks affecting traditional security by sending the wrong signal to those keen to develop biological weapons.
The virus does not respect national borders in its transmission. No nation can get out of the pandemic alone. If nation states tilt for competition and confrontation, we will certainly lose this war. The only option is to cooperate to shape a globally and regionally coordinated response.
Although COVID-19 initially hit China hard, its neighbours in the Asia Pacific have so far suppressed its transmission relative to Europe and the United States where cases are surging.
One reason behind this is that the Asia Pacific region has learned lessons from the 2002–2004 SARS outbreak. As a result, countries in the Asia Pacific introduced travel controls, border closures and lockdowns sooner, although some have done better than others. This was backed by enhanced health and medical coverage in the region. ASEAN included infectious diseases as a shared security challenge in creating its ASEAN Community and has swiftly mobilised the ASEAN Health Sector.
Accurate information sharing is key to successful containment and to prevent misinformation. In the immediate future, the Asia Pacific region needs to mobilise medical professionals to assist countries in need. If so required, the military should be mobilised to build emergency hospitals and to utilise military medical teams trained in handling emergencies. Military ships could also be converted into hospitals.
The most important immediate priority is to develop a vaccine, diagnostic tools and treatments for COVID-19. In order to avoid duplicated efforts, we will need to share best practices and clinical test results to develop an effective medical intervention to halt the pandemic.
In shaping a regional response, the Asia Pacific should utilise its existing regional architecture, including the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus. Regular teleconferencing by leaders can help enable the identification of challenges, the sharing of best practices and the creation of new approaches to address the pandemic and its knock-on effects. Regional cooperation will ease the fear and want of the entire regional population and allow us to live with more dignity.
Akiko Fukushima is a Senior Fellow…
China
New Publication: A Guide for Foreign Investors on Navigating China’s New Company Law
The sixth revision of China’s Company Law is the most extensive amendment in history, impacting foreign invested enterprises with stricter rules on capital injection and corporate governance. Most FIEs must align with the New Company Law by July 1, 2024, with a deadline of December 31, 2024 for adjustments. Contact Dezan Shira & Associates for assistance.
The sixth revision of China’s Company Law represents the most extensive amendment in its history. From stricter capital injection rules to enhanced corporate governance, the changes introduced in the New Company Law have far-reaching implications for businesses, including foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) operating in or entering the China market.
Since January 1, 2020, the Company Law has governed both wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) and joint ventures (JVs), following the enactment of the Foreign Investment Law (FIL). Most FIEs must align with the provisions of the New Company Law from July 1, 2024, while those established before January 1, 2020 have bit more time for adjustments due to the five-year grace period provided by the FIL. The final deadline for their alignment is December 31, 2024.
In this publication, we guide foreign investors through the implications of the New Company Law for existing and new FIEs and relevant stakeholders. We begin with an overview of the revision’s background and objectives, followed by a summary of key changes. Our in-depth analysis, from a foreign stakeholder perspective, illuminates the practical implications. Lastly, we explore tax impacts alongside the revisions, demonstrating how the New Company Law may shape future business transactions and arrangements.
If you or your company require assistance with Company Law adjustments in China, please do not hesitate to contact Dezan Shira & Associates. For more information, feel free to reach us via email at china@dezshira.com.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
Lingang New Area in Shanghai Opens First Cross-Border Data Service Center to Streamline Data Export Process
The Lingang New Area in Shanghai has launched China’s first Cross-Border Data Service Center to facilitate data export for companies in Shanghai. The center will help with applications, data catalogs, and management, aiming to provide legal and safe cross-border data transfer mechanisms.
The Lingang New Area in Shanghai’s Pilot Free Trade Zone has launched a new cross-border data service center to provide administrative and consulting services to companies in Shanghai that need to export data out of China. The service center will help facilitate data export by accepting applications from companies for data export projects and is tasked with formulating and implementing data catalogs to facilitate data export in the area. The Shanghai cross-border data service center will provide services to companies across the whole city.
The Lingang New Area in the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone has launched China’s first Cross-Border Data Service Center (the “service center”). The service center, which is jointly operated by the Cybersecurity Administration of China (CAC) and the local government, aims to further facilitate legal, safe, and convenient cross-border data transfer (CBDT) mechanisms for companies.
The service center will not only serve companies in the Lingang New Area but is also open to companies across Shanghai, and will act as an administrative service center specializing in CBDT.
In January 2024, the local government showcased a set of trial measures for the “classified and hierarchical” management of CBDT in the Lingang New Area. The measures, which have not yet been released to the public, seek to facilitate CBDT from the area by dividing data for cross-border transfer into three different risk categories: core, important, and general data.
The local government also pledged to release two data catalogs: a “general data” catalog, which will include types of data that can be transferred freely out of the Lingang New Area, and an “important data” catalog, which will be subject to restrictions. According to Zong Liang, an evaluation expert at the service center, the first draft of the general data catalog has been completed and is being submitted to the relevant superior departments for review.
In March 2024, the CAC released the final version of a set of regulations significantly facilitating CBDT for companies in the country. The new regulations increase the limits on the volume of PI that a company can handle before it is required to undergo additional compliance procedures, provide exemptions from the compliance procedures, and clarify the handling of important data.
Also in March, China released a new set of technical standards stipulating the rules for classifying three different types of data – core, important, and general data. Importantly, the standards provide guidelines for regulators and companies to identify what is considered “important” data. This means they will act as a reference for companies and regulators when assessing the types of data that can be exported, including FTZs such as the Lingang New Area.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
A Concise Guide to the Verification Letter of Invitation Requirement in the China Visa Process
The application procedures for business visas to China have been simplified, with most foreigners now able to apply for an M/F visa using only an invitation letter from a Chinese company. Some countries are eligible for visa-free entry. However, a Verification Letter of Invitation may still be needed in certain cases. Consult the local Chinese embassy for confirmation.
In light of recent developments, the application procedures for business visas to China have undergone substantial simplification. Most foreigners can now apply for an M/F visa using only the invitation letter issued by a Chinese company. Additionally, citizens of certain countries are eligible to enter China without a visa and stay for up to 144 hours or even 15 days.
However, it’s important to note that some applicants may still need to apply for a “Verification Letter of Invitation (邀请核实单)” when applying for an M/F visa to China. In this article, we will introduce what a Verification Letter of Invitation is, who needs to apply for it, and the potential risks.
It’s important to note that in most cases, the invitation letter provided by the inviting unit (whether a public entity or a company) is sufficient for M/F visa applications. The Verification Letter for Invitation is only required when the Chinese embassies or consulates in certain countries specifically ask for the document.
Meanwhile, it is also essential to note that obtaining a Verification Letter for Invitation does not guarantee visa approval. The final decision on granting a visa rests with the Chinese embassy abroad, based on the specific circumstances of the applicant.
Based on current information, foreign applicants in Sri Lanka and most Middle East countries – such as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, and so on – need to submit a Verification Letter for Invitation when they apply for a visa to China.
That said, a Verification Letter for Invitation might not be required in a few Middle East countries, such as Saudi Arabia. Therefore, we suggest that foreign applicants consult with their the local Chinese embassy or consulate to confirm in advance.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
- New Publication: A Guide for Foreign Investors on Navigating China’s New Company Law
- Lingang New Area in Shanghai Opens First Cross-Border Data Service Center to Streamline Data Export Process
- A Concise Guide to the Verification Letter of Invitation Requirement in the China Visa Process
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